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Summary
The unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic has a severe impact on societies, economies and labor markets. 
However, not all countries, socio-economic groups and sectors are equally affected. For example, 
occupational groups working in sectors where value chains have been disrupted and lockdowns have 
had direct impacts are affected more heavily, while the slowdown of hiring activities mostly affects 
young labor market entrants. 
As a result, there has been a steep increase in unemployment rates in many countries, but not everywhere 
to the same extent. Part of this difference can be related to the different role and extent of short-time 
work schemes, which is now being used more widely than during the Great Recession. Some countries 
have created or expanded these schemes, making coverage less exclusive and benefits more generous, 
at least temporarily. But short-time work is certainly not a panacea to “flatten the unemployment curve”. 
Furthermore, next to providing liquidity support to firms, unemployment benefits have been made more 
generous in many countries. Often, activation principles have also been temporarily reduced. Some 
countries have increased access to income support to some extent also for non-standard workers, such 
as temporary agency workers or self-employed workers, on an ad hoc basis. A major change in working 
conditions is the broad move towards telework arrangements and work from home. 
Nonetheless, it appears too early to assess the relative success of national strategies to cope with the 
pandemic and to revitalize the labor market as well as the medium-term fiscal viability of different 
support measures. Future monitoring will also have to trace policies to cope with the imminent structural 
changes that might result from the crisis or might be accelerated by the crisis. 
1 The authors of this report wish to thank Patrick Arni, René Böheim, Thomas Leoni, Pierre Cahuc, Tommaso Colussi, Rui Costa, 
Stephen Machin, Priscila Ferreira, João Cerejeira, Miguel Portela, Lena Hensvik, Oskar Nordström Skans, Susan Houseman, 
Egbert Jongen, Paul Verstraten, Martin Kahanec, Monika Martišková and Raul Ramos for their invaluable effort and contributions 
to the IZA Crisis Response Monitoring in these strange and challenging times.
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Introduction 
Economic and social disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic may have lasting 
effects on employment, income and working conditions. At the same time, there are 
significant cross-country differences in the labor market and social policy responses that 
are deployed to help mitigate the imminent crisis effects as has been shown by policy 
inventories released by the OECD and other institutions.
Against this background, several renowned labor economists have agreed to jointly 
monitor these crisis responses as country experts. Based on a qualitative survey among 
these experts, this report establishes an independent assessment of actual crisis-related 
policy responses, also drawing on the invaluable input of individual country reports (see 
Box 1). The interested reader may refer to the country experts’ studies for more detailed 
information on individual countries, while this report summarizes their results and puts 
them into a broader perspective. Furthermore, it identifies some remarkable similarities 
and patterns across countries in the labor market impacts of COVID-19 and initial policy 
responses. But it also highlights important cross-country differences. The remainder of 
this report is organized along the set of eight questions included in the qualitative survey.
 Box 1: List of Countries, Country Experts and Country Reports
 While the following individual country reports have been used as background 
information for this report, updates will become available via the project website 
https://covid-19.iza.org/crisis-monitor/ in the near future. 
 Austria: René Böheim and Thomas Leoni 
https://www.iza.org/wc/files/downloads/iza__crisismonitor_countryreport_at_202006.pdf 
 France: Pierre Cahuc 
https://www.iza.org/wc/files/downloads/iza__crisismonitor_countryreport_fr_202006.pdf 
 Germany: Werner Eichhorst and Ulf Rinne 
https://www.iza.org/wc/files/downloads/iza__crisismonitor_countryreport_de_202006.pdf  
 Italy: Tommaso Colussi 
https://www.iza.org/wc/files/downloads/iza__crisismonitor_countryreport_it_202006.pdf 
 Netherlands: Egbert Jongen and Paul Verstraten 
https://www.iza.org/wc/files/downloads/iza__crisismonitor_countryreport_nl_202006.pdf 
 Portugal: Priscila Ferreira, João Cerejeira and Miguel Portela 
https://www.iza.org/wc/files/downloads/iza__crisismonitor_countryreport_pt_202006.pdf 
 Slovakia: Martin Kahanec and Monika Martišková 
https://www.iza.org/wc/files/downloads/iza__crisismonitor_countryreport_sk_202006.pdf 
 Spain: Raul Ramos 
https://www.iza.org/wc/files/downloads/iza__crisismonitor_countryreport_es_202006.pdf 
 Sweden: Lena Hensvik and Oskar Nordström Skans 
https://www.iza.org/wc/files/downloads/iza__crisismonitor_countryreport_se_202006.pdf 
 Switzerland: Patrick Arni 
https://www.iza.org/wc/files/downloads/iza__crisismonitor_countryreport_ch_202006.pdf 
 United Kingdom: Rui Costa and Stephen Machin 
https://www.iza.org/wc/files/downloads/iza__crisismonitor_countryreport_uk_202006.pdf 
 United States: Susan Houseman 
https://www.iza.org/wc/files/downloads/iza__crisismonitor_countryreport_us_202006.pdf
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Labor market impact of COVID-19 
Early forecasts about the economic impact of COVID-19 were clearly too optimistic. Over 
the past months, there has been a progressive deterioration of forecasts and of the actual 
economic situation. Recent forecasts expect dramatic declines of GDP between 6 and 12 
percent in 2020 (but can be as high as 14 percent; see, e.g., OECD 2020). Quite negative 
scenarios apply to countries with severe and long-lasting lockdowns such as Spain, Italy or 
France. However, the labor market impact is likely to also differ depending on the specific 
institutional arrangements, employment structures and crisis response measures, as well 
as depending on the further development of the pandemic.
Currently, getting a reliable and timely overview of the labor market situation in 
the countries which are monitored in this report is not an easy task. Data is becoming 
available only with a substantial time lag and with limited reliability in some countries. 
This holds for survey data on unemployment, but in particular for the intensity with which 
some labor market instruments (e.g., short-time work) are actually being used. Due to 
these circumstances, data on unemployment rates based on standardized surveys as, for 
example, published by Eurostat or the OECD lack timeliness and reliability. Hence, the 
current situation with respect to unemployment appears to be best approximated by not 
necessarily strictly comparable administrative data. 
Taking the number of registered unemployed from May 2020 relative to May 2019 as 
benchmark, there has been a massive increase by more than 50 percent in countries like 
Austria, the United Kingdom, Sweden or Switzerland. However, this increase has been even 
larger in the United States, while other countries reported rather moderate increases in 
unemployment between May 2019 and May 2020, e.g., France or Italy. This might be due to 
some delays in data reporting on the one hand, but institutional explanations might matter 
more. In fact, some countries have seen a massive decline in working hours in general, and 
in particular a massive increase in notifications for and take-up rates of short-time work. 
Hence, it seems plausible to map countries along the following two dimensions: a) the 
year-over-year increase in unemployment, and b) the current extent to which short-time 
work is used. While Table 1 shows that there is no clear inverse relationship between the 
two dimensions, this illustration can nonetheless provide a broad picture (despite some 
measurement issues with both dimensions). 
For example, the United States is the most prominent case of a steep unemployment 
increase in this country sample. Unemployment in the United States rose to almost 16 
percent in April 2020 (with some difference in survey data and register data) with some 
improvement since then. Job destruction has been relatively quick there, but also some 
early signs of recovery are potentially visible. On the other hand, work sharing plays only 
a very minor, albeit growing role in the United States. A similar case can be made for the 
United Kingdom where employment has markedly declined and unemployment has more 
than doubled compared to one year before. This is accompanied by a fall in working hours 
outside short-time work, but also – and different from the situation in the United States – 
in the context of a job retention scheme that allows for furloughing (stabilizing more than 
a fourth of all jobs in the United Kingdom at the time of writing). 
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Table 1: Unemployment and Short-time Work
Share of employees in short-time work  
(in % of total dependent employment in May 2020)





(May 2020 relative 
to May 2019)
Very strong  
(> 100%)












Source: Authors’ illustration based on country reports (listed in Box 1) and OECD data. 
Notes: Regarding short-time work, some countries only provide notifications that are not necessarily identical with the number of 
individuals actually taking up short-time work at a later stage.
In Austria, while experiencing also a remarkable decline in employment and record levels 
of unemployment, about one-third of the (dependent) labor force is in short-time work 
that was adapted to mitigate the consequences of COVID-19. Parallel to a steep increase in 
unemployment, Switzerland is also using short-time work quite intensively, potentially 
for about 37 percent of its workforce.
Other countries have not (yet) seen a comparable increase in unemployment. Germany 
has used short-time work successfully in the past during the Great Recession, but current 
take-up is estimated to be significantly higher than during the 2008-09 crisis. While 
exact figures of workers actually relying on short-time work only become available with 
a significant delay in Germany, the latest estimates are about 6 to 7 million short-time 
workers (i.e., about 20 percent of all dependent employees in Germany). This probably 
corresponds to more than 1 million workers in full-time equivalents in 2020, buffering 
against a massive increase in unemployment (which nonetheless grew by 26 percent 
between May 2019 and May 2020). 
The Netherlands report a drop in working hours, too, with particularly strong 
declines in catering, in the cultural sector and for the self-employed, while registered 
unemployment increased by less than 10 percent since May 2019. More than 20 percent 
of all Dutch workers are employed in firms with short-time work arrangements at the 
moment. The same is true for Spain, where the new temporary employment adjustment 
scheme ERTE is covering about one in five workers, preventing (or least delaying) massive 
job destruction at the moment. Nonetheless, Spain has recorded about 25 percent more 
unemployed in May 2020 than in May 2019. 
Despite relatively mild restrictions on economic activities and daily life, Sweden 
shows a rather strong increase in unemployment by more than 35 percent. In addition, 
the role of the newly created short-time work scheme is growing, albeit rather moderately 
in comparison (it covers about nine percent of the Swedish workforce). Slovakia, having 
implemented strict control measures, saw a comparable rise in unemployment, but also 
rolled out a short-time work scheme with limited importance so far. National data for 
France also show some resilience in employment (and no strong unemployment reaction, 
based on the data reported), accompanied by a very strong reliance on short-time work 
(used by about half of the employees). About one-quarter of all workers have been laid off 
temporarily in Portugal, while unemployment has increased by more than one-third. 
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Italy seems in a peculiar situation with a reported decline in unemployment, driven 
by discouraged job seekers leaving the labor force, and a very prominent role of short-
time work covering about half of the Italian workers in the private sector or about one-
third of total employment. Yet, the severe lockdown is likely to lead to major short-term 
disruptions in the Italian labor market with an imminent increase in unemployment.   
While the crisis affects virtually all sectors to some extent and in different ways, the 
impact of the crisis is highly unequal across socio-economic groups in the labor force. Even 
in countries with moderate overall unemployment reactions, not all sectors use external 
flexibility (dismissals, termination of fixed-term contracts, reduction of temporary agency 
work) and internal flexibility (short-time work, work sharing) to the same extent. This 
strongly depends on the willingness of employers to hoard certain types of labor, given 
required skill levels and qualifications (and their degree of substitutability), as well as on 
employment protection legislation. 
When studying country experiences more closely, employment losses tend to be 
concentrated in sectors that were directly affected by lockdown measures or disrupted value 
chains or general economic uncertainty. In fact, the sectoral composition of jobs destroyed 
appears quite similar across countries. The hospitality sector, leisure and tourism (hotels, 
restaurants, and travel), cultural activities and events, local retail trade, and logistics were 
most affected by declines in working hours and employment rates. In some countries, 
declining employment in manufacturing was noted (Portugal, Switzerland). At the same 
time, temporary peaks in demand could be observed in health, supermarkets or online 
retail trade and delivery services.
Furthermore, particular difficulties are clearly visible for low-skilled workers (and 
migrants), given the sectoral composition of their jobs and limited ability to work from 
home. The latter has critically contributed to the continuation of work in many white collar 
jobs. At the same time, many young labor market entrants, but also jobseekers in general, 
suffer from a massive decline in vacancies (for entry level jobs and jobs in general) and new 
hirings. In general, the crisis has so far rather reduced hiring rates than increased dismissal 
rates (in the continental European context). Particular difficulties can be expected for 
recent school leavers and graduates as well as apprentices in their final stages as job 
transitions will be hampered this summer. 
There is a general inequality of the labor market impact of COVID-19 to the detriment 
of those with temporary or variable contracts. For example, fixed-term employment 
is declining more strongly than permanent contracts in countries where this divide is 
particularly relevant such as Spain, Portugal or France. Temporary agency workers face a 
larger risk of being made redundant (e.g. in the Netherlands or Slovakia). The same holds 
true for marginal part-time workers, on-call workers and independent contractors in 
sectors that are heavily affected, despite some efforts to include them better into social 
protection and short-time work schemes (e.g., in Switzerland). The actual effect of the 
crisis on specific categories of workers, however, also depends on the institutional setting 
in the respective country and on the sectoral or occupational composition of non-standard 
work. In many cases, those affected by labor market disruptions have no or only very 
limited access to social insurance, and thus heavily depend on means-tested income 
support and ad hoc relief measures. 
Most experts agree that the peak in unemployment rates is yet to come, due to 
dismissals after an initial phase of short-time work, fewer hirings, very limited active labor 
market policies and increasing unemployment durations (in the continental European 
context). Hence, it appears too early to assess the success or failure of different national 
strategies.
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Orientation and targeting of adopted measures
The measures adopted to mitigate the consequences of COVID-19, as compiled in the OECD 
inventory and confirmed by the country papers, show large similarities and form a broad 
immediate crisis response package. They typically include four types of schemes:
1. A direct labor cost relief and liquidity support to firms in order to allow them to continue 
their activities in a critical situation so as to maintain staff. This typically includes loans 
and guarantees, but also tax and contribution deferrals.
2. Special ad hoc programs have been adopted to support freelancers, i.e., self-employed 
that are typically not included in unemployment insurance. Some countries were 
quick to adopt these measures, others exhibit some delay. Also, these measures do not 
necessarily provide income support, but cover running business expenses; and they 
could be limited in terms of amount and duration as well as focusing only on certain 
types of businesses or freelance activities.  
3. Probably the most important program to deal with the crisis in this early stage is the 
expansion of short-time work schemes or equivalent schemes. Alternative schemes are 
called work sharing (at the state level in the United States), temporary layoffs (Portugal) 
or temporary adjustment (Spain). New schemes have been introduced in Portugal, 
Sweden and Slovakia, whereas other countries such as the Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Austria, France or Germany have enlarged existing schemes and made them more 
attractive to employers and/or workers. Some of these countries have also explicitly 
widened the scope of short-time work to include fixed-term workers, temporary 
agency workers or (quasi) self-employed. During short-time work, dismissals for 
business reasons are difficult if not legally prohibited in order to ensure the stability 
of permanent contracts at least for some time. It is obvious that compared to the Great 
Recession, in the current crisis more countries are using this instrument. While short-
time work is still biased in favor of permanent workers and certain industries, the 
formal and actual range of workers and sectors covered is wider than in the 2008-09 
crisis. 
4. Lastly, some countries have raised unemployment benefit levels (in some constellations) 
and prolonged benefit duration in unemployment insurance, in particular to account 
for the lockdown period when active labor market policies have been disrupted (and 
activation requirements waived). Coverage has sometimes been extended to include 
some categories of non-standard workers. Unemployment assistance generosity has 
been temporarily increased in Austria, and a new income support scheme has been 
introduced in Spain.
Individual countries have attached different weights to these four broad categories of 
schemes.
According to current assessments, the measures adopted in the early phase of the 
crisis are seen as broadly effective in stabilizing liquidity of firms and income of those with 
no job or shorter working time. However, their fiscal implications might be severe in the 
medium and long term if economic activity does not pick up again.
Yet, we can see some areas that have not been addressed (systematically): 
 Generally speaking, there is no targeted policy for labor market entrants (e.g. university 
graduates, school leavers, VET graduates) and no clear initiative to restart ALMPs. 
 Many countries have experienced tensions with respect to child care facility closures 
and school closures as well as their consequences on parents’ employment.
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 Some groups have lost their jobs without registering as unemployed, in particular if no 
unemployment insurance benefits are accessible to them. For example, this is the case 
for marginal part-time workers in Germany. These discouraged workers withdraw from 
the labor market and move towards inactivity (as can be already observed in Italy). 
Immediate liquidity support to businesses
The initial lockdown period meant a profound shock for businesses in Europe. A particular 
challenge has been the rapid and simultaneous disruption of operations in the domestic 
sectors and the export industry. As a consequence, there has been widespread concern 
about massive increases in bankruptcies even among financially healthy firms.
All countries in our sample therefore had to take measures to support the liquidity 
of companies. This usually took the form of guarantees, loans, or deferred tax and social 
security payments. This was often complemented with more idiosyncratic initiatives to 
support specific segments or industries. For instance, several countries decided to support 
airlines with rather large sums. The relative size of these different programs is currently 
difficult to assess. It can be expected, particularly if the recession will last, that the pre-
crisis fiscal situation of individual countries will influence the size of liquidity measures. 
The situation of small businesses has been a particular concern for policy-makers in 
most countries analyzed here. One potential problem is that such businesses do not have 
sufficient financial buffers to survive a period with no or significantly reduced revenues. 
Several countries have therefore set up funds from which lump-sum payments to small 
businesses are financed. This happened, for example, in Austria, France, and Germany. 
Germany provides higher payments than most other countries, ranging from 9,000 
Euro to 15,000 Euro, depending on the number of workers. However, the sum is strictly 
reserved for business expenses and must not be used as income replacement. Sometimes 
tax reductions (e.g., in Sweden) or specific loans (e.g., in United States, Italy, and Sweden) 
were reserved for small companies.  
A second concern is the social security of the self-employed with no or few workers, 
who usually are poorly integrated in unemployment insurance. Already over the past 
decade, a debate has emerged about whether European employment models depend 
excessively on low-paid and precarious forms of self-employment. In any case, the 
problem pressure of unprotected jobless individuals who were previously self-employed 
forced many countries to adjust their social security systems. Generally, the trend is to 
provide benefits roughly at the level of social assistance, but with more lenient access and 
behavioral requirements. The variety of measures can be illustrated with some examples.
The Netherlands created a temporary benefit scheme for three months on the municipal 
level that provides benefits (at the level of social assistance) for the self-employed without 
strict means-testing (called Tozo). Until May 2020, Tozo was claimed by almost a fourth 
of all self-employed workers in the Netherlands. The scheme was recently extended 
until October 2020, but it now includes a partner income test. Italy temporarily pays an 
allowance of 600 Euro per months to the self-employed and other non-insured types of 
workers. In the United Kingdom, a new scheme provides taxable grants corresponding to 
80 percent of the self-employed’s average monthly trading profits up to a total of 7,500 
GBP. By mid-June 2020, already 2.6 million persons had applied for such grants. 
A particularly generous treatment of the self-employed can be observed in the United 
States. Here, self-employed workers were made temporarily eligible for unemployment 
insurance (that was extended considerably, see Section 4 below) through a federally 
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funded program. This means that many freelancers and independent contractors should 
receive much more generous insurance benefits than comparable workers in Europe, who 
often have to rely on social assistance or equivalent payments. 
In most countries, the measures taken to protect the self-employed were ad hoc 
and adopted temporarily. Against this background, it is remarkable that Spain used the 
crisis as an opportunity to permanently modernize its social assistance, which previously 
differed across municipalities. Since June, there is a unified system (Ingreso Minimo Vital) 
that pays up to 1,000 Euro to families and 460 Euro to singles who fall in the definition of 
severe poverty (below 40 percent of median income). This will make the social security 
net much more consistent. The Spanish government expects around 850,000 households 
and more than 2 million people to benefit from this scheme. The costs are estimated to be 
approximately 3 billion Euro.
In sum, there is a variety of measures to support the liquidity of companies and the 
income of the self-employed. Many of the schemes were rather improvised and to date, it is 
not clear whether the implementation has been appropriate to provide rapid assistance. In 
Italy, for instance, the Central Guarantee Fund provides loans up to 2,500 Euro to SMEs that 
are fully guaranteed by the Italian state. According to preliminary research, only a minority 
of eligible firms have applied, presumably because of excessively bureaucratic applications 
procedures. In Switzerland, it has been noted that there is a gap between guaranteed loans 
that have been approved and that have actually been taken up by firms. A reason could be 
that SMEs that are not forced to do so try to avoid indebtedness. This links to the question 
of what happens if the crisis lasts longer and SMEs will face difficulties to repay their state-
provided or guaranteed loans. Another implementation issue has arisen in Germany with 
lump-sum payments to the self-employed and small businesses. During the improvised 
roll-out, miscommunication initially led to a widespread impression that the money can 
be used for personal expenses, whereas it really is reserved for business-related expenses. 
The self-employed can only rely on social assistance for income replacement. It is 
currently uncertain if and to what extent the state will reclaim misappropriated payments. 
Also in the United Kingdom, surveys show that at least in the initial period of the above-
mentioned Coronavirus Self-Employed Income Support Scheme, there was widespread 
confusion about the eligibility criteria.
Problems such as these illustrate that the countries in our sample have much less 
experience with taking measures to protect self-employed compared to dependent 
workers. The next months should be a period of intense evaluation and policy learning in 
this field.
Support of dependent workers
The initial crisis response of the covered countries has shown some remarkable similarities. 
Most countries have tried to use a version of short-time work schemes to keep workers in 
their jobs and unemployment low. This makes a lot of sense, because the COVID-19 crisis 
looked (at least initially) more certain than ordinary shocks to take a V-shaped pattern. In 
such a situation, short-time work schemes have their strongest justification.
Several countries already had such scheme in place at the beginning of the crisis. In 
almost all cases, additional measures were taken to expand these existing schemes. The 
goal usually was to make them more inclusive and to lower residual costs for employers. 
Austria introduced, for instance, a temporary “Coronavirus short-time work scheme” that 
is more generous than the usual version. In France, Spain, and Italy, additional sectors 
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were included in the scheme and/or requirements for eligibility were relaxed. Germany, 
which made positive experiences with short-time work in the Great Recession, eased 
eligibility requirements for firms, raised replacement rates, and opened up the possibility 
for temporary agency workers to benefit from the scheme. The idea to include vulnerable 
types of workers was pursued even more decidedly in Switzerland, where workers on 
fixed-term contracts, apprentices, temporary workers, on-call workers and even family 
members helping in small firms have become entitled, at least temporarily. In the United 
Kingdom, the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme allows companies to send employees 
on leave, while 80 percent of the salary is compensated by the state. Compared to short-
time work schemes in most other countries, this program now also allows workers to take 
up part-time jobs in other companies (furloughing). This is an interesting institutional 
feature that could be considered in other countries. The Netherlands, Slovak Republic and 
Sweden have set up schemes in the crisis that closely resemble the typical parameters in 
other countries. 
In most countries, applications for short-time work have soared in the crisis. It 
certainly is at the core of the European crisis response. Besides the replacement rate, 
important institutional differences relate to the extent to which employers can reduce 
labor costs. This includes the remaining wage share that has to be covered and the question 
of whether social security contributions are waived. Some countries, such as France and 
Germany, allow short-time work without any costs to employers, but that is not the 
standard in Europe. At the other end of the spectrum is Portugal. In its temporary layoff 
scheme, employers still have to cover 30 percent of the wage, which makes the scheme 
considerably less generous.  
In the United States, short-time work schemes are administered at the state level. 
At the beginning of the crisis, only 26 states had such programs in place. The federal 
government decided to provide financial assistance to these programs and to support the 
remaining states to develop similar ones. The main reaction in the United States, however, 
was to considerably extend the coverage of unemployment insurance, which has been 
comparatively ungenerous. This happened most notably by paying an additional 600 
US-Dollar per week out of Federal funds and by extending maximum benefit duration by 13 
weeks. By some estimates, this generous treatment of low and medium incomes (in place 
at least until July 2020) has shifted the median replacement rate to more than 130 percent, 
so that many eligible workers could earn more than on their jobs. 
Although unemployment was less in the focus of European policy makers, many 
countries have extended eligibility or eased access (see also Section 3). The question 
was particularly relevant in Sweden, where the income ceiling for calculating benefits is 
rather low and which has a Ghent system with limited coverage through unemployment 
insurance funds. The government reacted, inter alia, with shortening the membership 
duration in funds that is necessary for eligibility to insurance benefits and with raising the 
benefit ceiling. Spain went into a similar direction by temporarily suspending minimum 
contribution periods for unemployment insurance.
Complementing the focus on keeping workers in their jobs during the crisis, some 
countries have temporarily changed dismissal regulation. Layoffs were banned or restricted 
in Italy, Portugal, Slovak Republic and Spain (a tighter control of collective dismissals was 
announced in France but has not yet been implemented). 
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Working conditions and work organization
COVID-19 led to a lockdown of economic activities in most countries, albeit with a different 
timing and intensity. Simultaneously, a massive expansion in working from home was 
observed – not only because of legal restrictions, contact bans and new guidelines by health 
and safety at work authorities, but also because of individual health concerns (especially 
for persons belonging to at-risk groups) and additional care responsibilities (due to school 
and child care facility closures). Against this background, COVID-19 pushed firms, schools, 
universities and public administration to consider the adoption of new technologies that 
allow employees to work from home.
To give just one representative example illustrating the expansion of telework, the 
share of employees who work from home at least two hours a day has doubled in the 
Netherlands compared to the pre-crisis situation (von Gaudecker et al. 2020). Similar 
increases can be observed in other countries, but there is also substantial heterogeneity 
across sectors. For example, in France telework is particularly frequent in the information 
and communication sector (63 percent of employees), and in financial and insurance 
activities (55 percent). These are sectors in which telework was already relatively common 
before the current crisis. In other sectors, including hotels and restaurants (6 percent of 
employees), construction (12 percent), the food industry (12 percent) and transport (13 
percent), work from home still relatively rarely occurs. Pre-crisis patterns in work from 
home across sectors were therefore amplified.
It should be noted that the Swedish case is somewhat exceptional, also in this context. 
While recommendations by public health authorities to work from home, if possible, had 
a substantial impact on the time spent at work, the shift to telework was more gradual 
and less pronounced in Sweden than in its neighboring countries. This can be explained by 
the fact that some workplaces that were closed by law in other countries remained open 
in Sweden, most notably schools and child care facilities, allowing parents to continue 
working as before. 
While the adoption of work from home has generally helped to mitigate the drop 
in working hours, in some countries – especially in those that were heavily affected at a 
rather early stage – a larger share of workers had to actually stop working. For example, six 
weeks after the beginning of the lockdown in Italy, the share of workers who (temporarily 
or permanently) stopped working was estimated at about 34 percent (Galasso, 2020). This 
share was particularly large among blue collar workers and, more generally, for jobs that 
could not be done remotely. 
The effects of border closures or intensified border controls appear especially relevant 
for smaller, open economies and for regions in closer proximity to a border with strong 
cross-border links. For example, the number of cross-border workers in Slovakia amounts 
to about 5 percent of the country’s labor force. Many of these workers are employed in 
health care; and a larger share adapted by staying in their host countries. In addition, 
special arrangements came into effect which included back-and-forth commuting options 
for those living in closer proximity to the border. Such temporary and discretional 
measures aimed at containing COVID-19 as much as possible without limiting economic 
activities by a too large extent.
Economic activities in “essential” sectors were generally not restricted. On the 
contrary, in some cases the workload in these sectors increased quite substantially. These 
sectors were mainly the health care sector and wholesale and retail trade (groceries). But 
workload also increased to some extent in public administration or banks (e.g., to handle 
applications for unemployment benefits, short-time work, credits or loans). For example, 
almost 8 percent of workers in the United Kingdom responded in a representative survey 
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that they have been working longer hours with no or reduced breaks in early June (ONS, 
2020). 
New hygiene rules, standards and guidelines by health and safety at work authorities 
to reduce the imminent risk of COVID-19 infections (also in effect after the initial period 
of lockdown) have been introduced in many countries, often sector-specific and not just 
limited to essential sectors. It can be expected that these measures will be gradually adapted 
in the future, also depending on the spread of COVID-19. While it is clear that these health 
measures could reduce productivity now and also in the future, the precise extent to which 
this may be the case is not yet clear. According to anecdotal evidence from Austria, special 
working arrangements are still in place in many firms because the workplace organization 
makes it difficult to apply the hygiene rules prescribed by the government. This is the case, 
for instance, in many larger firms, where workplaces are organized in open-plan offices. 
Many firms have therefore shifted towards weekly, or sometimes daily, worker rotation 
schemes (i.e., workers rotate between working from home or in the office or groups of 
workers attend the workplace while other groups work from home).
In response to the crisis, quite a few countries have introduced new temporary 
regulations of working time and holidays (e.g., Germany, Switzerland, or France). These 
new regulations are often in effect until December 31, 2020 and usually imply relaxed rules, 
most notably with respect to working hours and resting hours, but are sometimes sector-
specific. For example, the Swiss government temporarily relaxed the rules governing 
working conditions for medical institutions and gave specific exceptions to extend weekly 
working hours beyond the usual legal maximum to the meat industry and banking sector 
(in the latter case to handle the bridging loans applications). In Sweden, to accommodate 
the increased demand in the health care sector, medical unions and employers have agreed 
on a crisis agreement, which requires staff to potentially work more hours and adapt to 
location changes in case of an emergency situation. In return, the employees receive a 
bonus payment, but this agreement has so far only been activated in one area of Stockholm 
that was most heavily affected by COVID-19. In Slovakia, some aspects of working time 
regulation generally do not apply to workers for which working from home (or telework) is 
their main form of work. 
These ongoing changes in working conditions and in the work organization within 
firms may contribute to an intensifying polarization in the labor market. Some observers 
point to a new labor market divide between those workers that are able to work from 
home (with differences between workers with or without care obligations), those working 
in the service sector or in essential sectors (e.g., frontline workers with a higher risk of 
infection and an increased workload) and those workers with a high risk of losing their 
jobs (e.g., hotels and restaurants, tourism, cultural sector). For example, in Austria the 
share of working from home varies greatly across skill-levels and occupations. While 
only 14 percent of workers with compulsory education and 26 percent of those with a dual 
vocational education degree worked remotely, half of the workers with upper secondary 
education and almost two thirds of those with tertiary education did so (Pichler et al. 2020). 
Similar findings in a disaggregation by income level also highlight the social gradient of 
COVID-19’s labor market impact.  
At the broader level of society, traditional gender roles regarding care responsibilities 
may be reactivated in the wake of the current crisis. For example, primarily due to school 
and child care facilities closures, COVID-19 is estimated to have directly affected care 
arrangements for about 10 percent of the working age population in the United Kingdom. 
Gender differences are large: only 7 percent of men have been directly affected, but almost 
13 percent of women (ONS 2020). However, while women still appear to have been doing 
the greater share of child care, the gender child care gap for the additional, post-COVID-19 
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hours is smaller than that for the allocation of pre-COVID-19 child care (albeit with a 
substantial degree of heterogeneity across families; Sevilla and Smith 2020). Again, this 
situation is different in Sweden as school and child care facilities have remained open. This 
clearly helped parents to continue working as before, especially in the context of a Nordic 
country with a very clearly developed dual-earner model and a near universal residential 
separation between children and their grandparents. 
The longer-term implications of changes in working conditions and in the work 
organization within firms are not yet clear. The sudden rise in work from home may, 
however, trigger a debate about new regulations for this type of work arrangements (e.g., 
in Germany). While it is too early to judge whether this discussion will ultimately result in 
a new legal framework in some countries, the outcome of the debate will very likely depend 
on how lasting the shift towards working from home actually turns out to be. Regarding the 
possible return to more traditional gender roles, there appears to be no consistent evidence 
so far.
New labor market entrants
Although there is a very broad consensus that new labor market entrants will be facing 
particular difficulties this year and potentially severe and long-lasting scarring effects, 
only few actual policy responses targeted at this particular group can be observed.
Within the group of new entrants to the labor market, three subgroups can be 
distinguished:  
 Graduates (from schools and universities), apprentices: Many of those individuals who 
were supposed to finish their studies soon are currently confronted with short-term 
practical problems how to continue their studies and to actually obtain their degree. 
Moreover, they will enter the labor market in a period of a severe recession, which can 
have very substantial long-term effects (Kahn 2010; Oreopoulos et al. 2012).
 Unemployed, out of the labor force: These individuals are confronted with reduced 
hiring activities by firms and a massive drop in posted vacancies. This sharp drop 
in labor demand may also lead to increasing inactivity rates and more discouraged 
workers. 
 Crisis layoffs: Individuals who lose their job in the current recession may face 
particular challenges to quickly return to employment. Although at this stage, in 
some (predominantly European) countries with a larger welfare state, the increase in 
unemployment is mainly driven by a massive drop in vacancies and hirings, a longer 
recession will ultimately lead to layoffs also in these countries. When this happens, 
the affected individuals are not only confronted with the slump in labor demand, but 
also with continued and potentially accelerated structural change. Job profiles and skill 
requirements may change accordingly, and dismissed workers may therefore not be 
able to easily return to their former job.
More generally, younger workers and immigrant workers may be particularly hit by 
the current crisis. The important difference to previous recessions is that in the current 
situation, also many sectors that offer entry-level jobs are affected (e.g., hotels and 
restaurants, retail). In some countries (e.g., United Kingdom), it is even the case that 
precisely those sectors which used to absorb part of the downturn employment in previous 
recessions are currently the most affected. This considerably worsens the outlook for new 
labor market entrants – and also for groups such as refugee immigrants, for which labor 
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market conditions upon entry may have lasting negative effects (Aslund and Rooth 2007). 
This could pose a particular challenge for countries that still deal with the labor market 
integration of the most recent refugee influx (e.g., Germany).
While it is also possible that some firms may even increase their hiring activities and 
may act countercyclically in this respect, this is clearly not a dominant strategy in the 
current situation with large uncertainty. It may also be more relevant in countries facing 
demographic change and imminent skill shortages (such as Germany). In these countries, 
firms in a relatively strong position (e.g., in terms of liquidity or business expectations) 
could even increase their hiring activities, especially focusing on younger workers with 
sought-after skills. To avoid time-consuming, competitive and costly staffing in the 
future, it could be a rational approach to hire such workers even when product demand is 
weak.
The situation for younger workers may be particularly challenging in countries that 
heavily rely on the dual apprenticeship system (e.g., Germany, Austria, Switzerland) 
as this form of the vocational training system also depends on firms’ demand for 
apprentices. This could imply that younger workers in these countries do not only face 
deteriorating employment prospects after their graduation, but also that a larger part of 
the usual vocational training system leading to degrees and certificates may come to a 
halt. For example, preliminary figures for Austria indicate that the number of vacancies 
for apprentices in May 2020 declined by about 30 percent in comparison to the previous 
year. In Austria, about 71 percent more persons were looking for an apprenticeship position 
in May 2020 than in May 2019. More positive signals can be observed from Switzerland, 
where for the upcoming cohort two thirds of all offered apprenticeship positions have 
been already filled. However, as the majority of apprenticeships usually start only in late 
summer, it seems too early to judge how this situation will evolve until then. In any case, 
demand and supply on the vocational training market should be closely monitored – 
especially in countries with a strong dual apprenticeship system. 
Other countries, mainly in Southern Europe, may also face huge challenges with 
respect to new labor market entrants. Although these countries do not rely on dual 
apprenticeships systems, they have to deal with notoriously high youth unemployment 
rates – even in the pre-crisis situation. For example, in Spain the situation for new labor 
market entrants could be very difficult this year, especially during summer when they are 
usually offered internship positions that are often converted into temporary employment 
contracts. A similar situation may actually occur in Sweden, where summer job contacts 
play a major role for the school-to-work transitions of high school graduates. Hensvik et 
al. (2017) show that as many as one-third of the vocational high school students in Sweden 
find their first stable job in firms in which they had previously held a summer job during 
high school. This share is moreover notably higher during recessions.
Concerning school-to-work transitions, it appears as a rational approach in the 
current situation to stay longer in education than otherwise. However, this implies an 
increased competition after the crisis. It may also imply the need for additional funding on 
an emergency basis aimed at both students and educators. 
Next to that, various policy responses how to best support labor market entrants 
are currently discussed – albeit with remarkable heterogeneity in the intensity of these 
discussions across countries. While there is an intensive policy discussion and also rather 
concrete initiatives in some countries, the situation of new labor market entrants has not 
yet received much attention in other countries. The latter seems to be the case in Southern 
European countries such as Italy, Portugal, and Spain, but also in Sweden, Switzerland, 
or the United States. In countries with rather concrete initiatives, these measures appear 
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to strongly depend on institutional context. For example, a joint federal support initiative 
to make apprenticeship capacities more resilient in times of crisis will come into effect in 
Germany. The program includes bonus payments to SMEs that provide apprenticeships, 
bonus payments to firms taking over a current apprentice from a firm that has gone 
bankrupt during the crisis, support to avoid short-time work among apprentices, and 
incentives for training in facilities outside individual firms. Hiring subsidies targeted at 
younger workers and subsidies for apprentices have been announced for the next coming 
months in France (but details are not yet clear). An internship scheme to support school-
to-work transitions of graduates has been proposed in Slovakia.
Policy innovations and labor market trends
In many countries, one can currently observe governmental interventions at an 
unprecedented speed and breadth. The short-run objectives of various policy responses are 
predominantly income and employment stabilization. In some countries, these responses 
rely to a larger extent on automatic stabilizers, while the amount of discretionary measures 
is generally large and often unprecedented. Nonetheless, the degree of policy innovation 
appears rather incremental than revolutionary – possibly with the exception of short-time 
work schemes. This instrument has been expanded or newly introduced in a number of 
countries. 
In the current stage of the crisis, a policy debate about the need for additional 
measures to stimulate the economy and mitigate unemployment – mainly fiscal stimulus 
packages – appears to gain momentum. The situation in the United States can serve as a 
prime example illustrating the different views in this debate. On the one hand, it is argued 
in favor of extending measures and adopting a major economic stimulus package that 
would include significant infrastructure spending. On the other hand, it is argued to wait 
for the effects of existing measures and to see how the economy responds when initial 
restrictions on business openings are gradually lifted. The outcome, however, may be 
similar as in Germany, where the government has agreed upon another stimulus package 
in June 2020. Including this latest stimulus package, Germany’s measures – together with 
liquidity aid and loan guarantees – equal more than 30 percent of the country’s annual GDP 
(BMF 2020a; BMF 2020b).  
It is a very common perception that the current crisis may accelerate structural change 
and digitalization. Firms may increasingly view digital tools as a hedge and reinsurance 
against external shocks. In this respect, the crisis is also an endurance test of firms’ (and 
countries’) past digital achievements, and their past omissions become very visible. Of a 
more fundamental nature is the fact that also the general attitudes towards robots may 
change. While the widespread perception of many workers had been that robots are a threat 
for their jobs, the current crisis shows rather clearly that they can actually help preserving 
labor by allowing firms to continue or even expand their production also in turbulent times. 
Nonetheless, an increased speed of structural change could be too quick for some workers, 
and an accelerated pace of job destruction may make it very difficult for dismissed workers 
to find new employment.
In addition, the current crisis may also accelerate the pre-crisis trend of shifting a 
share of the usual work schedule to working from home. Hence, remote work may become 
more frequently at least a realistic option for a substantial share of the workforce.  Also the 
attitudes towards working from home could change permanently – but it appears open in 
which direction: On the one hand, many workers and firms have now experienced first-
hand that working from home is actually feasible in their business environment. On the 
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other hand, quite a few workers and firms have also now experienced how difficult it is to 
cope with the various challenges posed by working from home. Hence, it is not yet clear 
if the currently observed shift towards working from home will continue after the crisis. 
Among other things, this will also depend on its impact on workers’ productivity. While the 
currently available evidence on this issue is still scarce, it appears that productivity effects 
are rather heterogeneous across workers and sectors.
Other pre-crisis trends – often sector-specific – may be amplified by the crisis. For 
example, it appears likely that the crisis will accelerate the long-term decline of local retail, 
often delivered through smaller shops, while all forms of online retail will experience an 
extra boost. A similar experience was made in Asia after the 2002-04 SARS outbreak. In 
addition, the ongoing transformation of manufacturing, in particular of car manufacturers 
and their suppliers, may proceed even more rapidly than expected before the crisis. More 
generally, labor demand shifts may be further amplified by adjustments on the supply side. 
For example, the scope and direction of job search may change (e.g., directed towards more 
resilient jobs; Hensvik et al. 2020).  
The crisis may therefore act as a catalyst for a number of pre-crisis trends. But 
some pre-crisis trends may in fact be reversed. One candidate in this context is the 
re-organization and reallocation of global value chain downstream production. It is argued 
that in some countries, a reshoring of certain activities is likely to occur. In this scenario, 
the current economic shock will push firms to decrease especially their dependency on 
single geographic-centric suppliers. However, in an alternative scenario, significantly 
shorter or less complex global value chains in industrial production are unlikely to occur. 
One argument supporting this view is that firms in the post-crisis situation may even 
rely to a larger extent on cost-saving initiatives, which typically include outsourcing and 
offshoring. A re-organization and reallocation of global value chain downstream production 
is then unlikely to occur – especially in countries where the level of automation is already 
very high (e.g., Germany; Krzywdzinski 2020). This view is also shared by countries with 
a lower level of automation (e.g., Slovakia) that are rather concerned about a potentially 
widening gap between countries relying on cheap and labor-intensive production, and 
countries relying on innovative and capital-intensive production. 
From the current perspective, it appears rather unclear how the crisis may ultimately 
affect the design of alternative work arrangements (including self-employment and 
freelance work). Similarly, it appears too early to draw general lessons from the current 
crisis for the future design of the welfare state. But it could be the case that in some 
countries (e.g., United Kingdom) the already existing willingness-to-pay for more job 
security and social safety among self-employed workers (Blundell and Machin, 2020; 
Boeri et al. 2020) may be intensified when a significant proportion of workers in alternative 
work arrangements are currently suffering significant economic hardship. Moreover, in 
the current situation of economic turmoil, some pre-crisis reforms in this area could be 
postponed, adjusted, or even not implemented all (e.g., the heavily debated reforms of the 
French pension and unemployment insurance system).
In the long run, the overall functioning of the labor market may be affected by the 
trade-off between health concerns and economic growth, which has taken on a much 
greater significance. However, there are also more optimistic views given the nature of this 
crisis as a prototypical external shock. In addition, the increasing use of online tools could 
have a greater impact on the search and matching process in the labor market as broader 
population groups have gained deeper online experiences, sometimes involuntarily. Online 
processes and platform solutions may become more widespread. Finally, the sudden 
changes as a result of the outbreak of the pandemic may hold the ground for a multitude of 
innovations that are not yet foreseeable in detail.
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Next steps and fiscal viability
This report has shown that all covered countries are eager to show a bold reaction to the 
Corona crisis. One of the big questions is how sustainable the responses will be if the 
crisis will last longer than initially expected. Increasingly, forecasts assume a U-shaped 
recession rather than the initially expected (and hoped for) V-shaped recession. Moreover, 
it is very unclear whether a second wave of infections will require additional periods of 
lockdowns and restrictions. The question of financial capacity is a particularly pressing one 
against the background of the Euro crisis, which was triggered by a financial markets’ loss 
of trust in the sustainability of public debt.
Indeed, we can expect a division between those countries whose debt is considered as 
sustainable (e.g., Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden) on the one hand, and 
those countries who are more vulnerable to punishment by financial markets in the form 
of rising bond spreads (e.g., Italy, Portugal, and Spain). Even in the former group, domestic 
politics could make it more difficult to have an equally ambitious response in potential 
second wave. This might make governments more reluctant to place health concerns above 
economic interests.
The Brussels European and Global Economic Laboratory keeps track of the discretionary 
fiscal responses of several EU countries covered in this report, as well as of the United 
Kingdom and the United States (Anderson et al. 2020). Fiscal responses are broken down 
into several categories: the immediate fiscal impulse (discretionary public spending and tax 
breaks), deferrals of taxes and social contributions, and liquidity assistance or guarantees 
(see also Section 3). While fiscal impulses, deferrals, and liquidity assistance affect public 
debt immediately, guaranteed loans create potential costs in the future.
The distribution of the fiscal responses across these categories (measured in percent 
of GDP) is depicted in Figure 1 for those countries in our report with available data. The first 
observation is that (based on these estimates) pre-crisis fiscal position does not determine 
the size of the reaction. Overall, Italy, Portugal and Spain each have more ambitious 
packages than the Netherlands. Second, what is remarkable is that these three countries 
mobilize relatively few resources for an immediate fiscal impulse. Portugal and Italy have 
relatively large deferrals that (hopefully) will lead to a rebound in tax revenue in 2021. A 
potentially worrying observation is that Italy in particular heavily relies on measures that 
might produce large and uncertain costs in the future. Third, Germany and to a smaller 
extent also the United States stand out with the size of its immediate fiscal impulse. This 
obviously benefits from the fact that both countries do not have to worry too much about 
punishment through financial markets. If this strong reaction helps to kick-start the 
economy after the lockdown and to prevent bankruptcies, it could make it less likely that 
guaranteed loan default and turn to delayed costs of the crisis.
Research Report No. 98  Short-Run Labor Market Impacts of COVID-19, Initial Policy Measures and Beyond
20|153
Figure 1: Size of fiscal stimulus for selected countries
IZA Crisis Response Monitoring: 





– 16 –  
 
The distribution of the fiscal responses across these categories (measured in percent of GDP) is 
depicted in Figure 1 for those countries in our report with available data. The first observation is 
that (based on these estimates) pre-crisis fiscal position does not determine the size of the 
reaction. Overall, Italy, Portugal and Spain each have more ambitious packages than the 
Netherlands. Second, what is remarkable is that these three countries mobilize relatively few 
resources for an immediate fiscal impulse. Portugal and Italy have relatively large deferrals that 
(hopefully) will lead to a rebound in tax revenue in 2021. A potentially worrying observation is 
that Italy in particular heavily relies on measures that might produce large and uncertain costs in 
the future. Third, Germany and to a smaller extent also the United States stand out with the size 
of its immediate fiscal impulse. This obviously benefits from the fact that both countries do not 
have to worry too much about punishment through financial markets. If this strong reaction helps 
to kick-start the economy after the l ckdown and to prevent bankruptcies, it could make it less 
likely that guaranteed loan default and turn to delayed costs of the crisis. 
 
Figure 1: Size of fiscal stimulus for selected countries 
 
Source: Anderson et al. (2020). 
Note: Timing of last update varies. See original publication for details. 
 
In addition to national labor market and fiscal support measures, the European Commission has 
proposed a complex rescue package at the European level. In particular, the Commission 
announced a new recovery instrument (“Next Generation EU”) to be embedded in a “reinforced” 
long-term EU budget, referring to the multiannual financial framework for the period from 2021 
to 2027. These ambitious measures are seen as complementary to national efforts to stabilize and 
revitalize the economy in EU Member States. A further impetus is to counter the divergence 
process that accelerated after the 2008-09 recession and to foster the transformation to a 
sustainable economy.  While Next Generation EU is designed to provide 750 billion Euro, the 


















Source: Anderson et al. (2020).
Note: Timing of last update varies. See original publication for details.
In addition to national labor market and fiscal support measures, the European Commission 
has proposed a co plex rescue package at the European level. In particular, the Commission 
annou ced a ne recovery instrument (“N x  Generation EU”) to be mbed ed in a 
“reinforced” long-term EU budget, referring to the multiannual financial framework for 
the period from 2021 to 2027. These ambitious measures are seen as complementary to 
national efforts to stabilize and revitalize the economy in EU Member States. A further 
impetus is to cou ter the divergence process that accelerated after the 2008-09 recession 
and to foster the transformation to a sustainable economy.  While Next Generation EU is 
designed to provide 750 billion Euro, the budgetary measures correspond to about 1,100 
billion Euro, adding up to about 1,800 billion Euro. Next Generation EU will be temporarily 
lifting the own-resources ceiling of the EU to 2 percent of the EU’s Gross National Income, 
allowing the Commission to use its positive credit rating to borrow 750 billion Euro on the 
financial markets. This joint lending via the Commission constitutes an important change 
on the EU policy stance. The additional funding will be administered through EU programs 
and repaid over a long period of time through future EU budgets, starting only in 2028. To 
help do this in a “fair and shared” way, the Commission has suggested a number of new 
own resources such as an emission trading system, a carbon border adjustment mechanism 
or a tax on digital transactions. In addition, in order to make funds available as soon as 
possible to respond to the most pressing needs, the Commission proposes to amend the 
current multiannual financial framework 2014-2020 to make additional 11.5 billion Euro 
available already in 2020.
The money raised for Next Generation EU are planned to be invested across three 
pillars. The first is to support Member States with investments and reforms through a 
new Recovery and Resilience Facility of 560 billion Euro. It will offer financial support for 
investments and reforms, including activities in relation to the green and digital transition 
and the resilience of national economies. These resources will therefore be linked to the 
EU priorities by embedding them in the European Semester. The measure will be equipped 
with a grant facility of up to 310 billion Euro and will be able to make up to 250 billion Euro 
available in loans. Support will be available to all Member States but concentrated on the 
most heavily affected ones. In addition, a 55 billion Euro top-up of the current cohesion 
policy programs between now and 2022 is to be allocated based on the severity of the 
socio-economic impacts of the crisis, including the level of youth unemployment and 
the relative prosperity of Member States. Furthermore, the smaller Just Transition Fund 
and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development are supported. The second 
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pillar aims at “kick-starting” the EU economy by stimulating private investment using a 
new Solvency Support Instrument, mobilizing private funds to support viable European 
companies in sectors, regions and countries most affected by the recession. It can rely on 
a budget of 31 billion Euro, aiming at 300 billion Euro in solvency support for companies 
from all economic sectors. In addition to this, the EU investment initiative is enlarged 
to 15.3 billion Euro to mobilize private investment in projects across the EU and a new 
Strategic Investment Facility to generate investments of up to 150 billion Euro in boosting 
the resilience of strategic sectors, thanks to a contribution of 15 billion Euro from Next 
Generation EU. The third pillar addresses relates to health program EU4Health. Its goal 
is to strengthen health security and prepare for future health crises with a budget of 9.4 
billion Euro and a 2 billion Euro boost to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. Further, 94.4 
billion Euro are allocated to Horizon Europe which will be used to fund vital research in 
health, resilience and the green and digital transitions. All this is planned to be adopted in 
July 2020. 
To mitigate the labor market impact of the COVID-19 recession, already in April 2020, 
the European Commission had initially proposed to the Council a temporary European 
financial instrument (Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency, SURE), 
which is now part of the larger EU rescue plan. Its goal is to support short-time work 
and related emergency schemes in EU Member states most affected by the crisis. This 
instrument has been adopted as EU Regulation 2020/672 by the Council on May 19, 2020, 
and national parliaments have to ratify it so that the scheme is likely to be operative in July 
2020. This instrument, based on art. 122 TFEU, is to be funded through bonds issued by the 
EU up to 100 billion Euro backed by guarantees worth 25 billion Euro from all Member States 
corresponding to their shares in EU GDP (e.g., 6.4 billion Euro in Germany, as granted in 
mid-June). The supporting funds will be handed over as loans under favorable conditions to 
those Member States suffering heavily from the crisis and using short-time work (or similar 
measures, particularly for the self-employed) to secure employment and income. The 
distribution of the SURE funds depends upon decisions by the Council, based on proposals by 
the Commission. To this end, the Commission will have to assess requests from EU Member 
States and evaluate their situation, in particular the increase of spending on short-time 
work and similar measures. SURE is conceived as a temporary assistance to Member States 
available, under current rules, until the end of 2022, with the possibility of extending it if 
the crisis persists. SURE can be seen as an ad hoc European reinsurance of national short-
time work schemes. To understand the proposal, two levels have to be distinguished: 1) the 
general role of short-time work and 2) the genuine European contribution.
As we have shown above, most countries covered by the IZA Crisis Response 
Monitoring have adopted a short-time scheme, with notable differences in scope and 
intensity. Short-time work only makes sense if one can expect a return to “normal” 
economic activity and increased labor demand in the near future. Ideally, short-time work 
schemes provide assistance to firms and workers for as long as the emergency situation 
lasts. SURE is arguably inspired by the remarkable success of the German short-time work 
scheme during the 2008-09 crisis, where it helped avoid job losses in the heavily exposed 
export sector. Now, the COVID-19 crisis not only affects manufacturing, but also many 
small and medium-sized firms in the service sector as well as the self-employed. In these 
cases, short-time work and assistance to self-employed outside unemployment insurance 
can only work if it is administered in a way that facilitates access by target groups that have 
no experience with this scheme. As the country reports show, this creates strong demands 
on the responsible administrative bodies. 
Hence, while we know that some countries have created or expanded short-time work 
in response to the 2008-09 crisis and are going even further in the current situation, it 
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will be crucial to what extent the newly affected firms and freelancers can effectively be 
supported and how the additional funds available through SURE can be used effectively 
to expand short-time work or implement additional measures (e.g., to strengthen the 
retraining and placement for those workers in short-time schemes for whom a return to 
their pre-crisis jobs is in doubt due to structural change that might be accelerated by the 
crisis). 
In this context, it is important to appreciate that short-time work is ideal to 
complement dismissal protection and can therefore be seen as an additional layer of a job 
insurance scheme (Vandenbroucke et al. 2020). It allows employers to retain workers at 
low cost instead of having to shoulder separation costs in the form of severance pay, long 
notice periods, or law suits. However, temporary workers tend to be excluded from this 
beneficial complementarity. Short-time work therefore risks leaving behind workers that 
are already vulnerable. 
But it seems that the possibility to use short-time work allows working hours of 
permanent workers to absorb a large part of the shock, hence not increasing the risk 
for temporary workers (who are of course in general more likely to lose their job, but 
apparently not because of the use of short-time work). An explicit approach to protecting 
these groups would make the initiative more socially balanced. While the SURE program 
allows for adjustments and in particular for assistance to the self-employed, it remains 
to be seen if and to what extent non-standard workers are included by national decisions 
and facilitated by the EU backing. This is important in particular for the segmented labor 
markets that exist in some of the heavily exposed countries.
Beyond design and implementation issues of short-time work that are also highlighted 
in the individual country reports, SURE can be seen as a timely, necessary (but limited) 
expression of European solidarity (Vandenbroucke et al. 2020) with the Member States, 
firms and workers that are affected by the crisis in an unprecedented way. There is a short- 
and medium-term dimension to this. In the short run, the European contribution relieves 
immediate pressure on national budgets and unemployment funds. Of course, it is too early 
to tell if the funds are sufficient to make a difference and if the national administration can 
deliver short-time work quickly enough to those in need. At the same time, the European 
initiative does not directly interfere with the diversity of national schemes. While this is 
justified by the time pressure involved, it would be important to ensure that European funds 
do not simply crowd out national spending, but lead to a genuine expansion. This applies in 
particular to the question of how generous and inclusive national systems are towards low-
wage earners, workers on non-standard contracts or vulnerable, economically dependent 
self-employed. Hence, the increase in expenditure for short-time work and similar 
programs that is required to be supported by European loans should also be linked with a 
sufficient generosity and scope of these programs. The overall effectiveness of SURE (and 
national short-time work programs) depends ultimately on the recovery of the European 
and global economy, and the overall EU recovery plan plays a major role much beyond the 
contribution of SURE (Claeys 2020). 
Second, in a mid- to long-term perspective, the proposed scheme could not only help 
stabilize member states’ labor markets now, but also provide a pilot for the introduction 
of a permanent European unemployment (re)insurance system without preempting any 
further decision on this at the moment (Tesche 2020). SURE relies on bonds issued by the 
Commission which is a non-negligible policy innovation at the EU level (Claeys 2020). 
SURE is only a temporary and limited intervention and does not entail any interference 
with national unemployment benefit and short-time work schemes while a permanent 
European unemployment (re)insurance model would require at least some minimum 
harmonization regarding core functions and parameters (Andor 2020). The current crisis 
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illustrates how valuable an effective system of automatic stabilizers without the need for 
cumbersome ad-hoc decision making would be. Based on our experience with previous 
crises, the European initiative to expand short-time work is a sensible policy that can 
help alleviate the COVID-19 shock. Beyond the current crisis, it could be an opportunity 
to address the pressing questions of how to organize European solidarity – and how to 
include workers at the margins of Europe’s current employment models.
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ABSTRACT
In Austria, the number of persons who registered as unemployed with the Public Employment Services 
(PES) rose to record levels in March and April. After May, the labour market situation improved slightly, 
but unemployment was still 50% greater than in the previous year. An adapted short-time work scheme 
(“COVID-19 short-time work”) is the main labor market stabilization program with a projected budget of 
up to €12 billion. At its peak, more than 1.1 million workers, about one third of the dependent workforce, 
had applied for the scheme.
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Labor market impact of COVID-19
First measures to lower the spread of the virus were announced by the Austrian government 
on March 11, 2020 and introduced in the following week. The Austrian economy went into 
lockdown on March 16. The measures included a ban the opening of shops, with the exemption 
of shops selling food, drugs or medical supplies; restaurants could sell take-out meals. After 
mid-April (Easter holidays), several types of shops were allowed to re-open conditional on 
increased safety measures, such as the wearing of facial masks. Further restrictions were 
lifted at the beginning of May and in mid-May restaurants, personal service providers (such 
as hairdressers) and, partially, even schools re-opened, subject to specific safety measures.
The strict measures had a dramatic impact on the labor market. The number of 
unemployed increased, the number of employed decreased, and there was a massive inflow 
into short-time work. The number of persons who registered as unemployed with the 
Public Employment Services (PES) rose to a record level by the end of March and continued 
to rise until mid-April. Since then, the rise has been halted. At the end of April 2020, a total 
of 571,500 persons were registered with the PES (including persons in training), which 
is an increase of 210,000 persons or 58% compared to April of the previous year. While 
the number of persons in training fell by about a quarter due to the discontinuation of 
training courses, the number of persons registered as unemployed increased by two thirds. 
The unemployment rate (based on persons registered with the PES, excluding persons in 
training) reached 12.7%. This is the largest figure for April since the early 1950s and was 
only exceeded by the winter unemployment of 1953 and 1954. The rise in unemployment is 
mirrored by a strong decline in employment (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Dependent employment in Austria, change on previous year.
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In comparison to 2019, total employment i  the economy was about 5% lower in March 
and April, which corresponds to a loss of 185,000 jobs. In M y, however, the labour market 
situation i proved slightly. The number of unemployed fell by almost 10% compared to 
April and employment rose by 1.6%. Compared to the same month in the previous year, 
unemployment was still up by 50% and employment down by 4%, but the downward 
spiral could be stopped. At the same time, however, there are up to 1.3 million workers 
with approved short-time schemes and there is uncertainty about the evolution of their 
situation in the coming months.
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Bock-Schappelwein, Huemer, and Hyll (2020) and Bock-Schappelwein, Eppel, 
Huemer, Hyll, and Mahringer (2020) provide a more detailed overview of the developments 
until the end of April, which we summarize here below. The labor market effects of the 
crisis are asymmetric across industries and worker groups. Most jobs losses occurred in 
the accommodation and food service industry, as employment in hotels and restaurants 
fell by almost 40%. Because of its size, this industry also recorded the largest drop in 
employment in absolute terms, with a decrease by almost 75,000 jobs. Other industries 
that were hit particularly hard by the crisis include the arts, entertainment, and recreation 
culture; personal services; and the provision of other business services (which also includes 
temporary work agencies). In these industries, employment fell by 12% to 15%. 
Although certain businesses in the retail industry were allowed to open from mid-
April and the initial drop in employment was comparatively mild (-3%), the large size 
of the retail industry resulted in a sizable loss of about 17,000 jobs. The decline in the 
transportation and storage industry was about 13,000 jobs (-6%). In the construction 
industry, the decline in employment was strong in March (-10 %), but this was partially 
offset by the development in April when many construction sites were able to resume work. 
In contrast, both the health and social work sector and the information and communication 
technology industry recorded a rise in employment of about 3,000 jobs compared to April 
2019, corresponding to an increase of 1.1% and 3.3%.
While in March men were slightly more affected by the decline in employment 
than women (men -5.6%, women -4.1%; Bock-Schappelwein, Famira-Mühlberger, and 
Mayrhuber, 2020), by the end of April the losses were almost balanced across the genders. 
Compared to the previous year, employment was 5.1% (about 103,000 jobs) lower for men 
and 4.9% (about 83,000 jobs) lower for women. 
Figure 2:  Short-time work and change in employment by industry, change in April 2020 with respect 
to employment level of previous year.
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Gaps betw en th  w rker groups are much more pronounced. The number of workers 
with Austrian citizenship fell by 4% (114,000 worke s), bu  for workers with foreign 
citiz nship the job loss was more than twice as large (-9.2%, corre pon ing to 72,000 
workers). This difference reflects the different distribution of workers across industries, 
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the segmentation in terms of occupations and employment forms, and the fact that many 
cross-border commuters (particularly in the East of the country) were unable to reach their 
jobs due to mobility restrictions.
Blue-collar workers are disproportionately more affected by job cuts than white-
collar workers. In April, the decline in employment among blue-collar workers amounted 
to -12.0% (compared to April 2019), while there were hardly any job losses among white-
collar workers or civil servants (-0.8%). In other words, 9 out of 10 lost jobs lost were from 
manual workers. The strong concentration of jobs losses on blue-collar workers is partially 
due to the weaker employment protection compared to white-collar workers. The period of 
notice for salaried employees varies from six weeks (for less than two years of service) to 
five months (for 25 years or more), depending on the number of years of service, while for 
manual workers it is only 14 days, although this period might vary by collective agreement). 
Young workers (under the age of 25) are also affected more than proportionally in terms 
of the employment decline, although in terms of rising unemployment the effect has been 
strongest among prime-age workers. (See also point 6 below.)
It is important to stress that the most important labor market measure implemented 
by the government in reaction to the crisis, the COVID-19 short-time work scheme, 
prevented an even steeper fall in employment. (See also point 4 below.) By early May 
2020, the PES approved almost 100,000 applications from firms applying for the scheme, 
covering more than 1.1 million workers. Figure 2 shows the impact that this measure had 
on employment across industries. Although at present we do not know to what extent 
the approved short-time periods will be used as firms do not need to use their approved 
applications, the scheme prevented much greater job losses. 
Depending on the industry, we see a large variation in the level of short-time 
utilization as well as in the combination of short-time work and labor shedding. In total, 
90% of the workforce in the tourism industry were affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. In 
arts, entertainment, and recreation, about three quarters of workers were affected, and in 
manufacturing, construction, and the retail industry the share was above 50%.
These labor market data are broadly in line with the latest economic forecasts. In 
its latest medium-term economic forecast from mid-April, the Austrian Institute of 
Economic Research (WIFO) expects the Austrian economy to contract by at least 5.2% in 
the current year (Baumgartner, Kaniovski, Bierbaumer-Polly, Glocker, Huemer, Loretz, 
Mahringer, and Pitlik, 2020). A more pessimistic scenario forecasts a drop in GDP by 7.5% 
(Baumgartner et al., 2020). According to these forecasts, the unemployment rate for 2020 
will reach close to 9%. These forecasts are based on the (crucial) assumption that the 
pandemic will be contained by the second half of the year, without a second lockdown, so 
that the economy will gradually recover. 
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Orientation and targeting of adopted measures
To soften the impact on the labor market, the government introduced several initiatives 
targeted at businesses. The main components can be summarized as follows: (i) a “Corona 
support fund” of €15 billion, targeted at all firms, (ii) a “hardship fund” of €2 billion, 
targeted at self-employed, freelancers, and small enterprises, (iii) guarantees and the 
postponement of tax liabilities for businesses, and (iv) the “COVID-19 short-time work 
scheme” with a current budget of about €12 billion.1 Measures (i)-(iii) are targeted at 
businesses which have little or no revenues due to the crisis. All measures were announced 
as methods for keeping business operational and able to provide employment. Several 
smaller measures were also introduced to soften financial difficulties at the household 
level, such as a “family hardship fund” (€30 million) and a moratorium for rent payments 
and evictions.
COVID-19 short-time work is an adaptation (effective from March 1st) of the existing 
short-time work arrangement and intended to keep employees employed even if there 
is little or no work. It is limited to a maximum of 6 months (divided in two periods of 
three months each); employees’ wages are paid by the PES with a replacement rate that 
varies between 80% and 95% (depending on the wage level); and firms’ social security 
contributions for their employees are refunded in full. The average working time over 
the period must be between 10% and 90% of the regular working time, which allows for 
shorter periods of 0% working time. It is more generous than the existing short-time work 
program. Firms have, however, to pay their workers in advance and are refunded later, 
which could lead to liquidity problems for some firms. 
Figure 3:  Do firms consider state support measures to be helpful for surviving the period of economic 
restrictions caused by the pandemic measures (in %)?
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Measures were targeted at “standard” businesses and were initially not available for 
NGOs, artists, and certain groups of self-employed. The government extended and adapted 
the program in several steps, with the aim to close gaps and to increase their coverage 
of vulnerable categories. By mid-May, steps have been taken to improve the situation 
of artists and persons working in the cultural and entertainment sector, who are in a 
particularly difficult situation because cultural activities and mass events are still largely 
banned or subject to very restrictive rules.
Although labor market indicators such as employment and unemployment currently show 
similar developments, in several respects the crisis affected women harder than men, as 
more women than men work in the health sector, in education, or in retail. In addition, 
both men and women have been working more in the home, but evidence indicates 
that the additional burden due to care and household work has not been shared equally. 
Berghammer (2020) states that 16% of women and 9% of men report that they spend 
much more time on housework (47% of women and 43% of men spend more or slightly 
more time on housework). The increase is most marked among families with children, 
but couples without children and people living alone also report increased time spent on 
domestic work. Gender-specific responsibilities for childcare increased and it is mainly 
mothers who look after their children and learn with them: 47% of women and 29% of men 
spend much more time on school-related activities. Survey data collected by the University 
of Vienna (Austrian Corona Panel Data, 2020) indicate a marked drop in life satisfaction 
during the pandemic crisis for the Austrian population as a whole. The decline was however 
steeper for women than for men (Haindorfer, 2020).
Immediate liquidity support to businesses
A dedicated hardship fund of €2 billion was established for freelancers, one-person 
companies, professionals, and other small entrepreneurs, meant to cover personal living 
costs. A larger Corona-support fund also provides partial support for fixed costs such as 
rent or interest payments. The application for grants to cover fixed costs started on May 20 
and entrepreneurs must have had a loss in revenue of at least 40% due to the pandemic to 
be eligible for support. 
In a first phase (from March 27), the hardship fund provided rapid financial support 
of up to €1,000, where eligibility was based on previous income and other criteria. In this 
first phase there were 144,000 applications and €121 million were distributed (i.e., an 
average payment of €840 which indicates that virtually all applications were approved). 
The measure was criticized for excluding specific categories of persons and entrepreneurs 
and the government subsequently adjusted the eligibility criteria.
A second phase with less strict eligibility criteria (particularly the income ceiling) 
started on April 16. The fund now provides up to €2,000 per month for up to three 
months. Further adjustments to the hardship fund were announced in early May, aimed at 
increasing its flexibility and the accessibility for specific groups. For instance, applicants 
can now claim support for three months within a six-month window. 
In addition, on April 3, the termination of rental agreements due to outstanding 
rent in April, May or June 2020 was temporarily suspended. For micro-enterprises with 
credit debts (as well as for private households), repayment and interest payments were 
automatically suspended for three months and the credit period extended by three 
months free of charge (Parliamentary Correspondence No 306 of 3 April 2020). The 
federal government agreed with the energy utilities and the regulator to secure the supply 
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of electricity, gas, and district heating for private households, one-person companies, 
and small enterprises even in the event of late payment. These deferrals aim to relieve 
temporarily the liquidity situation.
Support of dependent workers
The adapted short-time work scheme (“COVID-19 short-time work”) is the main measure 
aimed at labor market stabilization and it eclipses all other measures in terms of financial 
resources. The scheme was originally estimated to cost €400 million in mid-March, but 
the budget has been increased in several steps to €12 billion by mid-May. By early May, 
the unemployment office had received about 104,000 applications for short-time work for 
about 1.25 million workers. Currently, about 100,000 applications for more than 1.1 million 
workers (roughly one third of the dependent workforce) have been approved. The first 
three-month period of the scheme will end in June and firms are allowed to re-apply for a 
second three-month period. To date, it is still unclear to what extent the short-time work 
refunds that have been approved will actually be claimed by firms.
In the early phases of the lockdown, the PES was overwhelmed by applications which 
led to a large backlog in the processing of applications. This increased the uncertainty for 
firms, although almost 100% of applications were approved. The backlog of applications 
played arguably only a secondary role for liquidity concerns, because firms have to pay 
their workers in advance and will be refunded later. The large number of applications and 
the favorable conditions for short-time work led to concerns that firms could abuse the 
subsidy by allowing employees on short-time to work for more hours than stipulated under 
the short-time agreement. To allay these fears, the government announced controls to 
ascertain the correct utilization of the scheme. 
During the acute lockdown period, ALMP and especially training activities carried out 
by the PES came to a halt. Training measures for unemployed persons started again on May 
15 and attendance of further education will start from May 29.
With respect to passive labor market policies, the most important change concerns 
the unemployment assistance. This is a social transfer that can be claimed by unemployed 
persons upon exhaustion of the entitlement to unemployment benefits, with a lower 
replacement rate. At the end of April, the unemployment assistance benefit was increased 
to the level of unemployment benefit, with retroactive effect from mid-March. This 
measure is currently scheduled to expire at the end of September, but the Minister for 
Labor, Family and Youth may extend the period until the end of the year.
Working conditions and work organization
The lockdown resulted in momentous changes in work organization, and its effects are 
still reverberating. As can be seen in Figure 4, the lockdown, which began on March 16, 
immediately reduced workplace visits. Italy’s earlier lockdown, by comparison, lowered 
workplace visits only moderately during the first week. In Germany and – much more so 
– in Sweden, the reduction was less pronounced than in Austria. With the gradually lifting 
of restrictions from mid-April, workplace activity increased. The most recent data suggest 
that workplace visits gradually increased and almost reached pre-crisis levels by June.
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Figure 4:  Mobility trends during the Covid-19 pandemic. Change in visits to the workplace, daily data 
compared to the baseline for selected countries.
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Many firms still all w workers, in p rticular workers wh  have care responsibilities or who 
belong to at-risk-groups because of their age or pre-existing health conditions, to work from 
home. Schools have reopened, but pupils are attending classes on alternate days. Although 
child care arrangements a e provided f r children who cannot be cared for at home, only a 
small fraction of children spend the “regular” number of hours at school. In addition, special 
working arrangements are still in place in many firms because the workplace organization 
makes it difficult to apply the hygiene rules prescribed by the government. This is the case, 
for instance, in many larger firms, where workplaces are organized in open-plan offices. In 
many firms, workers rotate between working from home or in the office or groups of workers 
attend the workplace while other groups work from home.
This pattern is confirmed by company survey data that indicate that working 
from home was widely adopted. (See Figure 5.) Virtually all larger firms implemented 
(additional) forms of mobile working. About 80% of medium-sized firms and close to 60% 
smaller firms used some form of working from home. A sectoral disaggregation shows 
that home-office was less common in the construction industry (with about 50% of firms 
reporting an (increased) use of this instrument) than in other industries. In both the service 
industries and in manufacturing, however, about three quarters of firms implemented 
mobile working in response to the crisis (Hölzl, 2020). Another wide-spread measure 
concerned the reduction of vacation stocks and time credits accumulated by employees in 
previous periods.
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Figure 5: Measures implemented by firms as consequence of the pandemic (in %).
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The impact of the crisis on working conditions and working arrangements hit different 
segments of the workforce asymmetrically. Panel survey data collected by the University of 
Vienna (Austrian Corona Panel Data, 2020) show that in early April about one third of male 
workers and close to 40% of female workers were working from home. However, the share 
varied greatly across skill-levels and occupations. Only 14% of workers with compulsory 
education and 26% of those with a dual education were working remotely, whereas half of 
the workers with upper secondary education and almost two thirds of those with tertiary 
education did so (Pichler et al., 2020). A similar picture emerged in a disaggregation by 
income level, highlighting the social gradient of the pandemic’s labor market impact.
New labor market entrants
There were about 21% fewer training jobs for apprentices in May 2020 than in May 2019. 
By the end of May 2020, about 8,835 persons were looking for an apprenticeship (about 
71% more than in May 2019) and there were about 4,585 open apprenticeship posts (AMS, 
2020). Applicants who cannot find a training post or whose firm folded will have access to 
an apprenticeship training through the PES. 
The government ruled that the training period for apprentices can be reduced during 
short-time work, this is currently possible until August 2020. Accordingly, the duration 
of an apprenticeship can be shortened by up to four months if the apprentice was subject 
to short-time work. The training durations cannot be extended if the apprentice missed 
training time due to short-time work.  
Journeyman’s exams were suspended until May and were re-instated after May 4th. 
The government provides financial support for apprentices who could not take their final 
exams due to the crisis and suffer income losses (some 3,700 apprentices of about 7,300 
who could not take their exams).
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Figure 5: Change in unemployment, by age and education, change on previous year.
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The reduction in employment did however affect the youngest cohorts more strongly 
than the other age groups. The decline in employment recorded in April amounted to close 
to 9% for young workers (under-25s: -36,997 or -8.8%) and it was less pronounced for the 
25-54 age group (-153,287 or  5.6%). In contrast, the number of persons employed in the 
55+ age group rose slightly (+4,360 or +0.8%) (Bock-Schappelwein et al., 2020). 
Policy innovations and labor market trends
The extensive use of short-time work prevented many redundancies and an even greater 
rise in unemployment. As in the 2009 financial crisis, the negative effects of an economic 
crisis can be significantly mitigated by reducing working hours.
In the medium-term, however, employment will depend strongly on how the 
international demand for goods and services will develop. The Austrian Institute for 
Economic Research (WIFO) estimates that, conditional on keeping the pandemic under 
control, from the second half of this year the economy should gradually recover, leading 
to economic growth of 3.5 percent and a fall in the unemployment rate to 7.9 percent next 
year. Unemployment is estimated to remain high (7.5% for the period 2022 to 2024). In a 
more pessimistic scenario, if the global economy is expected to recover only moderately, 
the unemployment rate is estimated at 9.1%.
Nevertheless, even in a favorable scenario there is a risk that unemployed people 
who have slim chances of re-employment will remain unemployed for a long period. For 
example, persons who have health problems or the long-term unemployed had already 
lower chances of re-employment and their situation may worsen over the coming months. 
There is a risk that even during an upswing phase, they will feel the effects of increased 
2 An apprentice’s gross wage depends on the industry’s collective bargaining agreement and ranges between €550 and €900 
gross per month (WKO, 2020).
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competition in the labor market. The same can be said of the youngest cohorts, and of labor 
market entrants in general, who based on the evidence from previous crises are expected to 
experience long-lasting scarring effects.
Next steps and fiscal viability
Policy measures in Austria during March, April, and May aimed to help businesses survive 
and to cushion employment losses. As the number of seriously ill persons declined, the 
rules for disease control were relaxed. This led to the re-opening of schools, the re-opening 
of most businesses, and a gradual return to pre-crisis levels of business activities. 
However, uncertainty about the future development of the infections lowers demand, 
global supply chains are disrupted, and it is possible that a substantial number of businesses 
will have to fold. This will undoubtedly have implications for employment levels. Further 
adaptations of the short-time work scheme seem likely, possibly accompanied with more 
generous unemployment benefits. 
Policies so far have focused primarily on minimizing job destruction, with little or no 
measures to foster job creation. With the lifting of restrictions, future policies will focus 
also more strongly on job creation through government spending on infrastructure such as 
public transport or the renovation of schools. 
The fiscal impact of the crisis and of the costs resulting from the crisis response 
measures is still difficult to gauge, but is certainly going to lead to a record budget deficit. 
In addition to the initial €38 bn. rescue package, the government is currently discussing 
further measures to fight the recession and stimulate aggregate demand, including cuts in 
income taxation and temporary reductions of VAT for certain goods and services. 
The yields on government bonds rose slightly during the first weeks of the pandemic 
lockdown, but they declined again more recently and are currently negative. Against this 
backdrop, sustainability of the Austrian public debt is currently not a primary concern. 
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France has implemented a very stringent lockdown which slowed down economic activity sharply, by 
about 30% in April and 20% in May 2020. However, the lockdown was accompanied by a large spectrum 
of measures sustaining households, firms and independent workers. The expected total cost of these 
measures is about 110 billion euros (4% of GDP) accompanied by the creation of a 300 billion euros 
budget to guarantee bank cash lines to firms. These measures have been quite effective at dampening 
the impact of the lockdown on employment, income of households and firms.
IZA COVID-19 Crisis Response Monitoring
France (June 2020)
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Labor market impact of COVID-19
France started a rigorous lockdown on March, 17,  2020. Schools, restaurants and all shops 
except pharmacies and groceries were closed. Mobility was authorized for a limited list of 
motives explicitly listed by a decree released on 24 March.1 Those who moved were required 
to have an authorization from their employer or a sworn statement indicating the reason 
for the trip. Violation of these rules is liable to a fine from 135 euros to 3750 euros and 6 
months imprisonment. The rules were stringent: The government announced 15 days after 
the start of containment that there had been 5.8 million checks and 350,000 fines. 
The lockdown started to be released from May 11, but very gradually, with a limited 
reopening of schools and shops depending on sectors and regions. Restaurants and cafés 
remain closed. 
As a consequence of this very stringent lockdown, economic activity has slowed 
sharply. According to information available as of June 17, the estimate of the loss of 
economic activity linked to the health crisis is around 28% in April, 22% in May, and 12% 
in June, as shown by Figure 1. More than a month after the start of the gradual release 
from containment, the loss of economic activity would be almost three times less than 
that estimated at the start of containment. In the second quarter of 2020 and taking into 
account the estimates of previous months, this scenario would lead to a reduction in GDP 
of around 17%, after –5.3% in the first quarter. It would be the deepest recession since the 
creation of the French national accounts in 1948.








March April May June
Source: INSEE (2020c)
Household consumption is estimated overall to be 31% lower than its normal level in 
April (INSEE, 2020a).  The post-May 11 rebound had been particularly strong (with a loss 
limited to 7% from the pre-crisis level, compared to –31% in April). Available data suggest 
that this rebound is sustainable, with a loss of consumption from normal which would be 
limited to 5% in June.
1 Travel between the home and the place of exercise of the professional activity, when they are essential for the exercise of 
activities which cannot be organized in the form of telework or professional displacements which cannot be deferred; Travel 
to make purchases of supplies necessary for professional activity and purchases of basic necessities in establishments whose 
activities remain authorized;  Consultations and care that cannot be provided remotely and that cannot be deferred;  Care of 
patients with long-term conditions;  Travel for compelling family reasons, for assistance to vulnerable people or childcare; Brief 
trips, within the limit of one hour daily and within a maximum radius of one kilometer around the home, linked either to the 
individual physical activity of the people, to the exclusion of any collective sporting activity and any proximity to other people, 
either walking with the only people in the same home, or the needs of pets; Judicial or administrative summons; Participation in 
missions of general interest at the request of the administrative authority.
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Thanks to a very intensive use of short-time work, which covered about half of 
employees at the end of April 2020, the employment drop has been limited. It has mainly 
been due to the freeze of hiring. At the end of the first quarter of 2020, salaried employment 
in the private sector fell by 2.3%. Compared with the level at the end of the first quarter of 
2019, employment fell by 1.4%. The number of temporary workers fell in an unprecedented 
way over the quarter, by 37.0%. Excluding temporary employment, private salaried 
employment fell by 0.9%. Figures about unemployment (according to the ILO definition) 
which are available until the end of March show no increase in unemployment 2 weeks 
after the start of the lockdown, but an increase in the number of people declaring willing to 
work without looking for jobs because of the lack of job offers (INSEE, 2020b). 
The effects of the crisis are very different depending on the sector of activity (INSEE, 
2020a). The sectors most affected by downturns in excess of 50% are accommodation and 
catering (96%, of which 75% are off), followed by the manufacture of transport equipment 
(92%, of which 29 % stopped), construction (87%, of which 53% stopped), other service 
activities (68%, of which 41% stopped), mainly due to the arts and recreational activities 
(90%, of which 66% stopped), the manufacture of other industrial products (59%, of 
which 25% stopped), driven by the textile industry, and finally trade (51%, of which 22 % 
stopped).
Orientation and targeting of adopted measures
France has combined a strict containment policy with a large spectrum of measures to 
sustain households, firms and independent workers. The expected total cost of these 
measures is about 110 billion euros (4% of GDP) accompanied by the creation of a 300 
billion euros budget to guarantee bank cash lines to firms. These measures have been quite 
effective at dampening the impact of the lockdown on employment, income of households 
and firms. They also might have contributed to reduce economic activity. 
For workers, these measures include income support to sick workers and their 
families, to quarantined who cannot work from home, to persons losing their jobs or self-
employment income and help for insecure workers to stay in their home. Unemployed 
people continue receiving their benefits during the lockdown and the confinement period 
postpones the exhaustion date of unemployment benefits. Temporary agency workers are 
paid for the entire duration of their assignment as initially foreseen even if they cannot 
work because of the confinement measures. People who quit a job for another one but 
could not be hired are granted exceptional access to unemployment benefits. The seasonal 
suspension of evictions from dwellings (evictions are forbidden form November 1 to March 
31 in normal time) has been extended. The government has requisitioned hotel rooms for 
homeless people to be used for confinement. The emergency housing spaces that are made 
available during the winter period are made available all year long.
For firms, measures include deferral of payment deadlines for social and tax payments; 
possibility of tax rebates for firms facing very important difficulties in the framework of 
an individual examination of requests; deferral of the payment of rents, water, gas and 
electricity bills for the smallest businesses in difficulty;  aid of up to 1,500 euros for very 
small businesses (turnover < €1M), self-employed workers and micro entrepreneurs 
experiencing a very sharp drop in turnover (70% loss between March 2020 and March 2019) 
or subject to administrative closure; creation of a 300 billion euros budget to guarantee the 
bank cash lines that companies may need because of the epidemic; support from the state 
and the Banque de France (credit mediation) to negotiate rescheduling of bank credits; 
simplified and reinforced short-time work programs; support for the treatment of a 
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conflict with customers or suppliers by the Business Mediator; recognition by the public 
authorities of the Coronavirus as a case of force majeure for their public contracts which 
implies that for all state and local public contracts, the delay penalties are not applied. 
Immediate liquidity support to businesses
The set of new measures implemented to support small firms and self-employed described 
above has been quite effective at mitigating the impact of the epidemic on firms.  Data 
on firm bankruptcies are not available yet, but there is no sign of significant increase in 
bankruptcies in the beginning of May 2020. On the corporate side, there was a surge in both 
bank loans (+ € 34.2 billion) and deposits (+ € 40.6 billion) in March. This surge probably 
reflects the precautionary behavior of firms in view of the fall in their sales: the increase 
in their deposits largely represents the time lag between the receipt of borrowed funds and 
future disbursements. As a result, the next months could reveal a tighter cash position.
Support of dependent workers
Unemployment insurance was effective at providing income to unemployed workers 
insofar as unemployed people continue receiving their benefits during the lockdown, 
and the confinement period postpones the exhaustion date of unemployment benefits. 
However, short-time work was the main scheme used to counteract the impact of the 
strict containment policy. In France, employment protection regulations require dismissal 
notices of several months and complex and costly procedures for most workers. Many firms 
whose activity has been very significantly slowed down by the lockdown would not have had 
enough liquidity to face these constraints and should have been liquidated in the absence of 
help. In this context, short-time work was the main program chosen by the government to 
sustain firms and to allow workers to keep their jobs.  Since March 1, 2020, short-time work 
schemes have been extended until December 31, 2020, to certain categories of employees 
who were previously excluded, under specific conditions (employees whose working hours 
are atypical, childminders and home workers, employees of public employers carrying out 
an industrial and commercial activity mainly, vulnerable people and parents of children 
under the age of 16 unable to work, etc.). The authorization to use partial activity has been 
granted for a maximum duration of 12 months (compared to 6 months previously) and 
cannot exceed 1,607 hours per year per employee until December 31, 2020 (against 1000 
hours ago). The net replacement ratio has been increased to 100% at the minimum wage 
and 84% for higher wages up to a maximum of 4.5 times the minimum wage, which covers 
more that 95% of wage earners.  The cost of short-time work is borne by the administration. 
The short-time work allowances are paid by employers who are reimbursed within an 
average delay of 12 days. according to the agency in charge of reimbursements of short-time 
work allowances.  There is no residual cost to the company unless it is covered by collective 
agreements which impose higher replacement income than those provided by law, which is 
scarce. Administrative procedures have been simplified. In particular, the authorization to 
use short-time work is considered granted within 48 hours after the filing of the request in 
the absence of a response from the administration (this period was 15 days previously). 
The government also announced that collective dismissals are subject to increased 
scrutiny before getting the authorization from the administration during the containment 
period. Accordingly, the  number of collective layoffs dropped dramatically: it is about 
three times lower in March-April 2020 than in March-April 2019.
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Hence, since the start of the coronavirus crisis, the use of short-time work has 
experienced exceptional growth. In the beginning of May 2020, about 50% of employees 
have required short-time work, with on average 420 hours of unoccupied hours requested 
per employee (12 weeks of 35 hours per week). In normal time, about 2/3 of short-time 
work requests are consumed. However, there is much uncertainty about the share of these 
requests which will be consumed during the epidemic. The expected public expenditure is 
around 1 percent of GDP. However, the exact figures will not be known for several months 
to the extent that employers can request reimbursement of the short-time work allowance 
within 1 year following the end of the period covered by the authorization. 
The very high short-time work take-up translates into a small increase in the entries 
into unemployment, which rose by 31% in the week of the start of the lockdown (17 March) 
compared to 2018 and 2019, but decreased in the following weeks and became lower by 12% 
than in previous years at the end of April as shown by Figure 2. 



















































































Source: DARES. Ministry of Labor
Working conditions and work organization
During April 2020, about a quarter of employees was teleworking, and another quarter 
worked on site (DARES, 2020a). Telework is particularly frequent in the information and 
communication sectors (63% of employees), and financial and insurance activities (55%), 
in which it was already much more widespread before the crisis. It is less common in 
accommodation and catering (6% of employees), construction (12%), the food industry 
(12%) and transport (13%).
A large share of firms had to implement protective measures for their employees, which 
likely reduce labor productivity. Companies that have set up protective distances for most of 
their employees working on site represent 69% of employment.  Distance measures for on-site 
workers are more often implemented in industry and transport and less often in accommodation 
and food services (28%), other service activities (45%) and construction (46 %). 
When asked why they did not put in place certain preventive measures, companies 
most often replied that this was not necessary, given the organization of work (43% of 
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employees ), or that they did not have the necessary equipment (43%) (DARES, 2020a). 
22% replied that this was not possible given the organization of work.
On 25 March, the government passed an ordinance which modified the regulation of 
holidays and working time until 31 December 2020.  
Concerning holidays, this ordinance stipulates that during the health emergency 
period and subject to a company or industry agreement, the employer may exceptionally 
impose the taking of paid holidays, within the limit of 6 working days, respecting a notice 
of at least one day (instead of 1 month or the period provided for by a collective agreement). 
Without a company or industry agreement, the employer can require the employee, with a 
minimum notice of one day, to take or modify working time reduction days (RTT) and the 
days available on the time savings account within the limit of 10 days. 
Concerning working time, companies belonging to sectors “particularly necessary 
for the security of the Nation or for the continuity of economic life” (the list of which is 
determined by a decree), may derogate from the regulation of hours of work (in particular, 
shift from 10h to 12h for the maximum duration of day work; shift from 8h to 12h for the 
maximum duration of night work; shift from 44h to 46h for the authorized weekly working 
time over a period of twelve consecutive weeks; shift from 48h to 60h for the authorized 
working time in the same week; work authorization on Sundays). 
New labor market entrants
The conjunction of the economic activity slowdown and of the large short-time work 
program which dramatically dampens the reallocation of jobs makes the situation of new 
labor market entrants particularly difficult. The government is anticipating drops in the 
demand for apprentices and in recruitment of youths. Hiring subsidies targeted at young 
workers and subsidies for apprentices have been announced for the next coming months 
but details have not yet been set up.
Policy innovations and labor market trends
It is likely that the hike in telework will have effects after the end of the epidemic. The 
government has also decided to report important reforms about the pension system 
and about unemployment insurance. It is not clear that these reforms, which were very 
controversial, will be implemented in the future, contrary to what was scheduled before 
the epidemic.
Next steps and fiscal viability
The current policy stance evolves. To exit the rigorous lockdown implemented on 17 March 
2020 and revive economic activity, the government started to reduce the lockdown on 11 
May 2020 and further on 22 June, the date on which all schools reopened. To boost the 
restart of economic activity, the government reduced short-time work subsidies provided 
to firms, while keeping the replacement ratio for workers unchanged, from June 1st. The 
extension of unemployment benefits will also be limited. Hiring subsidies for youth and 
plans for sectors most strongly impacted by the epidemic have been announced without 
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The main labor market impact of COVID-19 on Germany’s labor market has so far been a massive 
increase in short-time workers (currently more than 20 percent of all workers subject to social insurance). 
While this instrument has been successfully applied in previous recessions, various factors could make 
the use of short-time work in the current crisis more difficult and potentially also less effective. Besides, 
Germany’s fiscal measures – including the latest stimulus package and together with liquidity aid and 
loan guarantees – equal more than 30 percent of the country’s annual GDP.
IZA COVID-19 Crisis Response Monitoring
Germany (June 2020)
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Labor market impact of COVID-19
Data on the labor market impact of COVID-19 in Germany are still scarce; they become 
available only with a substantial time lag. While earlier forecasts released in March had 
been rather optimistic, especially concerning the labor market impact (e.g., Michelsen 
et al. 2020, Sachverständigenrat 2020a), more recent assessments are significantly 
more negative. For example, Weber et al. (2020) estimate GDP to decrease by 8.4 percent 
in 2020, and unemployment to increase to more than 3 million persons at peak. The 
federal government and the German Council of Economic Experts share rather similar 
expectations: They expect GDP to fall by 6.3 or 6.5 percent in 2020, respectively, and 
unemployment to rise to an average number of more than 2.6 million or 2.7 million persons 
during 2020, respectively (Bundesregierung 2020; Sachverständigenrat 2020b).   
Table 1 displays selected statistics for the actual labor market impact of COVID-
19 in May 2020 (currently the most recent available data). In that month, the number 
of registered unemployed stood at 2,813,000 persons, an increase by about 26 percent 
compared to May 2019 (BA 2020a). Taking into account the increase in April 2020, and 
also the previous year’s development, the overall COVID-19 impact on unemployment 
corresponds to an increase of 578,000 persons so far. A decomposition exercise shows that 
about one third of this increase is due to relatively fewer underemployed persons (e.g., 
as active labor market policy measures have been substantially reduced, individuals who 
would have otherwise been excluded from official statistics are now counted as registered 
unemployed), and that in each case about one additional quarter of this increase can be 
attributed to reduced hiring activities and increased layoffs, respectively (BA 2020a). 
Employment, however, has not declined significantly yet. 
Table 1: Labor Market Impact of COVID-19 in Germany (as of May 2020).
April 2020 YoY* May 2020 YoY*
Unemployment (Stock) 2,643,700 + 18.6% 2,813,000 + 25.8%
Unemployment (Inflow) 667,500 + 13.8% 484,300 – 18.3%
Unemployment (Outflow) 359,200 – 45.5% 315.100 – 46.2%
Underemployment (Stock; excl. STW) 3,466,300 + 8.5% 3.572.900 + 12.0%
Employment (Stock) 45,040,000 + 0.2% 44,900,000 – 0.5%
Posted Vacancies (Stock) 626,400 – 21.3% 583,600 – 26.3%
Posted Vacancies (Inflow) 76,200 – 58.9% 101,900 – 39.6%
Active Labor Market Policy Measures (Stock) 818,700 – 8.2% 742,400 – 17.4%
Source: Federal Employment Agency.
Notes: STW: Short-time work. YoY: Percentage change compared to one year before. 
The current rise in official unemployment statistics may only provide a first snapshot 
of the imminent COVID-19 impacts on the German labor market. For example, about 
38 percent of all firms in Germany submitted notifications for short-time work (STW) 
to the Federal Employment Agency, potentially resulting in a maximum number of 11.7 
million short-time workers (BA 2020a).1 While it is clear that not all of these workers 
included in notifications will actually be in STW later on (and not all short-time workers 
will experience a full reduction in working hours), STW in the current crisis has already 
reached a significantly higher level than during the Great Recession (where the peak was 
at about 1.5 million short-time workers; Brenke et al. 2013). Despite a significant time 
lag in reporting, Figure 1 shows that the latest projection for March 2020 by the Federal 
1 This number is the sum of persons included in submitted notifications for STW by firms in March, April and May 2020 (BA 
2020a).
Research Report No. 98  Short-Run Labor Market Impacts of COVID-19, Initial Policy Measures and Beyond
46|153
Employment Agency assumes more than 2 million short-time workers in that month. At 
its potential peak in May 2020, available estimates suggest that this number could have 
reached 7.3 million short-time workers, corresponding to more than 20 percent of all 
workers subject to social insurance (ifo 2020a).The Council of Economic  Experts, in its 
latest forecast, expects about 1.5 million short-time workers in full-time equivalents in 
2020 (Sachverständigenrat 2020b). 
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Business confidence stood at a historical low in April 2020, but slightly increased in May 
2020 (ifo 2020b), and further increased in June 2020 (ifo 2020c). Nonetheless, quite a 
few firms, besides submitting notifications for STW, are eating up working time account 
surpluses and are also starting to dismiss workers. Yet, at least in this early phase of the 
reces ion, unemployment figures not only increase because of inc eased layoffs, but to 
a similar extent also because of firms’ reduced hiring activities, resulting in fewer exits 
from unemployment (Bauer and Weber 2020). The demand for new workers has literally 
collapsed as the number of vacancies declined sharply (BA 2020a; Bossler et al. 2020). 
Compared to one year before, the inflow of posted vacancies was almost 60 percent lower 
in April 2020, and almost 40 percent lower in May 2020 (Table 1).
Unemployment risks are currently particular high in some sectors, including temporary 
agency work, the metal industry and automotive industry, hotels and restaurants, retail, 
various other service sectors, and to some extent even logistics (BA 2020a). These sectors 
have been either directly affected by restrictions on economic activities and social contacts, 
or indirectly via disrupted value chains, or simply by a sharp drop in demand. However, 
quite a few sectors in the German economy remain relatively unaffected (e.g., the public 
sector, the finance sector, education, health, and agriculture; BA 2020a). In terms of most 
vulnerable groups, employment losses can be expected to be particularly concentrated 
among workers with fixed-term contracts, temporary agency workers, marginal part-
time workers, self-employed and freelancers. For example, one in four solo self-employed 
workers considers it very likely they will have to give up their own solo self-employment 
within the next twelve months (Bertschek and Erdsiek 2020). The crisis also poses an 
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additional challenge for the labor market integration of the recent cohort of humanitarian 
migrants that arrived in Germany after 2015. 
Firms with liquidity problems already before the current crisis are at a high risk 
of bankruptcy. This risk may be particularly concentrated among SMEs with severely 
restricted economic activities, such as restaurants, small retail shops, and travel agencies. 
But it appears too early for an assessment: Due to changes in insolvency law, the precise 
extent to which these firms will ultimately go out of business will probably only become 
apparent in autumn 2020.2 
Orientation and targeting of adopted measures
Germany was relatively quick to adopt and, at a later stage, to adjust larger policy packages 
to mitigate the employment and social impact of the crisis (see KPMG Global 2020 for an 
overview about government and institution measures in response to COVID-19). While 
the extension of the long-standing short-time work (STW) scheme can be viewed as a 
standard response to economic recessions in Germany, STW is in the current situation also 
being used by firms that were not using it during the Great Recession in 2008-09 or in 
previous recessions. Preliminary data indicate that, for example, STW is again widely used 
in export-oriented sectors such as the metal industry, but they also point to an intensive 
use in service sectors (especially by hotels and restaurants where more than 90 percent of 
all workers had been included in notifications for STW; BA 2020a).
Next to the increased generosity of STW, there has also been a remarkable (temporary) 
extension of the contribution-based unemployment insurance benefit duration as part of 
a social protection package (Deutscher Bundestag 2020a). At the same time, job search 
requirements have been reduced and activation principles have come to a halt, both for 
the contribution-based unemployment insurance benefits and the tax-based basic income 
support.
Including the latest stimulus package, which has been agreed upon in June 2020, 
Germany’s measures – together with liquidity aid and loan guarantees – equal more than 
30 percent of the country’s annual GDP (BMF 2020a; BMF 2020b). The latest stimulus 
package (worth EUR 130 billion) has moreover shifted the focus towards boosting 
consumption. Important elements are a temporary VAT reduction (from 19 percent to 16 
percent and from 7 percent to 5 percent, respectively, from July 1, 2020 to December 31, 
2020) and a one-time EUR 300 lump-sum payment per child. 
Nonetheless, the particular emphasis on direct ad hoc support measures for small 
businesses and self-employed – especially in earlier measures – by way of lump sum 
payment, credits and guarantees appears remarkable (DB Research 2020). This novel 
feature of the current crisis response (when compared to previous recessions) could be due 
to the increased visibility of freelance work in Germany, but it could also relate to the larger 
extent to which SMEs and self-employed workers are affected by the contact ban and the 
shutdown (e.g., creative jobs, restaurants). 
Women could be one of the “blind spots” receiving less attention in policy responses 
so far (OECD 2020). For instance, they are overrepresented in the workforce of crisis-
related or essential sectors (most notably in the health sector, but also in the food retail 
sector), and they typically take a major part of the burden resulting from school and 
2 The obligation to file for insolvency has been suspended until September 30, 2020 for firms which are suffering economic 
difficulties or have become illiquid because of COVID-19 (under specific conditions, see KPMG Global 2020 for details).
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child care facility closures. A related issue is that also less attention has been paid to the 
flexible workforce of marginal part-time workers who are, for example, not included in 
unemployment insurance and will probably not register as unemployed.
Immediate liquidity support to businesses
To stabilize businesses, the federal and some regional governments in Germany promptly 
established different emergency measures (see KPMG Global 2020 for details). On the 
one hand, these programs provide support to larger firms that are directly affected by the 
shutdown by way of loans and credit guarantees: The state-owned development bank KfW 
is supporting firms by taking over credit risks from commercial banks as to make cheaper 
loans feasible; in addition, the federal government has set up an economic stabilization 
fund for the direct recapitalization of firms under certain conditions. On the other hand, 
these programs provide liquidity and income support to freelance workers and SMEs with 
up to 10 employees through timely lump-sum payments (PwC 2020). 
Federal programs grant an operating subsidy for three months (provided as a lump-
sum payment), ranging from EUR 9,000 for firms with up to 5 full-time equivalent workers 
to EUR 15,000 for firms with up to 10 full-time equivalent workers. State-level programs 
come on top, implying regional variation in these emergency measures within Germany. 
These payments are supposed to allow for the continuation of the business at least for three 
months and can be combined with short-time work for dependent employees. At the same 
time, access to basic income support without strict means testing was opened up for the 
target group of freelance workers as they often do not have access to contribution-based 
unemployment insurance benefits. 
However, observers point to the fact that some funds were exhausted relatively quickly 
and that some target groups were not reached at all. Despite the quick and significant policy 
response, it is also not yet clear to what extent these measures can effectively stabilize 
the economic situation of those affected. In addition, there are some concerns that no 
appropriate screening of applications took place in the early days of implementing the 
support programs and that information was lacking on the proper use of funds provided. 
Finally, also cases of fraud behavior were reported (Tagesschau 2020). 
Support of dependent workers
Although still only preliminary data are available, it is already clear that there has been a 
massive inflow into short-time work (STW) schemes during the initial phase of the COVID-
19 crisis in Germany. The well-established instrument of STW was one of the main factors 
contributing to Germany’s resilience to the 2008-09 crisis (Rinne and Zimmermann 
2012; Balleer et al. 2016). During the Great Recession, STW helped preserve permanent 
employment to a particularly large extent in Germany, while it had essentially no impact 
on temporary employment (Hijzen and Venn 2011; Cahuc 2019).  
However, since the 2008-09 crisis was characterized by a temporary external 
demand shock that almost exclusively affected predominantly larger, export-oriented 
manufacturing firms, and economic activity picked up again relatively soon, the situation 
appears entirely different this time. In the current crisis, a broad range of sectors is 
affected by the demand slump, also many SMEs are at risk, and uncertainty about the 
speed of economic recovery is large and widespread. In addition, the current recession 
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is accompanied by a structural transformation due to ongoing technological change and 
digitalization – not limited to, but also in manufacturing and in the automotive industry. 
These factors could make the use of STW in the current crisis more difficult and 
potentially also less effective. For example, the management and implementation of STW 
is probably easier within larger firms and with works councils that have already acquired 
experience in using this instrument. In the current situation, firms in the service sector 
and many smaller firms that are affected may be confronted with unfamiliar bureaucratic 
obstacles and practical challenges when implementing STW. Furthermore, the temporal 
scope of using STW appears limited if the crisis interacts with structural change, e.g., in 
retail (online vs. offline) or in the automotive industry, as a return from STW to “regular” 
work may not be taken for granted. Skepticism also seems to be justified to what extent the 
existing subsidies for training and qualification measures during STW are actually used, 
to what extent they can accommodate workplace mobility, and to what extent they are 
ultimately effective (Eichhorst and Rinne 2019).
Easing the conditions governing the use of STW was among the first policy responses 
to the COVID-19 crisis in Germany (Deutscher Bundestag 2020b). The new rules, which 
came into force retroactively as of March 1, 2020, made the instrument more accessible 
for firms as only 10 percent (previously: one-third) of workers need to be affected by a 
minimum reduction in working hours of 10 percent. In response to trade union complaints 
about insufficient STW allowances, especially during longer periods of STW, the generosity 
of these allowances has been temporarily increased (until December 31, 2020; BA 2020c): 
While the compensation still amounts to 60 percent of the missing net remuneration (67 
percent for parents) in the first 3 months, it increases to 70 percent (77 percent for parents) 
from month 4 onwards and to 80 percent (87 percent for parents) from month 7 onwards. 
Next to that, some firms decided to voluntarily top up STW allowances for their workers. 
Although the maximum duration of short-time working allowances is still 12 months,3 an 
intensive debate on a discretionary expansion of this benefit duration can be expected if 
economic recovery will not yet be in sight in autumn 2020.
Unemployment insurance benefits are most accessible for workers with longer 
employment spells. Despite some relaxation of benefit requirements over the last years, 
coverage by unemployment insurance benefits will likely be lower for workers with 
interrupted careers and fixed-term contracts. Unemployment benefit levels are low in 
absolute terms for those with low hourly wage rates or part-time workers. As a response to 
the crisis, the duration of unemployment insurance benefits has been extended temporarily 
for those unemployed whose benefits would expire soon.4
At the same time, participation in active labor market policy measures and the 
activation of jobseekers has been substantially reduced. The reduction of active labor market 
policy measures, in combination with substantially lower hiring rates by employers, will 
most likely lead to prolonged unemployment spells. This issue might become more severe 
if some providers of active labor market policy would ultimately have to terminate their 
business and if the capacity of active labor market policy measures cannot accommodate 
potentially large and more heterogeneous target groups after the initial crisis phase.
3 Only under specific circumstances the maximum duration of STW allowances is 21 months – namely, that STW had been 
already in place before December 31, 2020 and it must end before December 31, 2020 (BA 2020c).
4 Unemployment insurance benefit duration has been temporarily extended by 3 months for those workers whose benefits 
would otherwise expire between May 1, 2020 and December 31, 2020 (BA, 2020d).
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Working conditions and work organization
The shutdown period led to an expansion of work from home in Germany. This concerns 
both the share of workers who started practicing work from home, at least partially, and 
the intensity of work from home of those who already had experiences before. During 
March and April 2020, about one in four German employees worked from home, with 
substantially larger shares among workers with higher education and higher earnings 
(Möhring et al. 2020). 
Germany used to be a relative laggard in terms of remote and mobile work. This has 
quite suddenly changed during this crisis as immediate health concerns as well as contact 
bans put pressure on both employers and employees to encourage and accommodate 
working from home. Quite often, it has also been the only option to ensure continued 
business activity in occupations and jobs where (regular) physical presence was not 
needed. Besides the positive aspects of reduced risks of infection and the ability to 
continue operations, work from home tends to create stressful situations and entirely new 
challenges regarding the reconciliation of work, care obligations (especially during school 
and child care facility closures) and private life in general. 
In the current situation, the latent policy debate about which rules should apply to work 
from home has re-emerged. In particular, the discussion circles around the question if there 
is need for a binding legal framework, or if this can be left to negotiations between employers 
and employees (or within teams at the workplace). Moreover, a new divide in the labor market 
could emerge between those workers that are able to work from home (with differences 
between workers with or without care obligations) and those working in the service sector, 
i.e., frontline workers (with higher risk of infection) and those at a high risk of losing their jobs 
(e.g., in restaurants). In this regard, low-skilled workers could suffer the most in the current 
crisis as they spend less time working from home and are simultaneously more likely to work 
reduced hours or lose their jobs (von Gaudecker et al. 2020).
Some observers also fear that working from home might reactivate more traditional 
gender roles regarding care responsibilities, thereby creating obstacles for women and 
especially mothers to focus on paid work (OECD 2020). However, there is no consistent 
evidence on a return to more traditional gender roles in Germany (FAZ 2020). In some 
cases, bonus payments in (female-dominated) occupations such as retail trade and nursing 
have been announced as a compensation for extraordinary workload during the crisis. But 
regular wages in these occupations continue to be rather low. At the same time, working 
time regulation in sectors that are regarded as essential, such as logistics, the health 
sector, energy supply and administration, has been relaxed from April 2020 to June 2020 
to ensure business continuity in critical situations (BMAS 2020).
New labor market entrants
It can be expected that new labor market entrants in Germany will face particular 
difficulties, at least during this summer. Firms’ hiring activities will be reduced, either 
because of direct demand effects or general economic uncertainty (Klös and Schäfer 2020). 
However, given persistent skill shortages and continued demographic change with an 
ageing population, reduced hiring could only be temporary – at least in the German context. 
This is particularly the case if product demand recovers relatively quickly or expectations 
become more optimistic soon. But a scenario of a deep and long-lasting recession could 
result in persistently weak labor demand and hiring, with long-term disadvantages for 
current graduates (Kahn 2010; Oreopoulos et al. 2012). 
Beyond these average effects, the crisis impacts are likely to be quite heterogeneous 
across sectors and firms. First, it is possible that some sectors will be more substantially 
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affected and will thus shrink in the medium or long run (e.g., hotels and restaurants, 
tourism, local retail). This would also result in very limited hiring in these sectors. Second, 
other sectors could experience a structural and thus permanent increase in labor demand 
(e.g., health care). Third, firms that entered the crisis in relatively good shape or that follow 
a longer-term strategic approach might take advantage of the reduced competition for 
talents. These companies could even increase their hiring activities, especially focusing on 
younger workers with sought-after skills. To avoid time-consuming and costly staffing in 
the near future, it could be a rational approach, at least for some firms, to hire employees 
even when product demand is weak (Sachverständigenrat 2020a). Finally, implementing 
actual hiring does not appear to be a bottleneck in the current situation. Many firms 
relatively quickly adapt to new standards, for example, by using digital hiring tools more 
intensively.
The potential problems of current graduates might be amplified in the German labor 
market because of the crucial role of the dual apprenticeship system. This core mechanism 
and structural strength of the German employment model not only effectively provides 
the labor market with skills and qualifications in demand, but it also acts as an important 
counterbalance to hiring barriers in school-to-work transitions (Schneider and Rinne 
2019). According to recent data, a slowdown of the matching process between applicants 
and apprenticeship positions can already be observed (BA 2020a). Displaying selected 
statistics for May 2020 (currently the latest available data), Table 2 shows that both supply 
and demand decreased by about 9 percent compared to May 2019. 
Table 1: The Apprenticeship Market in Germany (as of May 2020).
May 2020 YoY*
Supply of Apprenticeships (Positions, total) 465,678  – 9.1%
Demand for Apprenticeships (Applicants, total) 399,821 – 8.9%
Open Apprenticeship Positions 250,292 – 5.8%
Applicants Not Yet Placed 195,789 – 2.2%
Source: Federal Employment Agency.
Notes: YoY: Percentage change compared to one year before.  
In addition, there is a substantial risk that a low willingness or capacity of firms to hire 
apprentices (and new workers in general) – given economic uncertainty, lack of business 
activity and high pressure to cut costs could result in a further decline of apprenticeship 
training, especially in some sectors and occupations. As the majority of apprenticeship 
training only commences in August in September, figures for the next months should be 
closely monitored and will provide the basis for a more detailed assessment. 
But stakeholders such as trade unions and employer associations asked for governmental 
support to firms providing training during the crisis via the highly institutionalized German 
dual apprenticeship system (e.g., DIHK 2020). In cooperation with some Federal Ministries, 
a larger number of stakeholders published a joint declaration in which they support 
needs-based and targeted support measures (Allianz für Aus- und Weiterbildung 2020). 
This has led to the adoption of a joint federal support initiative to make apprenticeship 
capacities more resilient in times of crisis. Small- and medium sized firms that provide 
apprenticeships, despite being currently in economic difficulties, can receive EUR 2,000 
per new apprenticeship contract as a subsidy if they keep the number of their apprentices 
constant, or EUR 3,000 per new apprenticeship contract if the firm raises the overall number 
of apprentices. The same applies if a current apprentice is taken over from a firm that has 
gone bankrupt during the crisis. The program also provides for support to avoid short-time 
work among apprentices, and for training in facilities outside individual firms. 
Research Report No. 98  Short-Run Labor Market Impacts of COVID-19, Initial Policy Measures and Beyond
52|153
Policy innovations and labor market trends
In Germany, the COVID-19 recession may not only result in a departure from the long and 
rather stable path of employment growth (Schneider and Rinne 2020), but the crisis may 
also accelerate structural change and digitalization. At the worker level, remote work may 
become more frequently at least a realistic option. In Germany, about one in six jobs may be 
permanently suitable for working from home (Pestel 2020). At the firm level, digital tools 
may be increasingly viewed as a hedge and reinsurance against external shocks. In this 
respect, the crisis is also an endurance test of firms’ past digital achievements, and their 
past omissions become very visible (Engels 2020).
In terms of disruptions or structural breaks at the sector level, it is very likely that the 
crisis will accelerate the long-term decline of local retail, often delivered through smaller 
shops, while all forms of online retail will experience an extra boost. As digitalization also 
continues in the health sector and in education, the skill needs of workers in these sectors 
will change accordingly. The ongoing transformation of manufacturing, in particular of car 
manufacturers and their suppliers, may proceed more rapidly than expected before the crisis. 
At the same time, however, and contrary to widespread beliefs, significantly shorter or 
less complex global value chains in industrial production are unlikely to occur. Firms in the 
post-crisis situation may even rely to a larger extent on cost-saving initiatives, which typically 
include outsourcing and offshoring. The crisis will by no means reverse this development and 
it will not trigger a trend to bring production back to Germany – for a simple reason: the 
level of automation in German manufacturing is already very high (Krzywdzinski 2020). This 
assessment may, however, differ from “essential” sectors: Here, too, there are discussions 
about reshoring production back to Germany, but mainly because of security concerns and 
to guarantee the supply of the German population even in emergency situations (e.g., in the 
areas of infrastructure, energy supply, and in the medical sector).  
Last, but not least, restrictions to migration and to EU mobility may have lasting effect 
on the functioning of the German labor market. Beyond its often controversially discussed 
labor market impacts, immigration from EU member states has certainly increased labor 
supply in Germany and, in comparison to many years ago, has led to more employees, 
but also to more unemployed and benefit recipients from these countries (BA 2020b). 
Nonetheless, it helped cushion the imminent problem of labor shortages in the German 
labor market. The country’s demographic challenge could thus intensify in the future.
Next steps and fiscal viability
The longer the COVID-19 crisis lasts, the more obvious the trade-off between COVID-19 
containment and reviving economic activities becomes. This concerns, for example, the 
re-opening of shops, restaurants and hotels, the re-opening of schools and child care 
facilities, and allowing for cross-border mobility. For example, the economic costs of a 
3-month shutdown in Germany had been estimated to be as large as 20 percent of the 
country’s annual GDP (ifo 2020d). Such a scenario would create a heavy fiscal burden for 
Germany, despite its relatively favorable initial position allowing for a larger fiscal stimulus. 
Currently, many restrictions have been removed (after slightly less than two months 
of a rather strict lockdown). This approach follows the general strategy of a careful and, 
depending on the local COVID-19 situation, potentially regionally differentiated revival 
of economic activities, in combination with close monitoring efforts, continued social 
distancing and widespread testing. The open question in this context is whether Germany 
will – sooner or later – be confronted with a “second wave” of infections, potentially 
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resulting in an even larger number of COVID-19 cases than in spring 2020. Also the 
nature of economic recovery could crucially depend on this, as well as on the situation 
in important German export markets (e.g., automotive industry). At the time of writing, 
local lockdowns in two German districts have been re-introduced due to a larger COVID-19 
outbreak involving one meat processing plant.
More generally, a controversial debate about the costs of forgone economic activities 
and governmental spending to mitigate the immediate effects of containment has 
emerged. In this context, it also seems advisable to avoid too broadly targeted and too 
generous governmental subsidies. These financial resources might be more effectively 
and efficiently spend in the future when an additional fiscal stimulus would be needed 
and when target groups could be more precisely identified and reached. Similar arguments 
have been put forward in the context of the latest stimulus package, which has been agreed 
upon in June 2020 (Handelsblatt 2020). However, in the current situation most economic 
observers view the fiscal stimulus package as largely appropriate both in size and timing; 
they rather warn against a too early return to austerity. 
Finally, the German situation also depends on the ability to stabilize the European and 
global economy. The German economy relies to a large extent on foreign demand for goods 
and services, on reliable and efficient global value chains as well as on free labor mobility. 
However, with regard to the European stabilization efforts, the German position looks 
more accommodating or solidaristic than perceived at first glance.
Research Report No. 98  Short-Run Labor Market Impacts of COVID-19, Initial Policy Measures and Beyond
54|153
References
Allianz für Aus- und Weiterbildung (2020). Gemeinsame Erklärung der Allianz für Aus- und Weiterbildung: 
Gemeinsam den aktuellen Herausforderungen durch die  Corona-Krise auf dem Ausbildungsmarkt begegnen 
– gemeinsam  den Ausbildungsmarkt stabilisieren! https://www.bmas.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/allianz-
aus-weiterbildung-2019-21.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=7 
BA 2020a. Monatsbericht zum Arbeits- und Ausbildungsmarkt, Mai 2020. Nuremberg. https://www.arbeitsagentur.
de/datei/arbeitsmarktbericht-mai-2020_ba146527.pdf 
BA 2020b. Auswirkungen der Migration auf den deutschen Arbeitsmarkt, April 2020. Berichte: Arbeitsmarkt kompakt. 
https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/Statischer-Content/Statistische-Analysen/Statistische-Sonderberichte/
Generische-Publikationen/Auswirkungen-der-Migration-auf-den-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf 
BA 2020c.Corona-Krise: Kurzarbeitergeld für Unternehmen. https://www.arbeitsagentur.de/m/corona-kurzarbeit/ 
BA 2020d. Arbeitslosengeld wird länger gezahlt: Zweites Sozialschutz-Paket sieht Verlängerung der Bezugsdauer 
vor. https://www.arbeitsagentur.de/news/zweites-sozialschutz-paket-arbeitslosengeld-wird-laenger-gezahlt 
Balleer, Almut, Britta Gehrke, Wolfgang Lechthaler and Christian Merkl (2016). Does short-time work save 
jobs? A business cycle analysis. European Economic Review 84(C), 99-122. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
euroecorev.2015.05.007
Bauer, Anja and Enzo Weber (2020). The Unemployment Impact of Corona Containment Measures in Germany. IAB 
Discussion Paper 16/2020. http://doku.iab.de/discussionpapers/2020/dp1620.pdf 
Bertschek, Irene, and Daniel Erdsiek (2020). Soloselbstständigkeit in der Corona-Krise: Digitalisierung hilft bei 
der Bewältigung der Krise. ZEW-Kurzexpertise 20-08. http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/ZEWKurzexpertisen/
ZEW_Kurzexpertise2008.pdf 
BMAS (2020). Verordnung zu Abweichungen vom Arbeitszeitgesetz infolge der COVID-19-Epidemie: COVID-19-
Arbeitszeitverordnung – COVID-19-ArbZV. https://www.bmas.de/DE/Service/Gesetze/arbeitszeitverordnung.
html  
BMF (2020a). Kampf gegen Corona: Größtes Hilfspaket in der Geschichte Deutschlands. https://www.
bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Schlaglichter/Corona-Schutzschild/2020-
03-13-Milliarden-Schutzschild-fuer-Deutschland.html 
BMF (2020b). Kabinett bringt Konjunkturpaket auf den Weg. https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/ 
DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Schlaglichter/Konjunkturpaket/2020-06-03-konjunkturpaket-beschlossen.html 
Bossler, Mario, Nicole Gürtzgen, Alexander Kubis and Benjamin Küfner (2020). IAB-Stellenerhebung im ersten 
Quartal 2020: Mit dem Corona-Shutdown ging zuerst die Zahl der offenen Stellen zurück. IAB Kurzbericht 
12/2020. http://doku.iab.de/kurzber/2020/kb1220.pdf 
Brenke, Karl, Ulf Rinne and Klaus F. Zimmermann (2013). Short-Time Work: The German Answer to the Great 
Recession. International Labour Review 152(2), 287-305. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/
j.1564-913X.2013.00181.x 
Bundesregierung (2020). Frühjahrsprojektion 2020. Berlin. https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Artikel/Wirtschaft/
Projektionen-der-Bundesregierung/projektionen-der-bundesregierung-fruehjahr-2020.html 
Cahuc, Pierre (2019). Short-time work compensation schemes and employment. IZA World of Labor 2019: 11. 
https://doi.org/10.15185/izawol.11.v2 
DB Research (2020). Government support for German companies in the corona crisis. Germany: Flash. March 
19, 2020. https://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/RPS_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000506161/Government_
support_for_German_companies_in_the_cor.PDF 
Deutscher Bundestag (2020a). Gesetz für den erleichterten Zugang zu sozialer Sicherung und zum Einsatz 
und zur Absicherung sozialer Dienstleister aufgrund des Coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 (Sozialschutz-Paket). 
Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2020 Teil I Nr. 14. https://www.bmas.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/PDF-
Gesetze/sozialschutz-paket-gesetz.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3 
Deutscher Bundestag (2020b). Gesetz zur befristeten krisenbedingten Verbesserung der Regelungen für das 
Kurzarbeitergeld. Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2020 Teil I Nr. 12. https://www.bmas.de/SharedDocs/
Downloads/DE/PDF-Meldungen/2020/kurzarbeit-wird-erleichtert-gesetzentwurf-de-bundestags.pdf?__
blob=publicationFile&v=8 
Research Report No. 98  Short-Run Labor Market Impacts of COVID-19, Initial Policy Measures and Beyond
55|153
DIHK (2020). Ausbildung in der Corona-Pandemie sichern: DIHK stellt 10-Punkte-Programm vor. https://www.
dihk.de/de/aktuelles-und-presse/presseinformationen/ausbildung-in-der-corona-pandemie-sichern-23402 
Eichhorst, Werner and Ulf Rinne (2019). Drohender Abschwung in Zeiten der Digitalisierung: Brauchen wir jetzt 
„Kurzarbeit 4.0“? ifo Schnelldienst 72(18), 3-6. https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/sd-2019-18-eichhorst-rinne-
konjunkturelle-eintruebung-2019-09-26.pdf 
Engels, Barbara (2020). Corona: Stresstest für die Digitalisierung in Deutschland. IW-Kurzbericht No. 23/2020. 
https://www.iwkoeln.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Studien/Kurzberichte/PDF/2020/IW-Kurzbericht_2020_
Corona_Stresstest_Digitalisierung.pdf 
FAZ / Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2020): Familienleben in Corona-Krise: Doch keine Rolle rückwärts. 
https://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/mehr-wirtschaft/ob-corona-schaedlich-fuer-die-emanzipation-
ist-16830849.html   
Gemeinschaftsdiagnose (2020). Wirtschaft unter Schock – Finanzpolitik hält dagegen. Frühjahr 2020. https://
www.ifo.de/sites/default/files/secure/prognosen/gd202004/gd-202004-gesamtdokument.pdf
Handelsblatt (2020). Scholz-Berater kritisieren Konjunkturpaket der Bundesregierung (June 11, 2020). https://
www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/coronakrise-scholz-berater-kritisieren-konjunkturpaket-der-
bundesregierung/25904542.html 
Hijzen, Alexander and Danielle Venn (2011). The Role of Short-Time Work Schemes during the 2008−09 Recession. 
OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers No. 115.  https://doi.org/10.1787/5kgkd0bbwvxp-en 
ifo (2020a). ifo Institut: Im Mai waren 7,3 Millionen Beschäftigte in Kurzarbeit. Pressemitteilung. June 2, 2020. 
https://www.ifo.de/node/55800 
ifo (2020b). ifo Geschäftsklima erholt sich (May 2020). https://www.ifo.de/sites/default/files/secure/umfragen-
gsk/ku-202005/ku-2020-05-pm-geschaeftsklima-DT.pdf 
ifo (2020c). ifo Geschäftsklima steigt deutlich (June 2020). http://www.ifo.de/sites/default/files/secure/
umfragen-gsk/ku-202006/ku-2020-06-pm-geschaeftsklima-DT.pdf 
ifo (2020d). Die Bekämpfung der Coronavirus-Pandemie tragfähig gestalten: Empfehlungen für eine flexible, 
risikoadaptierte Strategie. https://www.ifo.de/publikationen/2020/monographie-autorenschaft/die-
bekaempfung-der-coronavirus-pandemie-tragfaehig 
Kahn, Lisa B. (2010). The long-term labor market consequences of graduating from college in a bad economy. 
Labour Economics 17(2), 303-316. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2009.09.002 
Klös, Hans-Peter and Holger Schäfer (2020). IW-Arbeitsmarktmonitoring: April 2020. IW-Report 19-2020. 
ht tps://w w w.iwkoeln.de/f ileadmin/user_upload/Studien/Repor t /PDF/2020/IW-Repor t _2020_
Arbeitsmarktmonitoring_April.pdf 
Krzywdzinski, Martin (2020). Die COVID-19-Krise beschleunigt den Strukturwandel in der Arbeitswelt. https://
wzb.eu/de/forschung/corona-und-die-folgen/die-covid-19-krise-beschleunigt-den-strukturwandel-in-der-
arbeitswelt 
KPMG Global (2020). Germany: Government and institution measures in response to COVID-19. https://home.
kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2020/04/germany-government-and-institution-measures-in-response-to-
covid.html 
Michelsen, Claus, Marius Clemens, Max Hanisch, Simon Junker, Konstantin Kholodilin and Thore Schlaak (2020). 
Deutsche Wirtschaft: Corona-Virus stürzt deutsche Wirtschaft in eine Rezession. DIW Wochenbericht 
12/2020. https://www.diw.de/documents/dokumentenarchiv/17/diw_01.c.743506.de/wb12-2020_gl1_
msp.pdf 
Möhring, Katja, Elias Naumann, Maximiliane Reifenscheid, Annelies G. Blom, Alexander Wenz, Tobias Rettig, Roni 
Lehrer, Ulrich Krieger, Sebastian Juhl, Sabine Friedel, Marina Fikel and Carina Cornesse (2020). Die Mannheimer 
Corona-Studie: Schwerpunktbericht zur Erwerbstätigkeit in Deutschland (20.3.-15.4.2020). https://
www.uni-mannheim.de/media/Einrichtungen/gip/Corona_Studie/2020-04-16_Schwerpunktbericht_
Erwerbstaetigkeit.pdf 
OECD (2020). Women at the core of the fight against COVID-19 crisis. https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/
view/?ref=127_127000-awfnqj80me&title=Women-at-the-core-of-the-fight-against-COVID-19-crisis
Research Report No. 98  Short-Run Labor Market Impacts of COVID-19, Initial Policy Measures and Beyond
56|153
Oreopoulos, Philip, Till von Wachter and Andrew Heisz (2012). The Short- and Long-Term Career Effects of 
Graduating in a Recession. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 4(1), 1-29. https://www.aeaweb.
org/articles?id=10.1257/app.4.1.1 
Pestel, Nico (2020). Wie viel Homeoffice geht eigentlich? IZA-Experte Nico Pestel: Nur jeder sechste Job in 
Deutschland eignet sich dauerhaft für Telearbeit. https://newsroom.iza.org/de/archive/opinion/wie-viel-
homeoffice-geht-eigentlich/ 
PwC 2020. Finanzielle. Unterstützung in der Covid-19-Krisenlage: Factsheet für. Startups und KMUs. Update 4. Mai 
2020. https://www.pwc.de/de/startups/finanzielle-unterstuetzung-von-startups-und-kmu-in-der-covid-
19-krisenlage.pdf
Rinne, Ulf and Klaus F. Zimmermann (2012). Another Economic Miracle? The German Labor Market and the Great 
Recession. IZA Journal of Labor Policy 1:3, 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/2193-9004-1-3 
Sachverständigenrat (2020a). Die gesamtwirtschaftliche Lage angesichts der Corona-Pandemie: Sondergutachten 
2020. Wiesbaden: Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung. 
https://www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de/fileadmin/dateiablage/gutachten/sg2020/SG2020_
Gesamtausgabe.pdf 
Sachverständigenrat (2020b). Konjunkturprognose 2020 und 2021 (June 23, 2020). Wiesbaden. https://
www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de/fileadmin/dateiablage/Konjunkturprognosen/2020/KJ2020_
Gesamtausgabe.pdf 
Schneider, Hilmar and Ulf Rinne (2019). The labor market in Germany, 2000-2018. IZA World of Labor 2019: 379. 
https://wol.iza.org/articles/the-labor-market-in-germany 
Tagesschau (2020). Corona-Soforthilfen: Tausendfach Verdacht auf Betrug. https://www.tagesschau.de/
investigativ/ndr-wdr/corona-soforthilfe-betrug-101.html 
von Gaudecker, Hans-Martin, Radost Holler, Lena Janys, Bettina M. Siflinger and Christian Zimpelmann (2020). 
Labour Supply in the Early Stages of the COVID-19 Pandemic: Empirical Evidence on Hours, Home Office, and 
Expectations. IZA Discussion Paper No. 13158. http://ftp.iza.org/dp13158.pdf 
Weber, Enzo, Anja Bauer, Johann Fuchs, Markus Hummel, Christian Hutter, Susanne Wanger and Gerd Zika (2020): 







IZA – Institute of Labor Economics
Any opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may include 
views on policy, but IZA takes no institutional policy positions. The IZA research network is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles 
of Research Integrity.
The IZA Institute of Labor Economics is an independent economic research institute that conducts research in labor economics 
and offers evidence-based policy advice on labor market issues. Supported by the Deutsche Post Foundation, IZA runs the world’s 
largest network of economists, whose research aims to provide answers to the global labor market challenges of our time. Our key 
objective is to build bridges between academic research, policymakers and society.
This series often represents preliminary work and is circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for 
its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.
Cite as:
Colussi (2020): IZA COVID-19 Crisis Response Monitoring: Italy (June 2020). 
Tommaso Colussi
Catholic University Milan 
IZA
ABSTRACT
Italy was the first European country to enter lockdown in order to contain the spread of COVID-19. While 
managing the health crisis, the Italian government introduced several measures to limit the economic 
consequences of the pandemic. The cushion provided by short- time work programs and the suspension 
of the layoffs have limited the short- term effects of COVID-19 on the labor market. However, there are 
signals that as soon as these safety nets will be over employment levels will be severely hit: between 
April 2019 and April 2020, the share of inactive workers increased and the labor demand shrunk.
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Labor market impact of COVID-19
In March 2020, Italy’s industrial production fell almost 30% and GDP contracted 4.7% 
as a consequence of the lockdown measures. In April 2020, Italy hit a new record low for 
industrial production, which contracted by 19.1% relative to March.1 However, the effects of 
the lockdown on employment levels have not yet manifested; the cushion provided by social 
safety nets and the suspension of the layoffs have limited the short-term effects of COVID-
19 on the labor market. At the end of March 2020, the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) 
registered a decrease in the unemployment rate relative to March 2019, i.e.  -11.1%, while the 
employment rate only decreased by 0.1%.2 The decline in unemployment continued in April, 
reaching the lowest figure since 2007; this however reflected a considerable increase in the 
number of economically inactive people, as shown by the figure below. At the same time, the 
employment rate in April only decreased by 1.2% with respect to March 2020.
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Italy has adopted sectoral lockdown measures to contain the spread of COVID-19: the 
government decided to shut down non-essential businesses, involving almost 8 million 
employed people. Workers employed in financial, banking and insurance sectors, as well 
as in public administration and professional services could continue their activity from 
home. On the contrary, workers employed in manufacturing, construction, tourism and 
retail suffered the most (Barbieri et al. 2020)3. In April 2020, the Italian Social Security 
Administration (INPS) registered an increase in the requests for subsidies for temporary 
reductions of hours worked (i.e. Cassa Integrazione Guadagni) of about 2,953% with 
respect to April 2019.
It is still uncertain if these workers and firms will be able to resume their activities in 
the coming weeks.  According to the estimates of the Ministry of the Economy (MEF), the 
employment is expected to fall by 2 percentage points and the unemployment to increase 
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Orientation and targeting of adopted measures
On May 14th, the Italian government approved the third and most ambitious intervention, 
the Decreto Rilancio (Relaunch Decree), to revive the Italian economy. This 55-billion-
euro plan aims at helping businesses with non-repayable grants and tax breaks; a sizable 
amount, about 16 billion euros, has been allocated to strengthen and broaden tools for 
income support, such as Cassa Integrazione Guadagni (short-time work programs), and 
allowances for self-employed.
This decree followed two previous interventions, the Cura Italia (Save Italy) and 
the Decreto Liquidità (Liquidity Decree). The first one was an immediate response to the 
COVID-19 outbreak, which aimed at (i) strengthen the heath care service, (ii) support 
businesses and families by pumping liquidity and suspending tax payments, (iii) and 
preserve employment levels by extending temporary unemployment benefits to all firms 
and by suspending layoffs for the coming 2 months. The Decreto Liquidità instead mainly 
focuses on firms; the measures involved state guarantees for 200 billion euros in favor of 
banks, ultimately enabling them to grant loans to firms of all sizes. The guarantees cover 
between 70% and 90% of the loan amounts, depending on firms’ characteristics.
The first two interventions suffered from delays and difficulties in their implementation, 
mainly because of the excessive bureaucracy in the application procedures for accessing 
benefits and loans. The Relaunch Decree should simplify administrative procedures by 
cutting down bureaucracy.
Immediate liquidity support to businesses
The Cura Italia intervention introduced social safety nets for self-employed and seasonal 
workers, two categories that generally do not have access to such benefits. These workers 
were expected to receive a 600-euro allowance for the month of March. The allowance 
was then extended for the months of April and May and raised to 1,000 euros for seasonal 
workers employed in tourism. The implementation of this measure was quite successful, 
although some delays in the payments were registered. The Social Security Administration 
(INPS) received 4.8 million requests for the allowance, 83% of them were accepted and 
processed.5 The payments for the month of March were issued Between April 14 and April 
23 while the payment for the month of April will be delivered by the end of May.
Additionally, the government compensated shop owners by granting them tax credits 
to cover 60 percent of their March rent payment. The self-employed with mortgages can 
further ask to have their payments suspended for up to 18 months, conditional on their 
revenues falling by more than third.
Following the Liquidity decrees, small and medium firms (PMI) have access the Central 
Guarantee Fund. This Fund allows PMIs to take new loans with a maximum duration of 
six years (lately extended to 10 year); these loans will be 100% guaranteed by the Italian 
government for a maximum amount of 25,000 euros; further, the capital will not have to be 
repaid until 18 months after the loan has been disbursed. There are not yet official numbers 
on the take-up rate by Italian firms; according to a recent study (Boitani et al, 2020)6, the 
number of firms granted a loan was about 300,000 out of a potential pool of 2 million firms. 
An excessive bureaucracy in the loan application is one of the reasons for this low figure. 
5 https://www.inps.it/docallegatiNP/Mig/Allegati/Audizione_19_maggio_2020_Senato_PT.pdf
6 https://www.lavoce.info/archives/66692/garanzie-bancarie-lemergenza-deve-cambiare-le-regole/
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Support of dependent workers
The Cura Italia decree limited the negative effects of the COVID-19 outbreak on 
employment mainly by suspending the layoffs for two months.  At the end of March 2020, 
the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) registered a decrease in the employment rate 
by about 0.1% with respect to March 2019.7 However, this suspension, which has been 
further extended in the Relaunch plan, will not prevent firms from dismissing workers 
in the future. Further, the measures promoted by the Italian government did not stop 
the effects of the pandemic on the demand for labor:  a recent study shows that in March 
2020 the net job creation was about 60% lower than the one registered in the previous 
year (Anastasia et al. 2020)8. At the same time, the share of inactive in the labor market 
increased by 2.3% and the unemployment rate decreased by 11.1% thus suggesting an 
increase in the number of unemployed individuals who stopped looking for a job during 
the lockdown.
To sustain income, the Italian government extended Cassa Integrazione Guadagni 
(CIG), i.e. short-time work, to all firms independently of the sector of activity and size. 
The CIG is a tool that allows workers to temporarily receive unemployment benefits, which 
generally accounts for 80% of the monthly salary, while still keeping their job.9 Once firms 
restart their activities, employees can go back to work as usual. In April and May 2020, the 
total number of requests for unemployment benefits almost exceeded the whole number of 
requests received in 2009, one of the worst years in terms of employment outcomes.  As of 
May 21th, the Social Security Administration (INPS) received more than 1.1 million requests 
for Cassa Integrazione Guadagni (CIG), 869,000 were authorized but only 510,000 were 
actually processed and paid. These delays are due to the long and complex procedure to 
grant workers the unemployment benefit and to the increase in the number of applications 
following the lockdown.10 The Relaunch Decree should ease and shorten the procedure for 
unemployment benefits. 
Working conditions and work organization
As of mid-April 2020, six weeks after the beginning of the Italian lockdown, the share of 
workers who (temporarily or permanently) stopped working was estimated to be around 
34% (Galasso, 2020).11 Among different occupations, blue collar workers were the most 
affected by the lockdown: 50% of them had to stop working.  As expected, the lockdown 
affected occupations and jobs that could not be done remotely; when considering white 
collars, only 18% could not work as a result of the lockdown, this is because a high share 
of these workers (about 66%) could continue doing their job from home. Similarly, about 
50% of service sector employees could continue working from home and only 28% of them 
had to stop working.
Italy has one of the most advanced legal frameworks for smart working (Ichino 2020), 
however this practice is not widespread especially among small and medium firms.12 
7 https://www.istat.it/it/files//2020/04/Occupati-e-disoccupati-marzo-2020.pdf
8 https://www.lavoce.info/archives/65325/mercato-del-lavoro-gia-contagiato-dal-covid-19/
9 See Giupponi and Landais “Subsidizing Labor Hoarding in Recessions: The Employment & Welfare Effects of Short Time Work” 
for an extensive review of the functioning of the CIG
10 https://www.inps.it/nuovoportaleinps/default.aspx?itemdir=53641
11 The data come from a survey (REPEAT) interviewing about 1,000 individuals representative of the Italian population. More 
information on REPEAT – REpresentations, PErceptions and ATtitudes on the Covid-19 – can be found here: https://www.
lavoce.info/archives/66253/primo-maggio-il-lavoro-in-tempi-di-lockdown/
12 https://www.lavoce.info/archives/63816/se-lepidemia-mette-le-ali-allo-smart-working/
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According to a study by Corso (2020)13, only 12% of small and medium firms in Italy have 
smart working initiatives, however this number is on the rise.  Although the restrictions 
imposed by the lockdown cannot be seen as “real” smart working, but rather forced 
“teleworking”, the Covid-19 emergency highlighted the potential of smart working and 
companies that had already introduced models of smart working found themselves at an 
advantage. This pushed companies, universities and public administration into considering 
the adoption of new technologies that allow employees to work from home.
Universities were the first institutions to react by setting lectures, seminars, exam 
and graduation sessions online. By the end of February most of Italian universities already 
adapted to the COVID shock and were able to restart their activities.  A good response 
and adaptation also came from schools all over Italy. The public administration workers 
were able to perform their task from home, such as employees of the Social Security 
Administration who have managed and processed the huge amount of applications for 
unemployment benefits (Garibaldi, 2020).14
According to a recent survey (Boeri and Caiumi, 2020), 70% of managers interviewed 
adopted technologies to allow employees to work remotely. However, only 51% of the firms 
think that this type of smart working would be beneficial in the future once the COVID-
emergency will be over.15
Finally, the closure of schools and kindergartens have placed a particular burden on 
families. This may have lasting effects on labor force participation and household work 
arrangements. Del Boca et al. (2020) find that during the pandemic in Italy, women spent 
significantly more time on housework than men, as the additional care responsibilities 
caused by school and childcare closures fell to women.16 The impact of the lockdown on labor 
market outcomes may be larger for women as a consequence of unequal intrahousehold 
distribution of additional work.
New labor market entrants
Graduating in a recession has negative and long-run effects on the wages and employment 
prospects of workers (Oreopolus et al 2012)17.
The share of inactive in April 2020 increased by 11.1% relative to April 2019. This 
is because individuals stopped looking for a job, including new labor market entrants. 
Further, the demand for labor has shrunk since the beginning of the lockdown as shown by 
Anastasia et al. (2020). In June 2020, the Italian Social Security Administration presented 
new figures about labor turnover in the first quarter of 2020. Relative to 2019, the number 
of new jobs activated in 2020 decreased by more than 9%,18 while the number of job 
separations stayed more or less constant, as shown by Figure 2:
13 https://www.som.polimi.it/en/smart-working-during-the-time-of-the-coronavirus/
14 https://www.lavoce.info/archives/64787/il-mercato-del-lavoro-si-scopre-smart/
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Some Italian regions provide daily and more detailed information on labor turnover. 
For instance, in the region of  Veneto, the number of new jobs activated in the private 
sector between February 23 and June 14 2019 was about 204,000; in 2020 the same figure 
decreased to 100,000 (-51%), while job separations decreased of about 21% (from 145,000 
to 107,000).19
As young workers have the lowest fatality rate and the lowest risk of needing 
healthcare, they should be employed to revive the economy (Anelli et al. 2020).20 However, 
the employment prospects of new labor market entrants are particularly bleak; so far, 
no measures to facilitate the job search have been introduced by the Italian Government. 
Moreover, the National Agency for Active Labour Market Policies (ANPAL) has not been 
particularly responsive.
Policy innovations and labor market trends
During the lockdown, firms, universities, and the public administration adopted smart-
working practices for their employees to carry on their activities. These practices are likely 
to continue if their impact on workers’ productivity is not negative; this clearly depends on 
whether workers adapt to the new technologies and on the type of jobs performed, e.g. the 
frequency of interactions with other people. According to Boeri et al. (2020), jobs that can be 
carried out remotely are only a small fraction of all jobs, i.e. 24%.21 This share however could 
be lower if some essential sectors, such as schools and childcare, do not resume their activities. 
A key challenge for policy makers then becomes to get people back to work without 
putting their health at risk. The question is then to mitigate the work-security tradeoff 
by identifying sectors of the economy that have the lowest levels of exposure to the virus, 
physical proximity and demographic characteristics of their workforce (Barbieri et al. 
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If a large share of the workforce could not go back to work, firms may increase 
investments in automation or reorganize production lines in order to continue their 
activities. While robots are generally perceived by workers as a threat for their jobs, they 
may help preserving labor by allowing firm to expand their production (Boeri et al. 2020). 
Next steps and fiscal viability
The Italian Government extended social safety nets to support workers and their families. 
These measures only postponed the effects of COVID-19 on the Italian labor market but 
as soon as these will be over employment levels will be severely hit; it is essential that the 
Italian government will be ready and prepared when it happens. As suggested by Lucifora 
(2020), the Italian government should invest in ALMP that should trace and treat newly 
unemployed workers.23 In particular these intervention should sustain the workers who 
is going to lose a job and facilitate his/her job search process by (i) identifying and (ii) 
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ABSTRACT
The Netherlands witnessed an unprecedented drop in hours worked  of -11% in March, which dropped 
further to -15% in May. The drop in employment in persons was more modest, a total of -2.2% by May. 
The massive expansion of short-time work in the Netherlands is likely to play an important role in this, 
where now one quarter of all employees works in a firm that is using short-time work. Initially, speed 
was of the essence, and the targeting of the policies was limited. The current policy debate is about 
improving targeting and improving incentives for output and reallocation.
IZA COVID-19 Crisis Response Monitoring
Netherlands (June 2020)
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Labor market impact of COVID-19
The latest data from Statistics Netherlands shows a substantial drop in employed persons 
(Figure 1 left). This reduction was limited to -17 thousand persons in March, then increased 
to -160 thousand persons in April, and dropped back to -24 thousand persons in May, 
leading to a cumulative reduction of -201 thousand persons since the start of COVID-19 
pandemic (-2,2%). However, so far, the increase in the number of unemployed persons 
was moderate, up 56 thousand persons between February and May1, indicating that the 
labor force participation rate has fallen, from 71.4 in February to 70.2 in May.2, 3 The special 
policies that were enacted or expanded, like short-time work, are likely to have limited the 
drop in employment (CPB, 2020b).
The large drop in employed persons during April and May was preceded by an 
unprecedented drop in hours worked per week, which we already observed in March. After 
the lockdown mid-March, hours worked per week dropped by 11% (-4 hours), and have 
remained at that lower level in April (Figure 1 right). In May the number of hours worked 
continued to fall by another 4% (-1 hour).4, 5 We still have to see if the drop in hours worked 
will rebound to some extent in June, which marked the beginning of some substantial 
alleviations of the lockdown. The upcoming recession, however, is likely to be quite severe, 
with a forecasted drop of GDP of -6% in 2020 (CPB, 2020c).
Figure 1: Employment in persons and hours worked per week
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1 The number of unemployment insurance recipients increased by 61.000 since February (+25%). 
2 The unemployment rate increased from 2.9% in February to 3.6% in May. 
3 For other recent labor market developments in the Netherlands, see CPB (2020a) and CPB (2020b). 
4 In April, this drop in hours worked was particularly large in the catering industry (-48%), the cultural sector (-
35%), retail (-18%) and transport and communication (-12%). The drop in hours was more pronounced for self-
employed (-24%) than for employees (-12%), for women (-16%) than for men (-11%) and for low educated (-21%) 
than for high educated (-11%). 
5 The figures in the right panel of Figure 1 are slightly different from the May country report. This is because the 
sample of persons who completed the survey for the months March-May is somewhat different from the sample of 
persons who completed the survey for the months March-April. 
Source: Statistics Netherlands (employed, up to and including May 2020) and LISS-panel (hours worked).
1 The number of unemployment insurance recipients increased by 61.000 since February (+25%).
2 The unemployment rate increased from 2.9% in February to 3.6% in May.
3 For other recent labor market developments in the Netherlands, see CPB (2020a) and CPB (2020b).
4 In April, this drop in hours worked was particularly large in the catering industry (-48%), the cultural sector (-35%), retail 
(-18%) and transport and communication (-12%). The drop in hours was more pronounced for self-employed (-24%) than for 
employees (-12%), for women (-16%) than for men (-11%) and for low educated (-21%) than for high educated (-11%).
5 The figures in the right panel of Figure 1 are slightly different from the May country report. This is because the sample of persons 
who completed the survey for the months March-May is somewhat different from the sample of persons who completed the 
survey for the months March-April.
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Orientation and targeting of adopted measures
Around a quarter of all workers in the Netherlands are now in one way or another dependent 
on the special support policies that were enacted or expanded (Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Employment, 2020).6 In early June, 144 thousand firms with in total 2.1 million 
employees (24% of all employees in the Netherlands) have claimed short-time work 
subsidies (NOW, Tijdelijke Noodmaatregel Overbrugging voor Werkgelegenheid). Firms 
that have a drop in sales of more than 20% can get a subsidy of 90% of the wage bill that 
corresponds with the drop in sales. As a result, the Dutch government has supported firms 
in advance with an amount of 4.5 billion euro at the beginning of June, which corresponds 
to a three-month total of 8.7 billion euro. Furthermore, it is estimated that around 374 
thousand self-employed (25% of all self-employed in the Netherlands) have claimed 
a special form of welfare from municipalities (Tozo, Tijdelijke overbruggingsregeling 
zelfstandig ondernemers). This special form of welfare does not depend on partner income 
or wealth. Firms and self-employed could initially claim the NOW and Tozo for 3 months, 
respectively, from March onwards. Additionally, the government has granted firms tax 
deferrals (for a total of 10 billion euro by mid June).
The focus of the Dutch government with the NOW and Tozo was on getting support 
to firms and workers quickly. This has kept individuals out of unemployment, at least for 
the time being. This is generally considered to have been a timely and successful initial 
policy response.7 At the start of June both schemes (NOW and Tozo) have been renewed 
for another 4 months until October 1st, although the terms have somewhat changed: the 
penalty for people leaving the firm within the NOW is reduced and the Tozo becomes subject 
to a partner income test. These adjustments to the original schemes are aimed to make the 
support more targeted, and to mitigate adverse incentives for reallocation and working 
hours.8 Furthermore, concerns have been expressed that the special support policies may fail 
to protect persons with flexible hours contracts, agency workers and seasonal workers. The 
government is currently setting up a scheme of lump sum transfers for ‘flexible’ workers that 
lose a substantial part of their income but do not have access to unemployment insurance or 
welfare (TOFA, Tijdelijke overbruggingsregeling voor flexibele arbeidskrachten).9
Immediate liquidity support to businesses
As noted above, some 25% of self-employed have claimed the special welfare benefits 
(Tozo), which runs through the municipalities. Self-employed can claim the special 
welfare benefits form March, actual transfers have started in April. The government chose 
for quick delivery in the first installment of the Tozo, which was independent of wealth 
and partner income. There is no information on the extent to which these measures have 
mitigated the economic impact of COVID-19 on self-employed yet. The Tozo-scheme has 
been recently extended until October 1st, though this renewed scheme is now subject to a 
partner income test.
6 For an overview of all financial policy measures in the Netherlands related to COVID-19, see: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/
onderwerpen/coronavirus-financiele-regelingen/overzicht-financiele-regelingen.
7 According to survey results from the end of March reported in Von Gaudecker et al. (2020), only about 10% of employees was 
worried about their job in the next 4 weeks, in part due to the special policies to maintain employment, whereas about 30% of 
self-employed was worried about losing their work.
8 Indeed, e.g. Cahuc (2019) and Krugman (2020) note that short-time work arrangements like the NOW work best for a short-
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Small firms can also use the NOW for their employees, see also above. In addition, 
in selected sectors that are hit particularly hard, firms can get a one-time subsidy of 4 
thousand euro (TOGS). In early June, about 200 thousand firms received the TOGS. This 
amounts to a total financial support of 790 million euro (Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Climate Policy, 2020). Again, speed was considered to be of the essence. Furthermore, 
all firms can delay paying their taxes and many firms can also delay payments on their 
loans. There is no information on the extent to which these measures have mitigated the 
economic impact of COVID-19 on small firms yet.
Support of dependent workers
So far we have witnessed a substantial decline in employment in persons, though the 
decline up to and including April (and May) appears to be quite limited compared to other 
western countries (CPB, 2020b). This is generally considered to be related to the special 
policy measures taken, including financial support for short-time work10, which also 
contains a penalty on dismissals, and financial support for the self-employed. To the 
best of our knowledge, this is typically not being complemented by sectoral or firm-level 
agreements. However, note that there are already strong incentives for firms to maintain 
their employees, as they receive less subsidy and an additional penalty when people leave 
the firm during the subsidy period. It remains to be seen how the renewed support scheme, 
with a reduced dismissal penalty, will affect employment. Regarding ALMPs, training and 
schooling programs for job seekers have been put on hold.11
Working conditions and work organization
In general, there has been a large shift in hours worked at the workplace and hours worked 
from home. The drop in hours worked is most pronounced in sectors where there is limited 
opportunity to work from home, like the catering sector, the culture and entertainment 
sector and the retail sector (see Figure 2). In the business, financial and public services 
sectors and the education sector there has been a limited drop in hours worked, due to a 
large shift to working from home. 12 As expected, the drop in hours is much less pronounced 
for ‘essential workers’ like doctors, nurses, teachers, policemen and -women, military 
personnel, people that work in transportation, media or supermarkets (see Figure 3). 
Several sectors have witnessed a large increase in demand, like supermarkets, online shops 
and delivery services.
10 This is consistent with the evidence presented in Cahuc et al. (2018) and Giupponi and Landais (2020) for the short-run effects 
of short-time work policies in France and Italy, respectively, during the Great Recession.
11 Source: https://www.fnv.nl/corona/veelgestelde-vragen-per-sector/veelgestelde-vragen-voor-uitkeringsgerechtigden#wer
kloosheid.
12 See the May country report for the Netherlands for worked hours at the workplace and at home by sector.
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Figure 2:  Hours worked by sector
IZA COVID-19 Crisis Response Monitoring: Netherlands 
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Figure 3: Hours worked at the workplace and at home, essential and other workers
IZA COVID-19 Crisis Response Monitoring: Netherlands 
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Figure 3 Hours worked at t e workplace  at home, e sential and other workers 
 
Source: LISS-panel. Source: LISS-panel.
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Research provides a mixed picture of the effects of the corona crisis on gender inequality 
in the Netherlands (Yerkes et al., 2020). On the one hand, more fathers than mothers take 
on additional care responsibilities (22% versus 12%), which seems to be related to the fact 
that women are overrepresented in crucial professions. On the other, more mothers than 
fathers have less free time (57% versus 36%) and experience more work pressure (39% 
versus 31%).
Some firms had to shut down business temporarily because of outbreaks of COVID-19, 
in particular the meatpacking industry, which employs many migrant workers which live 
in close quarters and travelled to work packed in small buses.13
New labor market entrants
Previous research has shown that vocational and academic graduates in the Netherlands 
did suffer in terms of wages for 6 to 8 years after graduating, and to a lesser extent in the 
employment probability, when graduating during a recession.14 Given the social distancing 
measures and overall decline in labor demand (vacancies have plummeted after the 
lockdown15), things look pretty dim for new labor market entrants. We are not aware of 
(sizeable) policy innovations and initiatives related to hiring of new labor market entrants 
or the provision of apprenticeships (these have been postponed for vocational education 
where the sectors had to close or significantly reduce their activities due to the COVID-19 
pandemic and the resulting social distancing rules).16
Policy innovations and labor market trends
The response of the government during this unprecedented crisis has also been 
unprecedented in terms of the speed and breadth of the interventions. Perhaps as a result, 
the consequences for employment in persons in the affected sectors and other sectors 
so far appear relatively mild from an international perspective. This could be considered 
remarkable. These are still relatively early days in the pandemic, let alone the aftermath. 
Hence, it is hard to identify changes in medium- and or long-term trends, which will also 
depend on the length of the crisis. However, it is not unreasonable to assume that we will 
see an acceleration in working from home and a more rapid adoption of technologies to 
collaborate and work online. Furthermore, online shops are likely to get a boost, as they 
did in Asia after the 2003 outbreak of SARS.17 Furthermore, at least for the medium run, 
we may expect reshoring of certain activities and a drop in international labor mobility. 
Even more difficult to gauge are the long-term effects. An optimistic view is that this was a 
prototypical external shock, not due to an imbalance in the system, which suggests that we 
may return to the growth path from before the COVID-19 pandemic eventually.18
13 See: https://nos.nl/artikel/2334580-vleesindustrie-blijkt-coronahaard-bonden-en-werkgevers-willen-testen-en-controles.html.
14 See: Van den Berge (2018).
15 By the end of March, vacancies had dropped by 21% (CBS Netherlands, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/
coronavirus-covid-19/ouders-scholieren-en-studenten-kinderopvang-en-onderwijs).
16 Information for students is available here (https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/coronavirus-covid-19/ouders-
scholieren-en-studenten-kinderopvang-en-onderwijs).
17 See: https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/26/chinas-2002-2003-sars-outbreak-helped-alibaba-become-e-commerce-giant.html.
18 See: Krugman (2020).
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Next steps and fiscal viability
The most recent economic outlook of CPB (2020c) revealed that the shock to public 
finances due to the crisis and the special policies will remain bearable in the Netherlands, 
even in the most severe scenario. The gross government debt increases very sharply in the 
base scenario though, from 48.7% of GDP in 2019 to 62% in 2020 and 61% in 2021. Also in 
the scenario where we have a weaker recovery than in the base scenario and in a scenario 
with a second contamination wave, gross government debt will remain sustainable, at a 
debt level of 76% of GDP in 2021.
However, it is now also becoming clear that this will not be a V-shaped recession, but 
more likely to be a U-shaped or `Nike-swoosh’ shaped recession. This is because at least 
part of the social distancing policies will remain in effect until a vaccine or cure arrives. 
Hence, a reallocation of workers from firms and sectors that are shrinking to other firms 
and sectors is becoming inevitable. Hence, we should protect workers, but at the same time 
provide sufficient incentives and possibilities for workers to relocate to where they are the 
most productive. In this process we also have to make sure that there is not an excessive 
loss of firm- and sector-specific capital in the process of scaling down, and scaling up once 
the vaccine or cure arrives.19, 20
19 See also Blanchard et al. (2020).
20 The projected recession has also fueled the debate about the rather strict employment protection of workers with a permanent 
contract combined with limited restrictions for the use of ‘flexible’ contracts, where ‘flexible’ workers typically have limited 
insurance but sometimes special tax deductions (self-employed), which may be one of the reasons why the share of flexible 
work in the Netherlands is relatively high from an international perspective. This was already high on the agenda following the 
report of the Committee for the Regulation of Work (Commissie Regulering van Werk) published in January 2020. (https://
www.reguleringvanwerk.nl/) 
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Portugal declared the State of Emergency over coronavirus on March 18 and strict lockdown measures 
were imposed. To sustain the effects of the shock the government implemented a set of exceptional 
measures, which have cost 780 million euros until June. Although the social climate is quiet, the 
measures do not fully address the income loss suffered by agents and the effects of the economic 
slowdown. Recent forecasts by the EC suggest that the Portuguese GDP will fall by 6.8% in 2020, but 
will recover (5.8%) in 2021. If this happens, this cycle may in fact be closer to the “V” shape.
IZA COVID-19 Crisis Response Monitoring
Portugal (June 2020)
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Labor market impact of COVID-19
Portugal declared the State of Emergency over coronavirus on March 18. According to data 
provided by the Portuguese Institute of Employment and Professional Training (IEFP, 
2020), in May (March) 2020 the number of registered unemployed in mainland Portugal 
increased by 4.2% (9.6%) comparing to April (February) and by 36.2% (3.7%) comparing 
to May (March) 2019. This increase is mainly due to the increase of registered short-term 
unemployed (less than 12 months). Amongst the registered unemployed in May, 45% were 
males and 55% females. However, despite the greater share of females in the group of 
unemployed, the observed increase between May 2020 and May 2019 was larger for males 
(39.5%) than for females (33.7%).
Workers without a higher education degree were the most affected at this initial stage 
of the crisis, for whom we observe an average increase in registered unemployment of 
38.3% between May 2020 and May 2019 – which contrasts with an increase of 22.8% for 
workers with a university degree. There are no significant differences by gender across 
levels of educational attainment. 
Considering occupations, the worst hit groups were: Plant and machine operators 
and assemblers (62% increase comparing to May 2019); Sales and services workers (50% 
increase); Craft and related trades workers (42% increase); and Clerks (36% increase). 
Unemployment increased by 10% between February and March 2020 in the three main 
sectors of economic activity. This initial situation changed during May 2020 (full month 
in lockdown). Compared to May 2019 the number of registered unemployed increased by 
13.5% in the primary sector, by 27.8% in the secondary sector, and by 44.7% in the tertiary 
sector. These averages, however, hide great differences across the activities that compose 
the sectors. For example, within the manufacturing sector the worst hit activities were: 
Motor vehicles (45.9% increase, comparing to May 2019); Manufacture of basic metals 
and of fabricated metal products (45.4% increase); Textile, clothing and leather industries 
(43% increase); and Petroleum, chemical and rubber manufacturing (34.5% increase). 
Amongst the services sector the worst hit activities were: Lodging, restaurants and hotels 
(89.3% increase compared to May 2019); Transports and storage (62.8% increase) and 
Real estate (57.5% increase). Furthermore, the number of job offers fell by 39% when 
comparing May 2020 to May 2019 (although the number of job offers increased between 
April and May 2020 by 5%). Which makes finding a new job a difficult task for existing and 
newly unemployed as well as for labour market entrants. In Table 1 we provide a summary 
of the labour market impacts of this crisis in Portugal.
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Table 1:  Labour Market Impact of COVID-19 in Portugal (as of April 2020) – Registered 
Unemployment, Job Offers and Placements
2020 2019 Change in May
May April March May Previous month Previous year
Abs.  %  Abs. %
Registered 
unemployment (stock) 384 504 368 925 321 164 282 292 +15 579 +4,2 +102 212 +36,2 
< 12 months 258 368 244 142 200 082 157 146 +14 226 +5,8 +101 222 +64,4 
>= 12 months 126 136 124 783 121 082 125 146 +1 353 +1,1 + 990 +0,8 
Registered un-
employment (inflow) 44 718 63 643 51 432 36 209  -18 925 -29,7 +8 509 +23,5 
Employed job seekers 36 056 37 729 37 390 42 104  -1 673 -4,4  -6 048 -14,4 
Job offers (stock) 11 235 10 668 12 000 18 434 + 567 +5,3  -7 199 -39,1 
Job offers (inflow) 6 761 3 040 7 356 12 984 +3 721 +122,4  -6 223 -47,9 
Job placements 4 287 2 233 5 773 7 496 +2 054 +92,0  -3 209 -42,8 
Source: Institute of Employment and Professional Training [IEFP].
The State of Emergency was replaced by a State of Calamity on May the 3rd. However, 
despite expectations and incentives for the economy to parsimoniously get back to 
business, labour market conditions continued to deteriorate, albeit at a slower rate, during 
May. On May 27th 1,332,114 workers worked in firms that implemented partial or full-time 
layoff (which contrasts with only 72,507 on March 31st), more than half of these workers 
worked in Manufacturing, Gross and retail trade, and Restaurants and hotels (MTSSS, 
2020). Therefore, the effort to make is to prevent these laid-off workers from being made 
redundant and dismissed permanently. Otherwise, unemployment is likely to increase in 
the medium term (not immediately because of the ban on dismissals associated with the 
layoff regulations) because of large-scale redundancies (see Figure 1).
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aimed at tackling this crisis (e.g. the simplified layoff scheme and the credit lines for firms) 
require that firms do not dismiss permanent workers and that they do not proceed with 
collective dismissals for some time (for 60 days after the layoff ends, and until December 
2020 for those who take up credit lines). Self-employed workers account for 12% of total 
employment (14% male and 9% female), and 5% were business owners in 2019. We expect 
this crisis to have a significant impact on the activity and earnings of these workers. The 
SURE program by the EC may be an essential tool to help this group of workers.
Orientation and targeting of adopted measures
The OECD listing of measures is an appropriate summary of the government actions 
to tackle the impact of the health crisis over the National State of Emergency period 
(March 18th – May 2nd). However, since May 3rd Portugal started to ease the lockdown 
restrictions (and entered a National State of Calamity). New guidelines were issued, which 
include measures to reduce workers’ exposure to COVID-19 in the workplace, such as 
a recommendation for telework when and as much as possible during May, and partial 
telework with lagged schedules or shadow teams from June.1
According to a report by the Portuguese Minister of Labour and Social Solidarity 
(Godinho, 2020), as of 16 June 2020 the set of exceptional support measures to families, 
workers and firms had already benefited 1,222,000 people, 144,464 firms, and 778 million 
euros had been paid to recipients. Employment protection measures were by far the most 
expensive component of the measures adopted. The simplified layoff involved, thus far, 
an investment of 580 million euros (this measure was extended until July 2020). Income 
support for self-employed and members of statutory bodies cost 104 million euros. 
Exceptional support measures to families, such as subsidies for prophylactic isolation, 
for sick leaves, and to care for children aged under 12 (schools were closed at the start of 
the State of Emergency) cost 43 million euros. The automatic extension of unemployment 
benefits and of social inclusion income (for those who were receiving these subsidies in 
March 2020) cost 18 million euros. Furthermore, credit lines for financial support to firms 
involved an investment of 6,2 billion euros. To access these credit lines, however, firms 
have to declare that they assume the responsibility of not dismissing permanent workers 
and of not initiating any collective dismissal process before the end of December 2020.2 
All political parties approved the tools adopted to sustain the effects of the nationwide 
lockdown. It is difficult to sort the measures according to their relevance in social terms – 
all are important and each tackles a different issue. However, albeit costly, the temporary 
layoff scheme is arguably one of the most important measures adopted. This tool not 
only sustains the transition from employment to unemployment (at least for permanent 
workers), but can also be taken as a signalling device from the government to ensure that 
this is a temporary exogenous shock. In fact, the government appears to be in an active 
effort to avoid a shift in expectations amongst the economic agents, which could have 
severe consequences for the recovery phase. Therefore, the feeling is that it is “worth it” to 
help the labour market keep its structure and allow it to come back to business as the shock 
subsides. Since schools were closed during the lockdown (and will not open before the next 
academic year), income support for parents to stay home and look after their children is 
also a tool of utmost importance.
1 See plan for lifting lockdown measures: https://covid19estamoson.gov.pt/plano-desconfinamento-medidas-gerais/
2 ht tps : //w w w. spgm.pt /fotos/produtos _ documentos/decl ar ac ao _ compromis so _ manutenc ao _ pos tos _ de _
trabalho_5669791165ea16f8c56821.docx
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Although the social climate is quiet, the measures do not fully address the income 
loss suffered by all economic agents. Furthermore, temporary workers, the self-employed, 
small business owners and labour market entrants are particularly vulnerable groups (both 
in terms of income loss and of labour market status). Media also reported that the number 
of requests to the national network of food banks tripled in April when compared to the 
previous month. 3
Immediate liquidity support to businesses
There have been plenty of initiatives aimed at supporting the labour market (supply and 
demand sides). Exceptional support measures for include: (i) extraordinary support to 
maintain employment contracts (credit lines and simplified layoff rules); (ii) creation of 
an extraordinary training plan; (iii) a temporary exemption from payment of the social 
security contributions payable by the employer;  (iv) an extraordinary financial incentive 
to support the normalisation of the company’s activity; and (v) a ban on dismissals. 
According to a report by the Bank of Portugal there is a non-linear relationship between 
the percentage of firms without liquidity to face the fixed costs and the number of days 
of reduced activity. This percentage is larger amongst large firms and firms within the 
restaurants and hotels industry. The simplified layoff rules help alleviate this problem. 
Under layoff the share of firms with liquidity issues from reduced activity is similar to the 
share that we would observe in normal circumstances. Therefore, it is expected that the 
implemented measures will help preserve firms’ solvency in the long term and avoid firm 
closures. As mentioned previously (Figure 1), as of May 27, 111,536 firms had applied for 
layoff (involving 1,332,114 workers, about ¼ of the active population in February 2020). 
Given the scale of the task, however, some concerns arise as financial support takes time 
to reach its recipients (Bank of Portugal, 2020).
The self-employed and the members of statutory bodies were also targeted by ALMP 
by being allowed to request support for reduced economic activity (from April 1). On May 
8th, the income support eligibility conditions for self-employed and small business owners 
were enlarged in order to cover individuals not eligible for unemployment benefits. In 
Figure 2 we present the cumulative number of requests for financial support by the self-
employed (from April 1) and by members of statutory bodies (from April 20). During April 
186,000 self-employed and nearly 12,500 members of statutory bodies (of firms without 
registered employees) requested support.
3 https://rr.sapo.pt/2020/04/30/pais/pedidos-ao-banco-alimentar-triplicam-sem-emprego-muitos-dependem-de-apoios-
para-comer/noticia/191287/
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Figure 2: Requests for support measures by self-employed and members of statutory bodies
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Support of dependent workers
Official data reports an increase of 91,488 registered unemployed workers between 
February and May 2020, which corresponds to 36% compared to May 2019 (see Table 1). We 
also know that 111,536 firms joined the simplified layoff scheme (thus 1,332,114 workers are 
at risk of being at least partially out of work, whilst still keeping their jobs). The magnitude 
and the conditions of access to the simplified layoff suggests that should there not be any 
ALMP such as those implemented to tackle the crisis, labour market outcomes could be 
very different.
The suspension of employment contracts (layoff) is predicted in the General Labour 
Law. On March 15 the government defined new conditions of access to this tool (in particular, 
it clarified/ adjusted the meaning of “entrepreneurial crisis” which is a necessary condition 
to implement layoff) and simplified the procedures for requesting layoff, e.g. firms are 
exempted from presenting some documental proofs, but may be subject to inspection in 
the future and penalties can be applied. Under layoff, workers receive ⅔ of their gross pay, 
up to a maximum of €1,905. 70% of the workers’ pay is paid by Social Security and 30% 
is paid by the employer. Usually, layoff lasts for a month and can be extended monthly up 
to a maximum of 6 months (Order 71-A/2020, March 15). During the layoff period, and for 
60 days after it has ended, employment contracts cannot be terminated under collective 
dismissal or by reasons of extinction of the job for workers who were under layoff (Article 
13, Decree-Law 10-G/2020, March 26).4
4 Exceptions include the end of temporary employment contracts and fair cause for dismissal.
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Another measure aimed at supporting the income of dependent workers relates to the 
extraordinary extension of unemployment benefits and all benefits of the Social Security 
system. For example, a person for whom the period of entitlement to unemployment 
benefits ended from March onwards, had that period automatically extended until June 30 
(Decree-law 10-F/2020, March 26).
We do not have much information on support for job-seekers, which is understandable 
because the economy came to a halt during the State of Emergency and did not improve 
much during May. What we do know, however, is that the duty to actively search for a job 
while unemployed was suspended on March 19 (Dispatch 3485-C/2020, March 19). Once 
the lockdown measures are progressively lifted, and firms restart their activity, it is likely 
that a discussion about measures aimed at creating jobs will surface. At this moment, the 
government and social partners are more focussed on trying to stop the bleeding rather 
than on healing the wound. 
Working conditions and work organization
The major novelty over this period is the shift into tele(home)work, where possible. There 
are some potential positive effects of such work practices on (i) workers (improving 
the work, family and private life balance), (ii) employers (increasing productivity and 
efficiency) and (iii) society at large (higher labour force participation for women and 
reduction in traffic congestion). 58% of the firms have workers in telework arrangements, 
mainly in large (93%) and medium size (73%) firms. Only 30% of micro firms have at least 
one worker in telework (INEa, 2020). 
However, flexible working time arrangements and new working practices are not gender, 
age and household type neutral. The main shortcomings associated to flexible working times 
relate to: (i) the blurring boundaries between working and family time, which may worsen 
working and living conditions for workers, especially in the case of tele(home)working, 
with the risks of longer working hours, as well as the personal costs due to isolation, 
loss of visibility and lower career perspectives; and to (ii) the reduced predictability of 
working time, which is particularly negative for workers with care responsibilities. Workers 
with school-age children, who were themselves experiencing the novelty of tele(home)
schooling, have reported feeling overwhelmed with the whole situation. There has been a 
specific subsidy aimed at financially support workers with children under age 12 who have 
to stay at home because of school closures. Not all eligible workers applied to this subsidy. 
One can guess two reasons for that: (i) it implies a loss of income (loss of 1/3 of the base 
pay) and (ii) people are afraid of losing their jobs. It is hard to tell if Portugal is experiencing 
a reactivation of traditional gender roles. Official sources do not, as yet, report how care 
responsibilities were organized by gender. However, a survey conducted by Catholic 
University Lisbon (CESOP, 2020) concluded that “Women, more than men, are caring for the 
family, in lay-off and without activity. Men, more than women, have kept their jobs in the same 
venue.”5  Apart from this subsidy, to the best of our knowledge, there have been no other 
tools to respond to this new situation. 
Sectors that report an increased or normal workload are health and ICT sectors.
5 “Elas, mais do que eles, na assistência à família, em lay-off e sem atividade. Eles, mais do que elas, a manter as mesmas funções 
nos mesmos locais” online at: https://visao.sapo.pt/atualidade/economia/2020-05-14-covid-19-mais-mulheres-que-
homens-em-assistencia-a-familia-lay-off-ou-sem-atividade-estudo/
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New labor market entrants
Nationwide, there has not been much discussion of this topic, which is a bit worrying. After 
the Recent Great Recession, the EU used structural funds to tackle youth unemployment. 
But nothing, as yet, has been presented as a policy envisaging the integration of young 
people in the labour market (both at the EU and the national level).6 We do sense some 
concerns in public opinion about young workers in their 30s who are now experiencing the 
second recession. For labour market entrants, however, discussions are mostly focused on 
how and/or when they will finish their degrees (national exams, university admissions, 
university graduations). It seems that uncertainty on the type of recession/recovery (L, 
U, V, W, Nike Swoosh) helps confusion and fosters the lack of action. For the optimistic, 
who foresee a V shape recession, the problem is only temporary – therefore the market 
will pick up quickly. However, we know that for recent graduates it is urgent to enter the 
market shortly after graduation, otherwise they will be competing with the class of 2021, 
and compared to these the 2020 graduates will be a rotten apple. Overall, the issue with 
new labour market entrants is similar to that of job-seekers: the government and social 
partners are mostly focussed on preventing the economy from collapsing during/after the 
lockdown. We can also guess that it is difficult to design any policy that fosters employment 
while the economy is shut-down, time stands still and everyone is asked to be at home 
waiting for better days.
Applications for a job by employed job-seekers decreased during this period. 
Applications for a job by employed job seekers represented 7% of the total requests for a 
job in May 2020, which contrasts with 7.6% (8.2%) in April (March) 2020 and 9.7% in May 
2019. Overall, the number of employed job seekers decreased by 14.4% between May 2019 
and May 2020 (IEFP, 2020).
Policy innovations and labor market trends
The simplified layoff rules, although common in other European countries, were the most 
important and innovative policy measure. The main concern reported by the employers was 
the administrative and bureaucratic burden, despite the procedures being “simplified”, 
which implied additional costs and uncertainty regarding the eligibility conditions and the 
time frame to get the support.
Local authorities have also tried to ameliorate the conditions of their businesses and 
citizens. For example, some municipalities have exempted business from fees, others 
have changed regulations to allow business to operate in wider outdoor areas. We are also 
observing a fast digitalization of the economy. Besides tele-work and tele-school, actions 
are being taken to support local producers and businesses and platforms are being created 
to ease the communication between producers and consumers. Since local and family 
businesses can be an important source of support for the economy, any strategy that helps 
these firms to survive during the crisis are welcome. Some sectors and firms adjusted 
quickly, the textile sector and some tech firms are now producing all sorts of gear needed 
to tackle this disease (protective gear, ventilators, etc). Some firms producing canned food 
and cereals and its derivatives (pasta, flour) have more than tripled their production. Will 
these expanding sectors compensate for all other losses? The future will tell.
Most of our economic activity relies on manufacturing and services. It is possible that 
some change may happen in some services, e.g., employers may be less reluctant to allow 
6 http://www.bollettinoadapt.it/old/files/document/19711youth_action_tea.pdf
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working from home in some sectors and workers may be more open to new work practices. 
Over this crisis, it has also become apparent that long supply chains may be a problem in 
particular when the world shuts its doors. Will this suffice to induce structural change in 
what we do and how we do it? We will see. 
Recent forecasts predict a sharp decrease in Portuguese exports, following the global 
economic downturn. This shock will mainly affect export manufacturing branches, in 
particular Metal working, Automotive components industry, and Textiles, clothing, 
leather and footwear sectors, that showed an impressive recent export performance, not 
only due to quality improvements but also due to cost competitiveness, with export prices 
relative to Portugal’s competitors depreciating by around 6% since 2009 (OECD, 2019). The 
reallocation of global value chains can benefit these industries, as they compete closely 
with eastern Asia producers. On the other hand, since Portugal is a small open economy, 
any significant increase in barriers to international trade can reverse the export growth to 
non-European countries.
Next steps and fiscal viability
The strict lockdown measures and support from the government are not a long run 
equilibrium and cannot be sustained for a long period of time. This becomes apparent when 
we consider that most initiatives have an exceptional and temporary nature.
Overall, government actions tried to sustain the impact of the shock and avoid mass 
job destruction and firm closures. For the near future, it is important not to let the market 
adjust their expectations to the disrupted lockdown scenario. Instead, it is important 
that a majority trusts that “all we be well” and uses this positive expectation to rapidly 
adjust to a new way of living. If this happens, our recovery may in fact be closer to the 
“V” shape. Recent forecasts by the European Commission seem to lie on this scenario. 
The unemployment rate in Portugal is expected to rise by 3.2 percentage points in 2020 
(6.5% in 2019 to 9.7% in 2020, and 7.4% in 2021). The same projections suggest that the 
Portuguese GDP will fall by 6.8% in 2020 (below the EU average of -7.7%), but will recover 
in 2021 (expected growth of 5.8%). Using data from the Office for National Statistics (INE 
b, 2020), I Figure 3 we plot the Portuguese GDP in million Euros (chained volume series, 
reference year 2016) and date the phases of the cycle. During the first quarter of 2020 the 
Portuguese GDP fell by 3.8% compared to the previous quarter and by 2.3% compared to 
the same quarter in 2019. The future will tell the shape of this cycle.
Figure 3: Portuguese GDP
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Since Portugal was one of the countries involved in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis it is important 
to also note the projections made for the Public Budget Balance (as a percentage of GDP): -6.5% in 
2020 and -1.8% in 2021.7 The high public debt (118% of the GDP in 2019, 132% in 2020 and 124% in 
2021) prevents a more effective public support, not only to keep interest rates below 1%, but also to 
prevent the transmission to the banking sector, which remains fragile in spite of recent improvements. 
This raises questions on what the European response to the economic crisis that followed the outbreak 
of the COVID-19 disease, and support to member countries, will be. So far, the SURE (Support to 
mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency) program has been approved by the Council of the EU 
(which will be running, at least, from June 2020 to December 2022). This program provides loans at 
favourable rates to the member states to “cover the costs directly related to the creation or extension of 
national short-time work schemes, and other similar measures they have put in place for the self-
employed, as a response to the current crisis” (EC, 2020). It is difficult to foresee the effects of this 
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Since Portugal was one of the countries involved in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis it is 
important to also note the projections made for the Public Budget Balance (as a percentage 
of GDP): -6.5% in 2020 and -1.8% in 2021.7 The high public debt (118% of the GDP in 2019, 
132% in 2020 and 124% in 2021) prevents a more effective public support, not only to keep 
interest rates below 1%, but also to prevent the transmission to the banking sector, which 
remains fragile in spite of recent improvements. This raises questions on what the European 
response to the economic crisis that followed the outbreak of the COVID-19 disease, and 
support to member countries, will be. So far, the SURE (Support to mitigate Unemployment 
Risks in an Emergency) program has been approved by the Council of the EU (which will 
be running, at least, from June 2020 to December 2022). This program provides loans at 
favourable rates to the member states to “cover the costs directly related to the creation or 
extension of national short-time work schemes, and other similar measures they have put 
in place for the self-employed, as a response to the current crisis” (EC, 2020). It is difficult 
to foresee the effects of this program in Portugal both in terms of its effectiveness on labour 
market outcomes (since it is focussed on short-term work and on self-employment) and in 
terms of the balance of national accounts (since it is a loan).
7 https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-performance-and-forecasts/economic-performance-country/
portugal/economic-forecast-portugal_en
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Spain is one of the countries that has been hit hardest by COVID-19 during the first half of 2020. For 
this reason, the lockdown has been stricter and longer than in other European countries in order to 
flatten the curve. Around 6 million workers are now unemployed or covered by temporary employment 
adjustment schemes (ERTEs - Expedientes de Regulación Temporal de Empleo). Different measures 
(“Social Shield”) have been adopted in order to ensure an adequate level of social protection of workers 
such as the new minimum income scheme (Ingreso Minimo Vital – IMV). However, the impact on public 
accounts will be significant, and it will take time to come back to a sustainable path.
IZA COVID-19 Crisis Response Monitoring
Spain (June 2020)
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Labor market impact of COVID-19
Spain is one of the countries that has been hit hardest by COVID-19 between the first half of 
2020. The magnitude of the health crisis also explains why the lockdown has been stricter 
and longer than in other European countries with notable exceptions such as Italy and France. 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the Government Stringency Index for Spain computed by the 
Oxford Coronavirus Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT). This index is a composite 
measure of nine of the response metrics: school closures; workplace closures; cancellation 
of public events; restrictions on public gatherings; closures of public transport; stay-at-
home requirements; public information campaigns; restrictions on internal movements; and 
international travel controls. The index on any given day is calculated as the mean score of 
the nine metrics, each taking a value between 0 and 100. A higher score indicates a stricter 
government response (i.e. 100 = strictest response). As we can see from this figure, in mid-
March the Spanish government started to adopt measures to fight against the pandemics. 
These measures became stricter at the end of the month with a full lockdown (except for 
essential activities) for two weeks, although several restrictions are still in place. Table 1 
presents the chronology and a brief summary of the adopted measures in this context, that 
are now being relaxed although several restrictions are still in force. As also shown in Figure 
1, measures have been effective as it has been possible to flatten the curve and to significantly 
reduce the number of new COVID-19 cases.
Figure 1: Spain – COVID Stringency index (100=strictest response) and new COVID-19 cases
IZA COVID-19 Crisis Response Monitoring: Erro ! Reference source not found. 
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Table 1: Chronology of policy responses to COVID19 in Spain
January 31st 2020 First patient diagnosed in La Gomera (Canary Islands)
February 9th 2020 First patient diagnosed in Palma de Mallorca (Balearic Islands)
February 24th 2020 First patient diagnosed in the peninsula (Catalonia, Madrid and Valencia)
March 11th 2020 Educational activities suspended in Madrid and in the rest of Spanish regions similar 
measures were adopted in the next few days (still in force)
March 14th 2020 Declaration of the state of alarm involving recentralization of regional competences, 
severe restrictions of mobility and the cease of activity in non-essential sectors.
Extended March 27th, April 10th, April 24th, May 8th, May 22nd, June 5th  
(following until June 21st)
March 28th 2020 Halting of all non-essential activity
April 13th 2020 Lifting of some restrictions to non-essential sectors
April 26th 2020 Children under 14-year-old allowed to go outside
May 2nd 2020 Beginning of the plan for easing lockdown restrictions
Phase 0 (preparatory): People can go out for short walks and individual sports in 
their municipality of residence
Border controls and internal restrictions to mobility
May 11th 2020 Phase 1 (initial): Opening of small shops, terraces, etc in some regions according to 
different indicators related to COVID-19 prevalence and to the capacity of the health 
system. Phase-1 regions in this date cover around half of the Spanish population. 
More regions will be added sequentially according to the evolution of the indicators.
May 25th 2020 Expected date for Phase 2 (intermediate) – Opening of new sectors and activities
June 6th 2020 Expected date for Phase 3 (advanced) – 50% capacity – telework recommended
June 19th 2020 Some regions reach the “new normality”. It is expected that the rest follow in the next 
days (June 22nd in most cases)
Source: Own elaboration using data from https://administracion.gob.es/pag_Home/atencionCiudadana/Estado-de-alarma-crisis-
sanitaria.html
Recent forecasts for the Spanish economy1 expect GDP to contract by 9-15 percent during 
2020 due to the negative impact on activity of COVID19. Employment would decrease in a 
similar rate to GDP while unemployment rate would go up from the 14% at the end of 2019 
to 18%-25% depending on whether an early or gradual recovery is expected compared to 
a more risky scenario.
Taking into account the chronology of the restrictive measures adopted in Spain, 
Labour Force Survey data for the first quarter of 2020 is not very helpful to assess the 
impact of the crisis on the labor market due to the fact that it is only marginally covering 
the lockdown period starting the last days of March. However, LFS data shows that some 
firms anticipated the negative shock in activity and decided to decrease employment 
levels by reducing temporary workers. Figure 2 shows a decrease of -2.2% in temporary 
employment in the first quarter of 2020 compared to the first quarter of 2019 representing 
more than 90,000 jobs. As it is well known, the proportion of temporary employees in Spain 
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Figure 2: Spain – Year-on-year changes of employment (LFS)
IZA COVID-19 Crisis Response Monitoring: Error! Reference source not found. 
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Source: Own elaboration from LFS data.
Table 2 presents an estimate of the direct impact on employment of the full lockdown 
adopted between March 28th and April 12th. During this period, one third of workers was 
only allowed to telework. A recent report by the Bank of Spain2 has estimated that in 2019 
only an 8.4% of total workers worked from home regularly or occasionally. Although this 
proportion could have increased during this period, it seems reasonable to assume that 
in most cases the activity was stopped due to the lockdown. Assuming 50 weeks per year, 
a reduction of 50% of production during 2 weeks represents a fall of 2 percentage points 
compared to a normal year. s far as the activity has not been fully recovered yet and 
assuming a similar reduction in the activity during April and mid-May (6 weeks), only due 
to this effect, the accumulated fall in activity would be around 6 percentage points. In fact, 
as shown in Figure 3, data for GDP for the first quarter of 2020 compared to the same period 
of the previous year shows a decrease in -4.1% (after adjusting for calendar and seasonal 
effects). According to Eurostat3, seasonally adjusted GDP decreased by 3.2% in the euro 
area and by 2.6% in the European Union during the first quarter of 2020, compared with 
the same quarter in the previous year, while in France and Italy, it decreased by -5.4% and 
-4.8%, respectively.
2 Anghel, B., Cozzolino, M., Lacuesta, A. (2020), El teletrabajo en España, Artículos Analíticos, Boletín Económico 2/2020.
3 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/10294864/2-15052020-AP-EN.pdf/5a7ea909-e708-f3d3-8375-
e2510298e1b8
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Table 2: Impact of the lockdown on employment, in thousand persons
Allowed to work Only telework allowed Total
Essential activities 13,100 1,600 14,700
Non-essential activities 0 5,079 5,079
Total 13,100 6,679 19,779
% on total employment 66.2% 33.8% 100.00%
Source: Own estimates using data from the Spanish Labour Force Survey 2019 average values and estimates from the Spanish 
National Institute of Statistics (https://www.ine.es/covid/nota_tecnica_dirce.pdf)
Figure 3: Spain – GDP Year-on-year changes (Eurostat - Seasonal and calendar adjusted)




Source: Own elaboration using data from Eurostat. 
 
Available information from Social Security records allows to analyze the monthly evolution of 
registered employment until May 2020. The year-on-year changes in the number of employees and 
self-employed is shown in Figure 4 while Figure 5 shows the same information distinguishing between 
permanent and temporary workers. As we can see, all groups experience an unprecedented decrease 
in April, although in the case of temporary employment, data for March were also significantly lower 
than in the previous month, probably due to anticipation effects. Looking at the figures, we can clearly 
see that temporary employment is much more volatile than permanent one along the business cycle 
and that the values for the latest available observation shows an important stabilisation compared to 
previous months. As we can also see in Table 3, total employment measured as monthly averages did 
not fall substantially in March 2020 compared to March 2019 (-0.2%), but it felt a 4.0% in April 
compared to the same month of the previous year. This variation was mainly explained by the huge 
drop in temporary employment: -6.9% in March and -18.0% in April compared to the same months of 
the previous year. However, although data for May is still below the levels of the same month of the 
previous year (except for permanent employees), in all cases it has slightly recovered when compared 
to April 2020. Figure 6 shows the regional variation in the year-on-year changes in employment in May 
2020 compared to May 2019. As we can see in the map, there are important variations in the size of 
the shock on employment associated to the regional sectoral specialization, but also due to the fact 
that some regions were allowed to restart economic activity before the others based on pandemics-
related indicators. 
  
Source: Own elaboration using data from Eurostat.
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of employees and self-employed is shown in Figure 4 while Figure 5 sh ws the same 
information distinguishing between perman nt and temporary w kers. As we can see, all 
groups experience an unprecedented decrease in April, although in the case of temporary 
employment, data for March were also significantly lower than in the previous month, 
probably due to anticipation effects. Looking at the figures, we can clearly see that temporary 
employment is much more volatile than permanent one along the business cycle and that 
the values for the latest available observation shows an important stabilisation compared 
to previous months. As we can also see in Table 3, total employment measured as monthly 
averages did not fall substantially in March 2020 compared to March 2019 (-0.2%), but it 
felt a 4.0% in April compared to the same month of the previous year. This variation was 
mainly explained by the huge drop in temporary employment: -6.9% in March and -18.0% 
in April compared to the same months of t e previous year. Howeve , although data for 
May is still below the levels of the same month of the previous year (except for permanent 
employees), in all cases it has slightly recovered when compared to April 2020. Figure 6 
shows the regional variation in the year-on-year changes in employment in May 2020 
compared to May 2019. As we can see in the map, there are important variations in the size 
of the shock on employment associated to the regional sectoral specialization, but also due 
to the fact that some regions were allowed to restart economic activity before the others 
based on pandemics-related indicators.
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Figure 4:  Spain – Year-on-year changes in registered employment (Social Security records, monthly 
averages)








Source: Own elaboration from Social Security records. 
  
Source: Own elaboration from Social Security records.
Figure 5:  Spain – Year-on-year changes in registered employment (Social Security records, monthly 
averages)








Source: Own elaboration from Social Security records. 
  
Source: Own elaboration from Social Security records.
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Table 3: Registered Employment
Monthly averages
% Change from same month previous year % Change from previous month
March 2020 April 2020 May 2020 March 2020 April 2020 May 2020
Total -0.2% -4.0% -4.6% -1.3% -2.9% 0.5%
Self-employed 0.0% -1.7% -1.8% -0.2% -1.3% 0.3%
Employees 0.0% -4.5% -5.2% -1.6% -3.5% 0.4%
Permanent 2.7% 1.0% 0.8% -0.2% -0.9% 0.3%
Temporary -6.9% -18.0% -19.2% -5.2% -10.0% 1.3%
Source: Own elaboration from Social Security records.
Figure 6:  Spain – Year-on-year growth rate of employment, Spanish provinces – May 2020
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Source: Own elaboration from Social Security records. 
 
Figure 7 shows the evolution of the daily number of total registered employment. We can see how 
since the beginning of April, the trend in employment destruction has clearly changed, although the 
Source: Own elaboration from Social Security records.
Figure 7 shows the evolution of the daily number of total registered employment. We can 
see how since the beginning of April, the trend in employment destruction has clearly 
cha ged, although the spe d of recovery has been slow during May. Figure 8 compares 
the evolution of the Stringency Index with electricity demand showing a clear association 
between economic activity and the end of the stricter phase of the lockdown.
Figure 7:  Spain – Registered employment (Social Security records – in thousands)
IZA COVID-19 Crisis Response Monitoring: Error! Reference source not found. 
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speed of recovery has been slow during May. Figure 8 compares the evolution of the Stringency Index 
with electricity demand showing a clear association between economic activity and the end of the 








Source: Own elaboration using data from http://ourworldindata.org and from Red Eléctrica de España.  
Source: Own elaboration from Social Security records.
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Figure 8: Daily electricity demand and stringency index for Spain
IZA COVID-19 Crisis Response Monitoring: Error! Reference source not found. 
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speed of recovery has been slow during May. Figure 8 compares the evolution of the Stringency Index 
with electricity demand showing a clear association between economic activity and the end of the 








Source: Own elaboration using data from http://ourworldindata.org and from Red Eléctrica de España.  Source: Own elaboration using data from http://ourworldindata.org and from Red Eléctrica de España.
Figure 9 shows the evolution of registered unemployment using administrative data from 
Public Employment Services records. As shown also in Table 5, registered unemployment 
increased by 21.1% in April 2020 and by 25.3% in May compared to the same month of the 
previous year (data for the last day of the month), reaching more than 3.8 million with an 
increase of 778 thousand individuals compared to May 2019. The increase has affected all 
sectors with a similar intensity.
However, it is important to mention that unemployment has not increased to a higher 
extent due to the flexibility introduced in temporary employment adjustment schemes 
(ERTEs - Expedientes de Regulación Temporal de Empleo). In fact, the government 
affirmed that all dismissals caused by the coronavirus will be considered unjustified, thus 
increasing their cost. This measure is new in the context of the Spanish labor market as in 
previous crisis, external flexibility mechanisms were in place instead of internal ones such 
as temporary lay-offs.
Figure 9:  Registered unemployment (Public Employment Services – last day of month – year-on-year 
changes)
IZA COVID-19 Crisis Response Monitoring: Error! Reference source not found. 
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Source: Own elaboration from Public Employment Services records. 
 
As shown in Table 4, the number of workers covered by ERTEs at the beginning of May were 3.3 
million representing a 20% of registered employment in all sectors. However, these shares vary 
substantially across sectors with values above 50% for activities related to tourism and leisure 
Source: Own elaboration from Public Employment Services records.
As shown in Table 4, the number of workers covered by ERTEs at the beginning of May were 
3.3 million representing a 20% of registered employment in all sectors. Ho ever, these shares 
vary substantially across sect s with values above 50% for activities related to tourism and 
leisure activities. Similar measures were adopted for self-employed workers with more than 
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1.5 million being covered. If we sum all workers affected by these measures together with 
unemployed ones, the total number of persons affected by the economic downturn in Spain 
due to COVID-19 could have reached more than 8 million during April. However, a recent 
report by the Spanish Ministry of Labour4 shows that by mid-June, 1.1 million of workers 
were no longer covered by ERTEs, with more than 90% coming back to their jobs.





Accommodation 1,430 933 65.2%
Creative, arts and entertainment 306 155 50.5%
Other services 510 136 26.7%
Retail trade and repair of vehicles 3,073 813 26.5%
Real estate 141 26 18.1%
Construction 1,145 135 11.8%
Administrative and business support 1,308 200 15.3%
Education 1,031 152 14.7%
Transportation and support activities 896 135 15.1%
Manufacturing 1,990 369 18.6%
Scientific and technical activities 1,020 114 11.2%
Other sectors 4,338 220 5.1%
Total 17,187 3,387 19.7%
Source: Own elaboration using data from the Spanish Ministry of Labour, Migrations and Social Security5
Orientation and targeting of adopted measures
Spain is one of the few countries that has adopted measures along the 10 dimensions 
analyzed in the OECD inventory since the beginning of the health crisis. Different measures 
(“Social Shield”6) have been adopted in order to ensure an adequate level of social 
protection of workers.
Workers under precautionary confinement and/or suffering from COVID-19 benefit 
from a more generous coverage than the one for regular illnesses (similar to workplace 
accidents – 75% of social security regulatory base instead of 60%). During the two weeks 
of full lockdown, a full paid leave was granted for workers of non-essential activities that 
could not be carried out by teleworking with a compensation of non-worked days before 
the end of the year. Workers with family responsibilities due to school closures or need to 
provide care for family members can adapt their time and working conditions during this 
period (recently extended until three months after the end of the state of alarm). Firms 
cannot terminate temporary contracts during the crisis.
Minimum contribution periods for unemployment benefits have been suspended during 
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groups of workers (those with permanent discontinuous contracts or domestic employees). 
Extraordinary allowances and benefits for self-employed workers, affected by the suspension 
of economic activity, have also been adopted. It is also possible to combine unemployment 
benefits with temporary employment in agriculture under certain conditions.
There have been significant changes in the temporary employment adjustment 
schemes (ERTEs - Expedientes de Regulación Temporal de Empleo). Procedures have been 
simplified and access is now granted to all workers affected by employment suspension 
or working time reduction, regardless of their contribution period. The objective is to 
minimize dismissals during this period and facilitate a quick recovery of the activity 
once the confinement measures are lifted. Unemployment benefits received under the 
temporary employment adjustment scheme do not count in terms of consumption of 
unemployment benefit rights during the state of alarm and there is an exemption of social 
contributions during the period (100% for SMEs, 75% for the rest). Recent legislative 
changes have also allowed that ERTEs can be applicable in sectors considered essential 
but having nevertheless suffered a reduction in revenues due to confinement measures. 
All temporary employment adjustments process related to the Covid-19 crisis are covered 
under these provisions, even if they were initiated before the approval of the measure. The 
condition to use ERTE’s is that economic dismissals are not allowed in these firms, being 
this one aspect that has been recently reformed after an agreement with firm associations 
and trade unions. 
Additional measures have been adopted to support vulnerable families and workers. 
Social services programs have received additional funding and specific measures have 
been adopted to provide food to children affected by school closures. A three-month credit 
moratorium on the payment of credits and non-mortgage loans by vulnerable groups has 
also been introduced. Utility companies cannot cut services (water, gas, energy) in case of 
non-payment. A social benefit to cover the costs of energy provision has been extended 
to households affected by COVID-19. Evictions are prohibited due to missed payments for 
all households during the state of alarm and for vulnerable households (those affected by 
the ERTEs or whose incomes have fallen by more than 40% due to COVID-19) during the 
next 6 months. The discussion now at the policy level is whether ERTEs would be ceased 
immediately after the new normality has been reached or would be extended, at least, until 
the end of September.
But the most relevant measure in this area is the approval of a new minimum income 
scheme (Ingreso Minimo Vital – IMV) entering into force immediately. It guarantees an 
annual income level to all citizens depending on a vulnerability assessment based on the 
characteristics of the household and its wealth and income levels. For a household formed 
by a single adult, the minimum guaranteed amount is 5,538 euros per year but this figure 
increases up to 12,184 for a household formed by 2 adults and 3 children. The government 
expects that about 850,000 households and 2.3 million people would benefit from this 
scheme with a total expense of around 3 billion euros.
Immediate liquidity support to businesses
Different measures have been adopted to guarantee the liquidity and stability of firms and 
self-employed workers. 
The government has introduced the possibility of tax payment deferrals for a period of 
six months, upon request, without interests. Additionally, firms and self-employed with no 
social security debts are allowed to defer Social Security debt payments due between April 
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and June 2020 with 0.5% interest. Additional measures have been taken in order to align 
tax bases to the current situation. These measures are supposed to provide more than 15 
billion euros in liquidity for firms. Firms that have received public loans are also allowed to 
postpone their repayment. Moreover, guarantees to facilitate access of loans to companies 
and self-employed have been already granted. A specific financing line of 400 million 
euros has been approved for firms and self-employed workers in the tourism, transport 
and hospitality sectors and specific measures for exporting firms have also been adopted.
Firms are exempted of social contributions for workers affected by ERTEs during this 
period (100% for SMEs, 75% for the other firms) and specific bonuses have been introduced 
in the tourism sector. As previously mentioned, self-employed workers can benefit from 
the moratorium on mortgage payments to offices/commercial premises from 1 to 3 months.
Support of dependent workers
The extraordinary measures described above have been effective at the moment. Short-time 
work measures have reduced inflows into unemployment particularly in those sectors in 
non-essential activities with a higher direct impact of the lockdown, but that expect a quick 
recovery in demand during July (after the end of the state of alarm). However, there are 
other sectors that will face substantial limitations in their capacity due to social distancing 
measures to prevent a new wave of contagions, but also an important fall in their demand. 
This is clearly the case of touristic activities that will face very important restrictions for 
international visits that would not be fully compensated by domestic demand. 
Public Employment Services are devoting all their efforts to process the demands 
related to ERTEs, but anyway, there is no real possibility of keeping the rest of services 
linked to ALMP working as usual due to the restrictions imposed by the state of alarm. The 
situation will improve during the next months once the new normality is fully reached, 
although budgetary cuts have been already adopted regarding some programs.
Working conditions and work organization
Policies aimed to reduce workers’ exposure to COVID-19 in the workplace involve, on the one 
hand, the adoption of individual protection equipment and the adoption of the guidelines 
and specific orientations established by health and safety at work authorities. Most of these 
measures would be in place even in the phase of “new normality”. As previously mentioned, 
when possible, teleworking has been encouraged to continue with the activity during the 
COVID19 crisis. According to estimates by the Bank of Spain, following the methodology 
by Dingel and Neiman (2020)7, remote work could have easily increased to 30.6% of total 
employment from an 8.4% before the crisis or will do it in the next months. Some specific 
measures have been already adopted to support a fastest adoption of new technologies by 
small and medium-sized firms. In fact, although the new normality has been reached, there 
are still some sectors where the recommendation is still to telework.
In this context, it is important to mention that due to the closure of all childcare 
facilities and schools, the conditions for remote working have been especially hard 
for those families with young children, particularly for women as far as there are still 
important gender inequalities regarding home production duties.
7 Dingel I. J., Neiman, B. (2020), How many jobs can be done at home?, NBER Working Paper, n.º 36948.
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New labor market entrants
The situation for new labor market entrants this year is going to be very difficult, particularly 
during the summer time when they are usually offered internships that could be converted into 
temporary contracts when they end. At the moment, the focus of the policies is not considering 
the specific situation of this group. It is possible that this implies a higher enrolment in higher 
studies for the next academic year starting September-October, but teaching is also going to be 
subjected to important restrictions regarding face-to-face activities. For this reason, flexible 
and blended learning activities will probably be adopted in post-compulsory educational levels 
allowing this potential increase in domestic demand (probably compensating the fall in the 
international demand, particularly at the university level).
Policy innovations and labor market trends
One innovation in the context of the Spanish labor market is the government’s decision 
to favor the use of ERTEs, thereby minimizing dismissals. The promotion of measures for 
country-wide internal workforce reductions is a new policy that has not been adopted in 
previous crisis. The policy debate is now focusing on how to design public policies in order 
to provide an adequate support to citizens. The adoption of an unconditional basic income 
as an alternative to other social welfare measures were discussed at the beginning of the 
crisis, and as previously explained, a new minimum income scheme has been adopted 
covering the needs of those in situation of relative poverty.
Next steps and fiscal viability
As all countries, Spain is facing a simultaneous supply and demand shock caused by the 
pandemic and the response to it in terms of the lockdown. Due to the higher incidence of 
the disease, the supply shock is longer and more intense than in other countries. At the 
same time, the demand shock is also going to be of higher magnitude due to the productive 
specialization of the Spanish economy, particularly in some regions. For these reasons, 
the current level of public intervention must be sustained even after the current health 
crisis is overcome. This creates a clear tension in public finances, although some of the 
adopted measures such as tax delays, will have no final impact on the budget. In fact, 
once the confinement measures are relaxed or no longer in force, in most sectors the 
activity will rebound and this will alleviate the pressure on public expenses, particularly 
those related to income support policies for workers in non-essential activities. The 
government has forecasted public deficit to reach 10% of GDP and a level of public debt 
of 115% of GDP in 2020. For 2021, GDP is expected to grow by 6.8% from previous year 
while the unemployment rate will reduce to 17.2% (2 points less than the expected value 
for 2020). However, a more recent assessment by the Bank of Spain considers that deficit 
could increase to 11% in 2020 and debt to 119.3% under a gradual recovery scenario. In 
this case, fiscal consolidation would only take place very slowly with deficit over 6% and 
debt levels still at 118.7% in 2022, figures that are well in line with the June 2020 OECD 
Economic Outlook8. In sum, the impact of the measures adopted on public accounts have 
been significant, and it will take time to come back to a sustainable path. Probably, some 
exceptional measures should have to be adopted during the fall/winter in order to keep a 
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Although Slovakiá s quick response to COVID-19 pandemic led to very few cases and only 28 deaths, 
the overall economic impact has been much severe when  Slovak GDP shrank by 3.9% y-o-y in 1Q2020, 
which was one of the largest drops in Europe. Unemployment has grown by now by 2 pp since the 
beginning of the year and is expected to grow. If the second wave hit the country, the existing strategies 
of containing the pandemic may not be sufficient to prevent future lockdowns. 
IZA COVID-19 Crisis Response Monitoring
Slovakia (June 2020)
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Labor market impact of COVID-19
 Slovakia, a country of 5.4 million inhabitants, recorded its first COVID-19 case on March 
6, 2020, and its first death attributed to the pandemic on April 1, 2020. As of June 25, 
2020, Slovakia had recorded 1,630 cases, 28 deaths, and had 150 active cases. In terms of 
the number of COVID-19 deaths Slovakia occupies the last place among European states1
 This remarkable performance in terms of containing the pandemic has been due to 
several key factors: 
– Quick response - within less than a week since the first case schools and universities 
in Bratislava had been closed, border controls and mandatory quarantine for people 
returning from abroad had been introduced and non-essential shops had been 
closed; within ten days schools had been closed in the whole country, mandatory 
face masks had been introduced, and international bus, train, and air passenger 
services had been banned. 
– The high level of compliance of the general public, supported by the example of 
politicians, news anchors, and media personalities, all wearing facemasks on the 
screen. 
– Even though several mistakes have been made, the overall effectiveness of the 
measures taken was good. 
 The overall economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in Slovakia has been severe. 
Primarily due to meager foreign demand, in Q1 2020 Slovak GDP shrank by 3.9% y-o-y, 
which was one of the largest drops in Europe. Slovakia was still able to borrow record-high 
4 billion EUR for 5 and 12 years at very solid rates (reoffer yield 0.35% for 5-yr bonds, 1.056% 
for 12-yr bonds); Fitch downgraded Slovakia from A+ to A on May 8, 2020, nevertheless. 
 Following a slight increase of the unemployment rate from 6.13% in February to 
6.21% in March 2020, April 2020 marked a record-high monthly increase of the 
unemployment rate by 1.22 pp to 6,57% followed by further increase by 0.63 pp to 7.2% 
in May as reported by the Central Office of Labor, Social Affairs and Family (COLSAF) 
The unemployment rate however remains relatively low, compared to Slovakia’s 
historical data, when the unemployment rate reached about 15% just seven years ago.  
Table 1: Unemployment rate in 2020
January February March April May
Registered unemployment (in %) 4.98 5.05 5.19 6.57 7.20
Source: COLSAF
 Remarkably and surprisingly, whereas employers announced 2242 mass layoffs in 
March 2020 and the number increased to 3142 in April, May witnessed just 1116 mass 
layoff announcements. Another positive signal from the labor market was that in May 
9,665 people found jobs, which was by 3,744 (63%) people more than in April.
 While there were 180,756 unemployed in April and 198,256 in May 2020, COLSAF also 
registered 67 thousand vacancies in May, 5 thousand less than in April. Workers were 
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 Temporary agency workers and workers on fixed term contracts belong to some of the 
most affected groups in the labor market.3 Temporary agency workers are covered by the 
Labour Code provisions similar to regular employees and their employer (the agency) is 
obliged to offer at least 60% of the wage compensation if the employer cannot provide 
work to the temporary agency worker.4 The reference wage is equal to the average wage 
registered at the agency for the last 12 months. Data about actual layoffs of temporary 
agency workers is not available, but we expect that they are exposed to lay-offs more 
often than regular employees. 
 Another vulnerable group, which is poorly protected against job loss are workers 
working on work agreements outside of the regular employment contract.5 There 
are two types of such agreements: (1) work agreements equivalent of part-time 
employment contracts and (2) work agreements for the maximum of 300 hours per 
year. Even if in the majority of cases employees with such work agreements are part of 
the social insurance system, employers are not obliged to compensate for their wages 
if they do not have the work for them. To compensate these workers, in mid-April 
the government announced that those who have a valid work agreement but cannot 
perform their work are entitled to a monthly subsidy of 210 EUR provided by the state 
as a compensation for the wage loss. 
Orientation and targeting of adopted measures
 The OECD inventory provides a relevant summary. The only important update is 
introduction of Kurzarbeit for companies since April 17th, which we assume will be 
updated in the database in due time. 
 The overall policy set can be considered as adequate. 
 The actual data about state compensation programs between mid-March and June 
2020 published by the analytical unit of the Ministry of Labour show that as of June 
10th, 496 thousand workers were supported by the government programs targeted on 
employers and self-employed. The majority of support requests were approved (87% 
of the amount as of May 2020 and 99% in June 2020 requested was approved and 
distributed). The average amount per employee has doubled between March and April. 
This increase was expected, as the compensations for April covered the whole month 
while March compensations reflected the period after the declaration of the emergency 
state in March 12th. In March the support varied between 251 EUR per self-employed 
to 284 EUR per employee in establishments closed or regulated because of the anti-
pandemic governmental measures.6 In April 2020 the amounts increased to 474 and 493 
EUR, respectively.7
 Of the total state compensation programs targeting the labor market, the largest 
3 KOZ statement before the tripartite meeting on May 18th, 2020: https://hsr.rokovania.sk/2020-/
4 https://www.ip.gov.sk/koronavirus-praca-agenturnych-zamestnancov-pocas-mimoriadnej-situacie/
5 Slovak Labour Code distinguish between fixed term contract which is regular employment contract but set on specific time 
period and work agreement contract, which is designated for smaller jobs (up to 20 hours per week, maximum 1 year, or 
for maximum 300 hours per year). While the first type establish similar employment protection as the regular open-ended 
employment contract (e.g. severance payment if work contract ends before the set date) in the case of work agreement, 
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support went to the industrial sector (39% in March and 46% in April, 2020) and to 
the wholesale and retail services (20% in April). The largest amount of the support per 
employee was in accommodation services (260 EUR in March and 546 EUR in April, per 
employee). As the support for March was paid only in May, the HORECA sector service 
providers were complaining that the support was late and insufficient. Indeed, in March 
2020 42% of all newly registered unemployed were from this sector. Nevertheless, the 
share of the HORECA sector in unemployment decreased to 13% in May 2020.8 We note, 
however, that in spite of the partial re-opening of restaurants in May 2020, 14% of them 
were not expecting to re-open at all because of bankruptcy.9
 At the beginning of the pandemic, the representatives of employers complained 
about late and inefficient help from the government to enterprises and were afraid of 
significant job losses if more robust help was not provided.10 They mostly criticized 
complicated administration of the measures adopted to alleviate the economic impact 
of the pandemic as well as insufficient support to big employers. A comparative study 
of the Centre for Public Policy, Bratislava, and Inline Policy, London, also concluded 
that the initial support of the Slovak government was not sufficient; a program of 
guaranteed loans for entrepreneurs was seen as the one missed the most.11
 The more recent figures on the demanded and actual take-up signal that situation has 
improved by May 2020, and employers could reach the support demanded. 
 Although the May unemployment figures suggest some stabilization in the labour 
market, this might be temporary only, as the numbers of cases have started to increase 
in the second half of June in Slovakia and several other countries. The existing strategies 
of containing the pandemic may not be sufficient to prevent future lockdowns. 
 Some of the groups that may be less well covered include municipalities (who will 
lose on income taxes) and socially excluded and marginalized groups (who may be 
falling through the safety nets and the measures implemented). Some loan programs 
for municipalities have been announced in late June; however, it remains to be seen 
whether municipalities will be willing and able to use these programs in a larger scale.
 No impact studies about the effectiveness and efficiency of the adopted measures are 
available as of June 2020.
Immediate liquidity support to businesses
 Although initially large employers complained about the ceiling that capped the 
maximum amount that an employer could receive through the anti-COVID-19 schemes, 
the ceiling was lifted relatively soon and there seem to be no major impediments in the 
schemes implemented. 
 Although the problem of moral hazard and possible abuse of the schemes is relatively 
often discussed, the general approach is that help must come quickly. This may be 
justifiable also on the grounds of the argument that because the shock is exogenous and 
unexpected, the scope for moral hazard is somewhat limited. It is however too early to 




10 AZZZ statement before the tripartite meeting on May 18th, 2020: https://hsr.rokovania.sk/2020-/
11 https://www.cvp.sk/content/suhrnna-sprava-covid.pdf
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 Self-employed are entitled to the support based on the decrease in their revenues (for 
the decrease from 20% to 39% the support is 180 EUR, for 40% to 59% decrease the 
support is 300 EUR, for 60% to 79% decrease the support is 420 EUR, and for a decrease 
of more than 80% the support is 540 EUR). As of June 2020, 40 thousand self-employed 
have been compensated with the average amount of 250 EUR in March and 474 EUR in 
April, 2020 (the compensations were paid in April and May respectively). Remarkably, 
as of May 2020 the year-on-year rate of closed licenses for self-employment did not 
increase compared to 2019.12
Support of dependent workers
 Except allowing for post or email registration with the Labour Offices, the unemployment 
insurance scheme remained unchanged. As of April 21st the extension of unemployment 
benefit by one month was granted to those whose entitlement were running out during 
the crisis. Trade unions demanded the general duration of the UB be extended beyond 
this one-off technical extension, however, as of June 28 30 they have not made a 
specific proposal. 
 No new specific support to unemployed nor new ALMPs have been announced as of June 28.
 Kurzarbeit was introduced in Slovakia as a temporary measure, but there is discussion 
about the possibility to implement it as a systematic measure also for the future.13 There 
is a proposal to increase social insurance contributions by 1 percentage point (0.5 pp 
paid by employers and 0.5 pp paid by employees) to finance such permanent Kurzarbeit 
scheme, but this has not been approved yet. 
 The spread of the support among firms of different size suggests that number of 






Research Report No. 98  Short-Run Labor Market Impacts of COVID-19, Initial Policy Measures and Beyond
100|153
Table 2:  The actual take-up of various instruments of Kurzarbeit based on the size of the workplace 
(as of June 10th, take up for March and April 2020)
total micro small medium big unspecified
Number of supported employers
Support to closed workplaces 8 973 6 883 1 576 186 32 296
Compensation to employer in (partial) 
lockdown per employee
2 864 1 998 572 143 90 61
Compensation to employer based on 
revenues drop
11 597 8 010 2 541 583 188 275
Number of supported employees
Support to closed workplaces 43 974 15 380 12 786 6 692 7 515 1 601
Compensation to employer in (partial) 
lockdown per employee
88 016 4 767 5 277 7 217 68 751 2 004
Compensation to employer based on 
revenues drop
229 822 70 823 32 814 39 728 80 537 5 920
Support per employee (in EUR)
341 248 386 365 394 399
Source: https://www.employment.gov.sk/sk/ministerstvo/vyskum-oblasti-prace-socialnych-veci-institut-socialnej-politiky/
analyticke-komentare/prva-pomoc-slovensku.html (own computation)
Working conditions and work organization
 The automotive sector, which is the backbone of Slovak manufacturing, stopped most of 
the production in March and April, but has been gradually restarting their production in 
late May and early June. 
 The number of cross-border workers, many of whom in the care sector, constitute 
5.2% of Slovakia’s labor force. Although border controls made it difficult for them to 
commute or travel between their workplaces and homes, many of them adapted by 
staying in their host countries. In addition, special arrangement have been made for 
them, and those working within 30km, later 50km, from the border could travel back-
and-forth without quarantine or tests. Slovakia is further liberalizing the border regime 
in June 2020.  
 Four physical distancing measures studied by Kahanec et al (2020): events ban, school 
closure, non-essential shopping ban and prohibition of non-essential movement 
decreased the presence of workers at workplaces by circa 54%. While some of the 
workers could not continue performing their work, others continued working from 
home (home office).14
 Telework and working from home is regulated in the Slovak Labour Code since 2007 
(§ 52 of the Labour Code on working from home and telework). As of working from home 
14 Kahanec, M., L. Lafférs and J.S. Marcus (2020) ‘The impact of COVID-19 restrictions on individual mobility’, Bruegel Blog, 5 May
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and telework related to lock-down, most of the employees who worked on homeoffice 
should fall under section 5 of this paragraph which explicitly says that homeoffice in 
exceptional situations is not considered as telework. 
 If working from home or telework is considered as the main form of work, some working 
time regulation does not apply to the respective workers.  This may negatively affect the 
working conditions of such workers.
New labor market entrants
 The number of vacancies declined sharply and the labor market will offer only limited 
opportunities during the COVID-19 crisis. The Economic Crisis Council is proposing 
internship schemes for graduates to support their school-to-job transition. 
 Besides the proposed internship support Slovakia is running program to support young 
people in their first employment since 2015 through the program of youth guarantee 
and support the idea on the right on the first job. Nevertheless, some of the programs to 
support vulnerable groups on the labour market were stopped in May 2020 and are now 
reconsidered by the COLSAF.
Policy innovations and labor market trends
 This seems to be too early to evaluate, but there are some discernible developments 
already
 Whereas the policy innovation is rather incremental than revolutionary, Kurzarbeit has 
been introduced as a novel instrument. It is hard to say now whether and how it will 
survive beyond the crisis. 
 One of the key questions is how the automotive sector in Slovakia will adapt to the shock 
and also the overall push on further greening of its production. One scenario may be that 
Slovak factories will in fact increase their production of cheap combustion-engine cars, 
satiating the increased demand for such car by the crisis-stricken population, whereas 
the factories in the home countries of the mother companies (VW, KIA, PSA, Jaguar - 
Land Rover) will innovate and produce electric cars. This poses risks for the long run, 
especially if state-aid in home countries is conditional on the production of electric cars 
and related supplies staying in home countries for a long time.  
Next steps and fiscal viability
 Slovakia could sustain the current policy stance for several more months, although its 
fiscal space is rather limited. The current policies burden its fiscal position and future 
generations, which is particularly problematic given that Slovakia has one of the most 
rapidly aging populations in Europe. 
 The overall situation is evolving rapidly, as Slovakia has been vigorously reopening its 
economy in May and June 2020. 
 Although Slovakia is upgrading its anti-COVID-19 aid package, the hope is that with 
the reopening the economy will rebound and the policy measures will not be needed for 
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too long. Very much depends on foreign demand, and hence on the speed of recovery in 
Slovakia’s main trading partners in Europe and beyond. Coordination at the EU level is 
therefore essential. 
 As the economy is nearly fully reopened as of June 2020, the key measures are: 1) 
preventing the number of cases from increasing, resulting in the need to step back with 
the reopening; 2) related, testing and tracing vigorously and smartly, isolating active 
cases, making the health sector more resilient; 3) providing for the adjustment of the 
economy to the changed economic conditions and opportunities under the new post-
COVID-19 normal (e.g. digitalization, greening), including technological advancement 
and upgrading its position in value chains; 4) fighting poverty, social exclusion and 
excessive inequality in the labor market and education, ensuring a decent living 
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Swedish measures to mitigate the spread of the Covid-19 virus have been less restrictive than those 
used in most other countries. Despite of this, we document a massive con- traction of the Swedish labor 
market with an emphasis on hotels, restaurants and retail sectors. Early policy responses have primarily 
been in the form of short-term financial aid to firms and policies aiming at preserving permanent 
employment contracts. A very generous short-time work scheme covers 9 percent of the total labor 
force. Policy measures are expensive, but sound fiscal finances makes them sustainable in the short to 
medium run.
IZA COVID-19 Crisis Response Monitoring
Sweden (June 2020)
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Labor market impact of COVID-19
The first case of Covid-19 was confirmed by the Swedish Public Health Agency on January 
31 in a traveler from China and a few weeks thereafter, during the second week of March, 
community spread was confirmed. As a response, various restrictions were imposed with 
the aim of slowing down the spread (or “flattening the curve”). These restrictions have 
been relatively mild compared to other European countries. The measures primarily rely 
on voluntary compliance with recommendations from the Public Health Agency regarding 
social distancing. During the second week of March (week 11), the Public Health Agency 
made several formal announcements, requiring all residents to keep a distance from each 
other, that high schools and universities must move their teaching online, and that workers 
should work remotely to the extent possible. All workers should remain at home if they 
have any symptoms traditionally associated with the flu or the common cold. Unnecessary 
travel within the country should be avoided. Gatherings were limited to 500 people; a 
restriction that was further tightened to 50 two weeks later. Compulsory schools (until age 
15-16) have remained open and parents are obliged by law to ensure that children without 
symptoms attend school. Pre-schools (before age 6) also remain open but these are not 
covered by school attendance laws. Outdoors movement is unrestricted and encouraged 
for all groups as long as proper distance can be maintained. All shops and businesses can 
remain open but they need to ensure proper distance between customers and all employers 
are required to take measures that help protect their workers.
Some descriptive indicators of the timeline of the spread of the Covid-19 virus in 
Sweden are collected in figure 1. With the well-known caveats associated with each such 
indicator, they jointly suggest a rapid spread with many new severe cases around weeks 
11 to 14 followed by a levelling out and a gradual fall in new severe cases starting between 
week 15 and 17 depending on indicator.
The Swedish response has been highlighted as an exception due to its comparative 
leniency. The response has spurred international criticisms in media and elsewhere. But the 
response has also been perceived as a possible route forward for other countries. The WHO 
(on April 20) described the Swedish response as a possible future “model” for other societies 
when opening up from their current lockdown policies. It may therefore be of particular 
interest for other countries to assess the labor market effects of the Swedish response.
In this context, it may be important to note that the Swedish response was never 
motivated by economic concerns per se.   The response has been coordinated by the Public 
Health Agency with very little interference from the political sphere (or economists). The 
agency motivates its route by a desire to avoid negative side effects on physical and mental 
health from reduced mobility and isolation, and a desire to impose a regime that can be 
sustained for a prolonged period of time with a fully functional health-care system. The 
agency has firmly stated that “heard immunity” is not a policy target and that the overall 
aims of the policies are similar to those of other countries. At the same time, the agency 
considers it impossible to prevent the disease from spreading in the long term without 
heard immunity or vaccination. 
Overall, the Swedish Covid-19 response, as interpreted through an economic lens, 
mostly differs from other countries in terms of degree rather than content (with the 
exception of the open schools). The “recommendations” are more binding than the word 
may suggest as residents and firms are expected to abide by them. It is obvious that the 
recommendations had a massive impact on people’s behavior.1 The recommendations 
1 Compliance with the “recommendations” have been particularly high on public holidays. Travel out of Stockholm was very 
limited across Easter, and parks were completely empty during April 30th (“Walpurgis”) when students traditionally celebrate 
the arrival of spring in public parks.
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therefore had a sharp effect on economic outcomes. Sales in restaurants dropped by 70 
percent from the second week of March and sales of apparel fell by about 50 percent during 
the same weeks.2




Figure 1: Timeline of the Covid-19 spread 




1Compliance with the “recommendations” have been particularly high on public holidays. Travel out of 
Stockholm was very limited across Easter, and parks were completely empty during April 30th (“Walpurgis”) 
when students traditionally celebrate the arrival of spring in public parks. 
2See https://www.caspeco.se/ and www.svenskhandel.se. 
Source: Intensive care patients: Svt.se; Deaths: Worldometer.
Sweden has a total population of 10 million, whereof 7.5 million are in working age (15-74). 
In 2019, the labor force participation rate (73 percent) and employment rate (68 percent) 
were both high by international standards. The gender employment gap (4 percentage 
points) is also small. The unemployment rate (6.8 percent) was close to the European 
aver- age. Unemployment is to a large extent concentrated among low-skilled workers, 
recently immigrated workers, and students. The GDP-gap in 2019 was small but positive 
(0.5 p r- ce ). Unemp oymen  increased slightly between early 2019 and early 2020. The 
country has its own currency and a floating exchange rate. Exports are nearly 50 percent of 
GDP. Public finances are sound with a relatively low level of public debt (Maastricht debt is 
35 percent of GDP).3
To study the immediate impact on the labor market we primarily rely on data from 
the Public Employment Service (PES) on workers who are registered as unemployed.4 In 
light of the comparatively mild nature of Swedish Covid-19 restrictions, it is remarkable 
how stark the labor market impact has been. This is, most likely, a consequence of high 
rates of compliance with the public recommendations. Figure 2 documents a rapid 
deterioration in labor market conditions as measured by registered unemployment, 
reduced vacancy postings, increased layoff notices and bankruptcies. We show how these 
measures evolved before and during the initial phase of the crisis. In all graphs, except for 
the stock of unemployed, we display the accumulated flows. For comparison, we provide 
corresponding numbers for 2019.
The figures suggest a substantial slow-down of the Swedish labor market starting 
around the time-of-announcement of the Covid-19 restrictions: The number of workers 
registered as unemployed at the PES increased by more than 100,000 people in just 3 
2 See https://www.caspeco.se/ and www.svenskhandel.se.
3 All numbers pertain to 2019. Labor market statistics and export share are taken from Statistics Sweden. Debt statistics are from 
the OECD. GDP-gap is from the National Institute for Economic Research.
4 The total number of ”registered as unemployed” usually align well with the number of unemployed in the Labor Force Surveys 
although the workers are not always the same. In particular, unemployed students rarely register as unemployed and 
participants in some labor market programs may not actively search for jobs and thus not show up as unemployed according to 
the LFS. 
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months and the increasing trend clearly continues. During 2019, the number of registered 
unemployed fell by around 14,000 during the same season. The increase in registered 
unemployed corresponds to about 1 percent of the labor force.5 As is apparent, the effect 
is mainly driven by the inflow into registered unemployment, even though the outflow is 
reduced as well.
The number of new vacancies at the PES dropped by 1/3 and the number of layoff 
noticies increased sharply from 24,000 to 84,000 compared to the same period in 2019, 
thus suggesting that around 1 percent of the labor force has been notified of a layoff 
because of the crisis. There is also a rapid relative increase in the number of workers 
affected by bankruptcies, although these events affect much fewer workers.
Note that there is a possible element of double-counting across indicators since 
redundancy notices also include bankruptcies, and an unknown fraction of workers from 
bankruptcies may have ended up in registered unemployment. Due to relatively long 
(2-6 months) advance notice periods, most of the workers affected by a layoff notice are, 
however, not in the unemployment statistics yet and previous experiences suggest that 
many of the noticed workers will not end up in unemployment at all.6 The most important 
aspect to consider is, however, that all of the trends are evolving rapidly at the time of 
writing. It is therefore almost certain that the final impact will be substantially larger than 
those suggested by the end-points of our time series.
5 The size of the labor force in May 2019 was 5.5 million according to the Labor Force Surveys
6 During the financial crisis, about 60 percent of notices resulted in layoffs, whereof half became unemployed. The assessment is 
also somewhat complicated by the fact that layoff notices to the Public Employment Service only are required when firms lay off 
at least 5 workers, and the impact of the current crisis appears to be concentrated in sectors where there are many small firms.
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Figure 2: Initial impacts of the Covid-19 crisis 
Source: (a)-(c), (e)-(f) The Swedish Public Employment Service; (d) Hensvik et al. (2020). 
Source: (a)-(c), (e)-(f) The Swedish Public Employment Service; (d) Hensvik et al. (2020).
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(c) C mulative outflo  fro  unemployment
(e) Cumulative layoff notifications (workers)
(b) Cumulative inflow into unemployment
(d) Cumulati e new vac ncies
(f) Cumulative bankruptcies (workers)
Research Report No. 98  Short-Run Labor Market Impacts of COVID-19, Initial Policy Measures and Beyond
108|153
Table 1: Initial impacts of the Covid-19 crisis
Measure By week 24 2019 By week 24 2020 Percent change
Registered unemployed 334,801 454,859 35.9
New registrations 175,182 276,138 57,6
Outflow to employment 190,984 158,396 -17.1
New vacancies 294,236 204,847 -30.4
New summer jobs 108,588 84,104 -29.1
Noticed workers 24,503 84,240 243.8
Bankruptcies 9,569 13,651 42,7
Short-time work (employers) 0 50,584 -
Short-time work (workers) 0 486,421 -
Note: The table shows the numbers and percent change corresponding to Figures 2 and 3. In addition, it shows the number of 
workers on short-time contracts. The numbers reflect the total stock/inflow/outflow over the period Jan-April in 2019 and 2020.
Orientation and targeting of adopted measures
Given the dramatic impact of the Covid-19 restrictions on the labor market it is not 
surprising that the Swedish government, as governments elsewhere, has imposed a 
number of targeted economic policy measures, some of which we summarize here. The 
specific policy measures appear to have had three objectives:
1. Reduce the financial burden from sickness absence.
2. Protect firms and jobs.
3. Increase access and generosity within the unemployment insurance system.
On sickness absence: The Swedish health insurance temporary covers the first day of 
sickness absence – normally paid by the absentee – and the first two weeks of sickness 
absence thereafter – normally paid by the employers.7 The measures were some of the first 
responses to the virus and its aim was clearly to ensure that workers with symptoms of 
Covid-19 should stay at home and not be tempted to remain at work for financial reasons.8 
The measures are perhaps particularly important for the Swedish Covid-19 strategy as it 
relies heavily on workers remaining at home after self-assessment of symptoms.
Protecting jobs and firms: There are a number of policy measures aimed at protecting firms and 
jobs at this early stage of the crisis. Several of the policies are explicitly short-term in nature. A 
scheme for general compensation for reduced sales relative to the previous year compensates 
for sales losses in March and April. It was announced early May to avoid strategic reduction 
of sales and is labelled as a “restructuring support program”. Payroll taxes for the first 30 
employees are reduced from around 30 to 10 percent of wages during March to June. This 
scheme covers wage costs up to a low wage cap of 25,000 SEK/Month which is close to the 10th 
percentile in the wage distribution. Financial support are available for landlords who rent out 
space to firms in some targeted industries (hotels, restaurants, and some retail) between April 
and June; the support reimburses half of any temporary rent-reduction for firms in covered 
industries, but at most 25 percent of the original rent. A targeted support system for cancelled 
events in arts and sports cover cancellations in April to May.
7 These measures are currently set to end in September.
8 Requirement for doctor’s certificate when absent is also temporarily relaxed.
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The most important policy tool, at least from a labor market perspective, is, however, 
the short-time work system that was set up as a response to the crisis. The system, which 
is in place for the full duration of 2020, allows firms to reduce working time for their 
employees by 20, 40 or 60 percent (May to July also 80 percent). Firms, workers and the 
central government share the costs, but most of the costs are born by the government. With 
a 60 percent reduction, employers reduce their wage cost to half, and workers retain over 
90 percent of their initial salary, see Table 2. There is a wage cap around the 80th percentile 
in the wage distribution (SEK 44,000/month). Costs above this cap are not covered by the 
subsidies. Firms are expected to do whatever else they can to reduce their labor costs, which 
implies that they should not hire new workers unless absolutely necessary. Only workers 
with at least 3 months tenure at the time of application can be covered by the system. 
Notably, this subsidy can be combined with the payroll tax reduction which implies that 
firms with less than 30 (low-wage) employees essentially have all their wage costs covered 
if workers are on 80 percent short-time work. At the time of writing, applications for 
short-time work covers 490,000 workers (9 percent of the labor force) whereof 394,000 
were already approved.
In addition to these subsidies, there are various liquidity measures aimed directly at 
firms, including a measure which allows firms to postpone 3 months of payroll taxes and 
VAT for one year at a low interest rate. These measures are complemented by interventions 
to ensure market-level financial stability by the Riksbank and other government agencies.
Unemployment insurance: The government has taken several measures to extend 
unemployment insurance coverage and increase benefit levels during the crisis. As a starting 
point, it is worthwhile to note that the UI system in Sweden has a very low cap which in 
effect means that the compensation is at the same flat rate for nearly all full-time employed 
workers. Compensation is even lower for workers who have chosen not to be members of 
a UI fund. Many workers are covered by additional insurance through schemes organized 
by unions or jointly by the social partners. These schemes cover workers who are union 
members and/or are employed at workplaces that are covered by collective agreements.
The main reforms put in place during the current crisis is a reduction of the work-
requirements for UI eligibility from 80 to 60 hours/month during 6 of the past 12 months 
and a loweredrequired duration of membership in UI funds from 12 to 3 months. The 
lowest benefit level (for those without UI membership) and the benefit cap have both been 
increased quite substantially; the increases are around 30 percent relative to previous 
levels. In addition, the Swedish financial supervisory authority have granted banks the 
right to provide general exemptions from rules regarding amortization of mortgages 
between April and June. The aim is to provide workers with additional liquidity in the case 
of job loss or other income disturbances.
Remaining challenges: Current measures have either focused on running costs (short-
time work, payroll reduction and financial support for rental costs) or replacing past lost 
earnings during specific months (compensation for reduced sales and cancelled arts/sports 
events). There is still considerable uncertainty regarding future lost earnings, perhaps in 
the next step within the tourist dependent sectors that rely heavily on earnings during the 
summer in Sweden as elsewhere.
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Table 2: The short-time work scheme
Working time reduction Worker pay reduction Labor cost reduction
20 % 4 % 19 %
40 % 6 % 36 %
60 % 7.5 % 53 %
80 %* 12 % 72 %
Note: Numbers pertain to workers earning less than 44,000 SEK/Month. Support is available for up to 6 months during March to 
December 2020. *80 % reduction is only available during May to July.
Source: The Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth.
Immediate liquidity support to businesses
The short-time work policy, which is the key policy tool at this stage, was introduced very 
rapidly and efficiently. It was announced to be in effect from the day of announcement even 
though it would take a few weeks to get the proposal through parliament and set up the 
system (i.e. firms could apply retroactively).  Applications could be submitted by early April 
but slightly more than half of the applications submitted at the time of writing pertain to 
working-time reductions starting in March. Access and application is streamlined through 
an on-line portal requiring very little information above a listing of the covered employees. 
Payments from the scheme came within days of the application for most firms.9 Figure 3 
illustrates the application and approval (i.e. processing, as most will be approved) rates 
across time. By the end of April, more than 50,000 firms have applied for the short-time 
work subsidy, which can be compared to 2,104 firms filing for bankruptcy during the same 
period. The applications cover 490,000 workers.10 Application numbers correspond to 15% 
of all firms and 9% of all workers in Sweden. This suggest that many small firms applied.11






Figure 3: Take up of short-time contracts 
Source: The Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth 
 
 
Because of the fairly mechanical approval of the applications, there is an obvious risk of 
fraud. There are, e.g., some anecdotal reports that employees are required to work more 
than allowed by the short-time work schemes while paid by the subsidies. There has been 
a discussion regarding whether subsidies should be accessible for profitable firms that pay 
out major dividends, which was possible initially but appear not to be any more after some 
adjustments by the responsible agency. In addition, there is an obvious risk that these 
policies are used by firms that in the end will not survive. But given the short-run nature 
of the policies, these seems as acceptable costs, at least at this early stage – but concerns 
could potentially be more severe in the longer run considering that the policy will be in 
effect throughout the year (at 60 percent work reduction).13 An unfortunate feature of 
the system is that it does not contain any guarantees for employment relationships to be 
maintained – the system can even be used while workers have received an advance notice 
of layoff. 
Some measures are explicitly targeted at the small firms and freelance workers. Reduced 
payroll taxes are clearly of largest importance for small firms as it only covers the first 30 
Source: The Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth
9 Firms without collective agreements need to make individual arrangements with 70 percent of employees in order to access the 
scheme. This is mostly relevant for small firms.
10 The numbers are from Swedish agency for Economic and Regional Growth.
11 Note that employers that were funded or owned by central or local employers were not eligible to apply, a restriction that apply 
to more than 1/3 of all workers in the economy.
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Because of the fairly mechanical approval of the applications, there is an obvious risk of 
fraud. There are, e.g., some anecdotal reports that employees are required to work more 
than allowed by the short-time work schemes while paid by the subsidies. There has been 
a discussion regarding whether subsidies should be accessible for profitable firms that pay 
out major dividends, which was possible initially but appear not to be any more after some 
adjustments by the responsible agency. In addition, there is an obvious risk that these 
policies are used by firms that in the end will not survive. But given the short-run nature 
of the policies, these seems as acceptable costs, at least at this early stage – but concerns 
could potentially be more severe in the longer run considering that the policy will be in 
effect throughout the year (at 60 percent work reduction).12 An unfortunate feature of 
the system is that it does not contain any guarantees for employment relationships to be 
maintained – the system can even be used while workers have received an advance notice 
of layoff.
Some measures are explicitly targeted at the small firms and freelance workers. 
Reduced payroll taxes are clearly of largest importance for small firms as it only covers the 
first 30 employees.  Self-employed workers have been given additional opportunities to 
put their firms in hibernation in order to access unemployment insurance. Firms can use 
the short- time work scheme even if self-employed as long as the firm is incorporated, 
and many small firms seem to be among the applicants as noted above. The arts and sports 
support which also could cover many freelancers have, however, taken long to materialize 
and there is still considerable uncertainty as to who will receive funding; the budget is fixed 
and will be allocated among applications after individual assessment.
Support of dependent workers
The Swedish labor market is characterized by very low wage dispersion which has remained 
reasonably constant across the past two decades.13 On the other hand, income inequality 
has increased, partly because caps on most social insurance payments, including UI, have 
remained largely fixed in nominal terms for a very long time. The combination of uniformly 
growing nominal (and real) wages together with fixed UI-payments have generated a 
situation where much of the income inequality is related to the employment margin. In this 
respect, the policy direction during the initial phase of the crisis has the benefit of effectively 
preventing poverty. This is true in particular, as the replacement rates in the short-time 
work program are very high – workers in this program are much better insured than they 
would be if they lost their job. On the losing side, however, are those marginal workers who 
are on temporary contracts that will not be renewed when expiring. The reduction of UI 
eligibility requirements may serve as to alleviate some of this impact.14
12 After the end-of-the year, there will be a slightly less generous system in place (permanently) that grants firms access to short-
time work under more restrictive conditions.
13 The background description in this paragraph draws heavily on Nordström Skans et al. (2017), for a summary in English of that 
source, see https://www.sns.se/en/articles/sns-economic-policy-council-report- 2017-policies-for-an-inclusive-swedish-
labor-market/. For a description of the Swedish wage structure see Carlsson et al. (2019).
14 We have not been able to document how various aspects of Swedish active labor market policies have changed in response to 
the crisis.
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Working conditions and work organization
The Swedish Pubic Health Agency recommends that all workers who can should work from 
home. As is shown in figure 4 this seems to have had a substantial impact on the time 
spent at work.  As a contrast, the figure also shows comparable statistics for neighboring 
countries with stricter policies and it is clear that the Swedish response was more gradual 
and less pronounced.  To some extent this is mechanical as some workplaces that were 
closed by law in other countries remained open in Sweden, most notably schools and child- 
care facilities. From the parents’ perspectives this may also have been an important factor 
in terms of ensuring effective labor supply by making it possible for parents to travel to 
work if needed, and to remain more productive when working from home. These factors 
may be particularly important in a Nordic context with a very clear dual-earner model 
and a near universal residential separation between children and grandparents. Very few 
families have access to non-employed household members who can take care of children, 
at least before the short-term work policies took effect.
A direct consequence of the Covid-19 outbreak is the fast increase in the demand for 
health care personnel. To accommodate this, medical unions and employers have agreed 
on a “crisis” agreement, which requires staff to potentially work more hours and adapt 
to location changes in an emergency. A 120% “crisis compensation” is offered in return 
on top of existing pay (yielding a 220% pay increase). The agreement has so far only been 
activated for a subset of ICU medics in the worst affected area of Stockholm.





Figure 4: Time spent in workplace 
Note:   The  figure  shows  the  change  in  the  time  spent  in  the  workplace  provided  by  Google’s  Covid- 
19 Community Mobility Report. The  data  is  drawn  from  users  who  have  opted-in  to  Location  His- tory 
for their Google Account and the baseline is the median value, for the corresponding day of the week, 
during the 5-week period Jan 3–Feb 6, 2020. The data and more information can be found at 
https://www.google.com/Covid19/mobility/. Because the location accuracy and the understanding of categorized 






Note:   The  figure  shows  the  change  in  the  time  spent  in  the  workplace  provided  by  Google’s  Covid-19 Community Mobility 
Report. The  data  is  drawn  from  users  who  have  opted-in  to  Location  His- tory for their Google Account and the baseline 
is the median value, fo  the c rresponding day of the week, during the 5-we k period J n 3–Feb 6, 2020. The data and more 
information can be found at https://www.google.com/Covid19/mobility/. Because the location accuracy and the understanding of 
categorized places varies from region to region, some cautions is warranted when interpreting the cross-country differences.
New labor market entrants
The cohorts about to enter the Swedish labor market face particularly challenging 
circumstances due to the Covid-19 outbreak. It is well-established that labor market 
entrants are more adversely affected by downturns compared to workers established on 
the labor market, which has long-lasting effects on job finding and earnings as shown 
by Oreopoulos et al. (2012) and by Engdahl et al. (2019) for Sweden. As shown by Aslund 
and Rooth (2007), labor market conditions upon entry also have lasting negative effects 
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on refugee immigrants. Adding to this general picture is the fact that the current crisis so 
far has been particularly damaging to the hotel, restaurant and retail sectors, all of which 
provide many entry-level jobs. The crisis is therefore likely to affect both young workers 
and immigrants particularly hard. This is very different from the Swedish experience 
during the financial crisis when the main effects were felt in industries that employ much 
fewer labor market entrants.15 Table 3 shows that the early impact on the inflow into 
unemployment during the first few week of the current crisis. The adverse effects so far 
appear to be strongest among workers aged 25-29.
Figure 5 shows that the number of posted summer-job vacancies has decreased by 18 
per- cent after the onset of the crisis.16 This is another cause for concern given the major role 
played by summer job contacts in the school-to-work transition for high school graduates 
in Sweden. Hensvik et al. (2017) show that as many as 1/3 of vocational high school students 
in Sweden find their first stable job in establishments where they had a summer/extra job 
during high school, a share that is notably higher during recessions. Müller (2020) shows 
that closures of such stepping-stones establishments before graduation have lasting 
negative effects on the affected youths, in particular if parents also lose their jobs at the 
same point in time.17
Table 3: New registrations in unemployment by age and gender
Measure By week 24 2019 By week 24 2020 Percent change
By age:
- 24 43,941 70,675 60.8
25-29 28,725 48,121 67.5
30-39 43,110 67,422 56.4
40-49 29,196 44,439 52.2
50-59 23,286 35,269 51.4
60+ 6,924 10,212 47.5
By gender:
women 85,582 132,995 55.4
men 89,600 143,143 59.8
Source: Public Employment Service
15 The financial crisis primarily affected exporting firms in manufacturing and their domestic suppliers in Sweden, see Olsson 
(2020).
16 The drop is substantially higher - 30 percent - in Stockholm (the region hit hardest by the outbreak).
17 Concerns have also been raised that the physical closings of high schools since March will be particularly harmful to student 
from low SES households and students with disabilities, potentially further widening the SES-gap in high school achievement 
and early labor market outcomes.
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Figure 5: Cumulative inflow of summer-job vacancies, by week 
Source: Public Employment Service 
 
  
Source: Public Employment Service
Policy innovations and labor market trends
Figures 6 illustrates how the number of noticed workers and workers covered by the short- 
time work program are distributed across industries. Layoff notifications are highest in 
hotels and restaurants, followed by administrative services. Short-time work on the other 
hand, is used most in manufacturing followed by wholesale and retail trade. The difference 
in the prevalence of layoffs vs. short-time work is interesting, as it could serve as a measure 
of the willingness to hoard labor in anticipation of future business opportunities. With 
this interpretation in mind, it seems as if restaurants and hotels are much less willing to 
hoard labor than employers in the manufacturing sector where much of the (early stage) 
disturbances appear to be in the form of supply-chain disturbances.18
Hensvik et al. (2020) provide a more detailed documentation of the differential labor 
demand response by industries and occupations as measured by vacancy inflows. They 
show that while the negative shock has a clear impact on all industries, some industries 
are substantially more affected than others. As with the figure discussed above, they 
document substantially larger drops in industries where social-distancing measures are 
likely to bind, such as hotels and restaurants, entertainment and retail trade. The impact 
is much more moderate in the health and education sector, in real estate and in public 
administration and defense. A similar picture emerges in their analysis of vacancies by 
occupations. Among the ten occupations with the largest decrease in vacancy inflow, they 
find waiters and bar tenders, dentists, and fast-food workers. On the other extreme, they 
show that the demand for journalists and health care specialists remain relatively resilient.
Overall, it seems plausible that the distribution of the shock speeds up ongoing 
structural transformation. The large impact in retail, and perhaps also in restaurants, is 
likely to be associated with a move towards online distribution of these goods, a process 
that was al- ready ongoing but at a slower pace before the crisis. Much of this (pre-crisis) 
transformation appears to be a within-industry phenomenon which is much more visible 
in bankruptcy statistics than in overall employment trends, at least within broad industry 
18 See e.g. Riksbank (2020).
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categories. In retail, the rate of layoffs due to bankruptcies grew by 50 percent between 
2018 and 2019 (from 2,000 to 3,000 workers) suggesting that the structural change 
was ongoing already before the current crisis.19 But the pace, as measured in the growth 
rate of bankruptcies, increased five-fold when the crisis hit; bankruptcies grew by 250 
percent from March 2019 to March 2020 (from 370 to 937 workers).20 From a labor market 
perspective, this is both good and bad news. It is good news in the sense that many of the 
businesses that are failing at the moment are likely to be have been unsustainable in the 
long run even without the current shock. It is bad news in the sense that an accelerated 
pace of job destruction in weak industries may make it very hard for laid-off workers to 
find new employment.
On the flip-side of this process, we see signs of encouraging supply-side adjustments. 
As an example, there has been a 30 percent increase in applications of prospective students 
to University nursing programs,21 which is very good news as this is a profession where the 
lack of skilled workers is particularly predominant. Similarly, Hensvik et al. (2020) find that 
job-seekers searching online on Sweden’s largest online job board respond to the crisis by 
redirecting their search efforts towards vacancies from the more resilient occupations.
Figure 6:   Distribution of the aggregate number of workers noticed/on short-time work Jan-April 
2020, by industry
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Source: The Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth. 
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to 1 across industries.
Source: The Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth.
19 We see the same rate of increase between February 2019 and February 2020.
20 Data is from scb.se. We do not see a corresponding pre-trend in other hard-hit industries such as hotels and restaurants and 
wholesale.
21 Applications closed on April 15. 1st option applications increased from 9,400 to 12,200. Data are from the national admissions 
office uhr.se.
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Next steps and fiscal viability
There is no doubt that the current economic policy measures are dramatic by any normal 
standards. The total cost of the current set of (short-run) discretionary measures is 
estimated to be 240 billion SEK,22 i.e. 4.8 percent of GDP. The most expensive measure is the 
short-time work scheme (95 billion SEK). The total cost estimate does not include liquidity 
measures or additional funding for health care expenditures and other related costs. As 
most programs have “running” costs, i.e. no fixed budget, it is not unlikely that the costs 
will exceed these estimates even without extensions, and extensions are likely to come. On 
top of this, there will be a substantial additional financial burden incurred from lost tax 
revenues and payments related to the automatic stabilizers. On the positive side, Sweden 
benefits from reasonably sound public finances, and in particular, low public debt (35 per- 
cent of GDP) at the onset of the crisis. Obviously, a low debt rate makes the response more 
sustainable than otherwise. At the same time, it is unlikely to be sustainable to retain one 
in every ten worker on a near full payroll without participating in productive work. In the 
worst case, the very generous subsidy rates in the short-time work scheme may induce 
firms to postpone the reopening of business activities for too long. In particular, the speed 
of recovery for “up-stream” firms that supply inputs to other firms may be hampered 
if their “down-stream” buyers remain in short-time work schemes for too long. This 
suggests that the most generous subsidy rate (80 percent) which currently will end in July, 
probably should not be extended.
Tentative conclusions: This report has produced an early assessment of the impact on 
the Swedish labor market from restrictions related to the Covid-19 outbreak with the aim 
of making an early assessment of policy measures aimed at mitigating the negative impact 
on the labor market. Our documentation and assessments are early and partial in nature. 
We hope to return and update our assessments later on.
In this early report, we make three main observations: First, despite the apparent 
comparative leniency of the Swedish Covid-19 restrictions, the Swedish labor market 
has been hit hard. The impact has been particularly severe in industries where Covid-19 
recommendations are most directly relevant, such as hotels, restaurants and retail.  Eight 
weeks after the restrictions were announced, 9 percent of the labor force is on short-term 
work. The crisis has led to an increase in registered unemployment and layoff notices 
of layoffs by 1 percent of the labor force each and the numbers continue to accumulate. 
Second, the negative impact has arisen even though policy responses have been massive 
by historical standards. Measures have primarily been aimed at protecting firms and 
permanent jobs. Our early assessment is that this has been a reasonable objective as it may 
facilitate a more rapid recovery when the economy rebounds. On the negative side, this 
focus inevitably leaves marginal workers to be hit very hard by the downturn. Reduced 
eligibility criteria for unemployment insurance may alleviate some of this impact. Third, 
despite being expensive, the current policy stance is financially sustainable. But current 
measures are explicitly short-run in nature, and it is likely that several of them may need 
to be prolonged. Strong public finances ensures that the country can spend and loan for 
some time, but as current measures are draining the public finances at a rapid pace, they 
are not sustainable indefinitely.
Perhaps the clearest take-away from our early assessment of the Swedish experience 
is to caution against overly optimistic assessments of the economic impact of gradual 
openings from complete lockdowns to Swedish-style “modest” restrictions in other 
countries. Even though it seems possible, or even plausible, that the labor market impact 
has been even worse in other countries (we leave explicit cross-country comparisons to 
22 Source: Government press conference on May 14, 2020
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the comparative part of this assessment project), it seems fair to conclude that restrictions 
such as those currently held in Sweden – with Swedish compliance rates – generate a 
substantial drop in labor demand, in particular within the hotels, restaurants and retail 
sectors. Thus, if Swedish-style restrictions are perceived as the route forward and the 
“new normal” as indicated by the WHO, we should expect the European labor markets, at 
least in segments related to personal services, to suffer greatly for an extended period of 
time. Recovery hopes may be more reasonable in the manufacturing sector where firms 
appear more willing to hoard labor at the moment, and where much of the (initial) negative 
impact appears to have been related to international supply-chain disturbances. These 
disturbances may be mitigated as restrictions are lifted across multiple countries at the 
same time.
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ABSTRACT
By mid of March (lock-down), published job vacancies on the Swiss labour market dropped by 45%. 
The collapse of labour demand led to an application of the short-time work scheme at unprecedented 
levels, covering 37% of the labour force by end of May. The scheme has been extended to also cover 
fixed-term employment and temp work. The unemployment rate increased comparably modestly to 
3.4%, whereby youth was most severely hit. A further substantial rise of unemployment is expected in 
autumn. The Swiss Confederation has so far activated 72.2 bio CHF to support the economy, 30.8 bio for 
expenditures on support schemes and 41.4 bio for guarantees securing business loans.
IZA COVID-19 Crisis Response Monitoring
Switzerland (June 2020)
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Labor market impact of COVID-19
According to the last official labor market statistics, the unemployment rate (registered 
unemployed) rose from 2.5%1 by end of February to 3.3% by end of April to 3.4% by end 
of May, implying an increase of 54% compared to May last year [SECO 2020a]. Larger 
immediate increases have been prevented by the extensive use of the short-time work 
scheme (see below). However, I expect that unemployment will further increase by a 
substantial extent. The amount of job vacancies has plummeted substantively. Within two 
weeks after the launch of the Covid emergency measures and lock-down (March 16th), the 
number of vacancies posted on job boards have decreased by 26% [Adecco Group Swiss Job 
Market Index/Stellenmarkt-Monitor University of Zurich]. The newly published vacancies 
initially fell by 45%. In May the situation slightly recovered, but the amount of new job ads 
locates still 30% below the comparable pre-year period [Novalytica/x28]. Figure 1 shows 
the weekly evolution of newly published vacancies in conjunction with the lock-down and 
re-opening steps. This evolution implies that, by end of May, the total number of posted 
vacancies (by firms and recruiters) was down to a level of approximately 130K, whereas it 
has been at 210K in the middle of Q1-2020 [jobradar.ch]. This massive reduction in labor 
demand, combined with expectedly increasing unemployment durations, gives rise to 
the prediction that unemployment will continue to substantially increase over the next 
months.
Figure 1:  Newly published vacancies in Switzerland, per week  
(“Ausserordentliche Lage”: lock-down and emergency measures by March 16, 2020)
IZA COVID-19 Crisis Response Monitoring: Switzerland 
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1 These are the official figures for the rate of registered unemployment (i.e., in unemployment 
insurance), reported by the Swiss State Secretariat of Economic Affairs (SECO). The unemployment 
rate according to the ILO definition, based on the labour force survey, amounts to 4.5% for Q1-2020 
(not yet affected by Covid) [BFS 2020a, Swiss Federal Statistical Office]. 
Source: x28/Novalytica
The extent of the labor demand drop differs substantially between sectors. Figure 2 tracks 
the 5 sectors with the largest amount of job postings (which cover more than 35% of the 
newly publish d job ads [Novalytica/x28]). Whereas the catering industry postings dropped 
by about 75% compared to the pre-year period, and retail by about 55%, the postings in the 
health and public sectors were much less affected (only about 20%). The most substantial 
recovery in the demand drop is seen in the retail sector, which most obviously benefitted 
from the stepwise re-openings in May.
1 These are the official figures for the rate of registered unemployment (i.e., in unemployment insurance), reported by the Swiss 
State Secretariat of Economic Affairs (SECO). The unemployment rate according to the ILO definition, based on the labour force 
survey, amounts to 4.5% for Q1-2020 (not yet affected by Covid) [BFS 2020a, Swiss Federal Statistical Office].
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Figure 1:  Newly published vacancies in Switzerland, by top 5 sectors and week, % changes 
compared to corresponding pre-year week
IZA COVID-19 Crisis Response Monitoring: Switzerland 
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The extent of the labor demand drop differs substantially between sectors. Figure 2 tracks the 5 
sectors with the largest amount of job postings (which cover more than 35% of the newly published 
job ads [Novalytica/x28]). Whereas the catering industry postings dropped by about 75% compared 
to the pre-year period, and retail by about 55%, the postings in the health and public sectors were 
much less affected (only about 20%). The most substantial recovery in the demand drop is seen in 
the retail sector, which most obviously benefitted from the stepwise re-openings in May. 
Figure 2: Newly published vacancies in Switzerland, by top 5 sectors and week, % changes 
compared to corresponding pre-year week 
[source: x28/Novalytica] 
 
Relatively mostly affected by increased unemployment are young workers. The number of youth 
unemployed (< 25 years) by end of May rose by 76.7% as compared to a year ago [SECO 2020a]. 
The youth unemployment rate started rising to 3.4%2, undoing the improvements over the last two 
years; it didn’t reach yet the peak level of the financial crisis (5.4%), but a further increase is to be 
expected in autumn. The impact of the Covid crisis on rising unemployment is broadly spread 
across industries and jobs. Massively affected is the gastronomy sector, over-proportionally 
affected are construction and the machine-, watch and metal industries. Areas within Switzerland 
that heavily rely on tourism tend to show larger increases in the local unemployment rates. Also, 
areas where export-oriented industries (except pharmaceuticals) and finance are strongly 
represented tend to suffer relatively more. Interestingly, the unemployment shock affected both of 
each, women and men, foreigners and Swiss, German-speaking and Latin areas, in about the 
same extent. 
 
2 The youth unemployment rate by ILO definition is at 7.2% in Q1-2020 [BFS 2020a], before Covid. 
(EU: 15.3%) 
Source: x28/Novalytica
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Figure 3: Rate of registered youth unemployment (ages 15 to < 25), by month
IZA COVID-19 Crisis Respon e Monitoring: Switz rland 
4/20 
Figure 3: Rate of registered youth unemployment (ages 15 to < 25), by month [source: SECO] 
 
By the end of April, about half of the total Swiss workforce (5.1 million workers in Q1-2020, [BFS 
2020a]) did rely on some support of one of the main (extended) social insurance/support schemes, 
i.e. unemployment insurance, short-time work scheme or the Income Compensation Act (EO, 
Erwerbsersatzordnung). For more details on the use and evolution of short-time work, see section 
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By the end of April, about half of the total Swiss workforce (5.1 million workers in Q1-2020, 
[BFS 2020a]) did rely on some support of one of the main (extended) social insurance/
support schemes, i.e. unemployment insurance, short-time work scheme or the Income 
Compensation Act (EO, Erwerbsersatzordnung). For more details on the use and evolution 
of short-time work, see section “Support of dependent workers” below.
2 The youth unemployment rate by ILO definition is at 7.2% in Q1-2020 [BFS 2020a], before Covid. (EU: 15.3%)
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Orientation and targeting of adopted measures
Overall, the set of adopted policies is quite comprehensive and seems to serve well its initial 
purpose to shield the affected participants of the economy against the short-run impact of 
the Covid shock. At the core, there are three sets of measures: short-time work (STW) and 
unemployment insurance (UI); income compensation; loans and guarantees for businesses 
directly or indirectly affected by the lock-down. The most important set of measures 
is – in terms of participants and financially – the STW/UI, whereby the vast majority of 
affected individuals and of the funding is in STW. So far, CHF 20.2 billion of additional 
federal funding has been transferred into the UI fund [EFV]. Second in terms of importance 
are the “Covid bridging loans”. CHF 41.4 billion have been given out as guarantees by the 
Swiss Confederation [EFV]. So far, only CHF 1 billion of these potential loans have been 
booked as losses (due to defaulted loans) by the confederation. It is expected that the credit 
default rate will remain relatively low; however, this heavily depends on how persistent 
the ongoing crisis and recession will turn out to be. The booked expenditures for income 
compensation (EO) amount so far to CHF 5.3 billion, whereby CHF 4 billion is assigned to 
directly affected self-employed and employees and CHF 1.3 billion to the indirectly affected 
[EFV]. Thus, the focus of the income compensation scheme is on directly affected self-
employed3 during the lock-down measures.
Initially some target groups among the self-employed, notably the ones indirectly 
affected by the shut-down measures, were neglected by the income compensation policies. 
However, this has been adjusted mid of April, through allowing these groups as well 
access to the Income Compensation scheme (EO) [BSV 2020a]. This coverage is restricted 
to a maximum duration of two months and terminates latest with the end of the Covid 
restrictions.
Important is as well the extension of the short-time work (STW) scheme to fixed-
term contract employment and to employees working for temp agencies by March 20. 
By the same date, the STW was opened as well to persons in an “employer-like status” 
(mostly partners in small limited liability companies who work as salaried employees 
in the company), persons in apprenticeship and persons working in the business of the 
spouse. [Bundesrat 2020a,b]
A potential issue of the adopted policy set is its relatively strong focus on providing 
loans and guarantees. This liquidity aid in form of “Covid bridging loans” is supposed to 
be paid back, which may lead to debt issues for substantial numbers of SMEs. However, so 
far only a smaller part of the credits approved by the banks have been finally taken up by 
the firms. It seems that (smaller) firms are reluctant to indebting themselves and currently 
mostly try to survive on their own resources, taking the credit only as a “last resort”. Thus, 
from a policy point of view it is questionable whether the loan and guarantee schemes 
will be sufficient to support the sustainability of some parts of the economy if the crisis 
turns out to harm firms over a longer time period. In the case of a longer crisis it may be 
advisable to extend the measures by possibly turning some loan schemes into cash grants 
and by adding some additional support for firms through fiscal policy. A further measure 
of effective additional support is the possible extension of the maximum duration of STW 
coverage from 6 months to 12 months, which is currently in political debate.
In the course of May, some further complements have been added to the financial 
support measures. A support scheme for start-up firms has been established by May 7. 
Start-ups in liquidity problems can apply for government-backed loans of up to CHF 1 
million [SECO 2020b]. Furthermore, it has been decided that the Cantons are obliged to 
3  The eligibility for income compensation among the employed is restricted to parents who are not able to work due to the closure 
of the schools or to individuals who have to isolate in quarantine.
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reimburse childcare institutions for parental contributions they lost due to the Covid lock-
down measures in the period from March 17 to June 17, 2020 [SECO 2020d].
Immediate liquidity support to businesses
As mentioned in the last section “Orientation and targeting of adopted measures”, the 
amount of potential liquidity support through credit guarantees is large in Switzerland. 
However, as mentioned, there is a substantial gap between the amount of credit support 
that firms and self-employed apply for and the amount they really claim. The mentioned 
reluctance to finally take up bridging loans could lead to some under-supply of liquidity 
and, relatedly, to some additional layoffs. The extent of this practical issue is currently 
hard to quantify. 
Given the reluctance of firms to claim the loans, the issue of credit misallocation 
should be rather minor. There is a certain risk of deadweight losses and abuse of the credit 
schemes – it is argued, however, that screening should be at a good level due to the fact 
that it is the ‘home bank’ of the firm which is in charge of assessing the loan application. 
Moreover, ex-post screenings (and penalties for abuse) are being implemented in the 
design of the loan schemes.
The delivery and implementation of the different schemes by public agencies and 
other entities (banks) is seen positively by firms and self-employed according to reports 
in the media. Both, applications for short-time work (through unemployment insurance 
agencies) and applications for bridging loans (through banks), were designed to be simple 
and fast. The banks usually reached the target of assessing a loan application within 24 
hours. The public agencies were struggling with the huge amount of short-time work 
applications but still usually managed to digest them without substantial delay and backlog. 
As for the extended use of the support scheme provided by the Income Compensation Act 
(EO), it has been reported that some eligible self-employed ended up touching very small 
daily allowances due to outdated income information recorded at the social security 
agency. But as well for this scheme, no broader complaints have been raised so far. 
However, the government’s decision to terminate the extensions of the STW scheme 
to persons in an “employer-like status”, in apprenticeship and to co-working spouses by 
the end of May – roughly in time line with the relief of Covid lock-down restrictions in 
May – has been criticized as being too early. This early termination is indeed problematic, 
since many of the (small) businesses that relied on this STW extension are still quite far 
away from returning to levels of economic activities similar to the pre-crisis time; also, 
some are in practice prevented from restarting their business due to the imposed protective 
measures (e.g., the event industry). Furthermore, also the income compensation extended 
to indirectly affected self-employed is running out quite quickly (see section “Orientation 
and targeting of adopted measures”). Thus, some of these types of businesses may need 
additional support to avoid insolvencies. 
Support of dependent workers
I assess the effectiveness notably of the short-time work (STW) scheme to avoid additional 
unemployment in the short run as being high. By 20 May, about 190,000 firms covering 
about 1.94 million employees have applied for STW [SECO 2020c]. This corresponds to 37% 
of the Swiss work force. The broad and extended application of the scheme, its simplified 
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administration and the elimination of barriers to getting STW (e.g., no waiting period for 
the employer anymore) helped avoid larger rates of increase in the unemployment rate. 
Data on effectively claimed STW coverage are released with a time lag. In March 2020, 
the effective claim of STW jumped up to covering 0.782 million employees, 0.778 million 
more than in February [SECO 2020a]. The number of affected establishments reached 
about 97,400 by end of March, as compared to a few hundred in the month before. The 
enormous leap in claimed hours is visible in Figure 4. It reached unprecedented levels, as 
the comparison with the increase during the Financial Crisis in 2009 documents.
Figure 4: STW: Number of reported (claimed) cancelled working hours (in 1000 hours)
IZA COVID-19 Crisis Response Monitoring: Switzerland 
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A crucial question for policy and the future evolution of the unemployment rate will be how long the 
coverage with STW will be sustained. Currently, a time limit of 6 months is stipulated; the political 
debate to extend this limit to 12 months is ongoing. Moreover, the extension of the STW scheme to 
persons in an “employer-like status”, in apprenticeship and to co-working spouses (see also section 
“Orientation and targeting of adopted measures “) has already been terminated by end of May. The 
larger (in terms of number of affected persons) extension of the scheme to fixed-term contract 
employment and to employees working for temp agencies is still operative. Thus, it will be up to 
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A crucial question for policy and the future evolution of the unemployment rate will be 
how long the coverage with STW will be sustained. Currently, a time limit of 12 months is 
stipulated; the political deb te to extend this limit to 18 months is ongoing. oreover, the 
extension of the STW scheme to person  in a  “employer-like status”, in apprenticeship 
and to co-working spouse  (see also sectio  “Orientation and targeting of adopted 
measures “) has already been terminated by end of May. The larger (in terms of number 
of affected persons) extension of the scheme to fixed-term contract employment and 
to employees working for temp agencies is still operative. Thus, it will be up to political 
discussion in the parliament how long the extended use of STW should be sustained and if, 
in general, the time limit should be extended or not. This will be related to the issue how 
long the approved additional CHF 20.2 billion for the UI fund (see also section “Orientation 
and targeting of adopted measures “) will cover the accumulating cost of STW and UI. A 
possible extension of the time STW time limit will presumably lead to additional financial 
requirements towards the end of the year. From an economic policy point of view, the 
key question is to which degree an extension of the STW time limit has an impact on 
mitigating additional unemployment. At which point is there a risk that longer STW 
coverage just supports unsustainable structures, i.e. struggling businesses that will have 
to lay off employees anyway? When this point will occur is difficult to assess and predict. 
This is crucially dependent on whether and when there will be a second wave, and of which 
dimension. Particularly in the case of shorter and rather local second waves, which may not 
that heavily affect the duration of the economic crisis, an extension of the STW time limit 
may be effective in sustainably avoiding some unemployment incidence. In the case of a 
more severe second wave that substantially increases the duration of the crisis it will be 
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difficult to mitigate a larger leap in the unemployment rate in the second part of this year 
or in next winter.
In any case, firms on STW will soon have to assess and revise their prediction 
concerning their future business prospects. If they are not sufficiently positive, firms 
may still decide at that point to lay off parts of their work force. This could lead to an 
additional increase in unemployment in autumn – particularly if it turns out that the dip 
of the international economic crises is not just short and that it is possibly related to some 
structural change within the economies. 
The support delivered to job seekers is marked by a shift of weights from active to 
passive labor market policy measures. To avoid larger peaks of benefit exhaustion, the 
Swiss unemployment insurance (UI) extended maximum entitlement to benefits for 
all types of job seekers by 120 additional daily allowances. This brings potential benefit 
duration for a prime-age individual up to 520 work days (about 2 years). On the other 
hand, the submission of proof of job search efforts is waived during the period of the Covid 
special regulations. Job seekers are, however, still obliged to search for jobs. [Bundesrat 
2020c] How long the additional benefit duration will be granted is not yet determined; this 
will depend on the timing of the termination of the related Covid ordinance. Since June, 
the monitoring of job search effort is gradually being re-established. Currently, it is in the 
discretion of the Cantons to define the practical monitoring intensity, the official wording 
is that job seekers and Public Employment Service (PES) counselors are “in dialogue” about 
the proof of regular job search effort.
During the lock-down, activation by ALMPs came to a halt and counseling by 
caseworkers was reduced to an administrative minimum by telephone. Thus, the active 
part of labor market policy was – and still is – almost entirely inexistent. Since June 8th, 
the PES in most Cantons run the important first meeting between job seeker and counselor 
(initial assessment and strategy definition) again as face-to-face (unless the job seeker 
belongs to a risk group). Further interactions are mostly by telephone. Officially, it is not 
forbidden, to my knowledge, to run ALMPs. However, in practice, classical measures like 
training programs are not operative at the moment (some training operators may work 
on online solutions). It is interesting, though, to observe that the number of participants 
in the temporary subsidized employment scheme during UI (“Zwischenverdienst”) did 
not reduce in the last lock-down months. The number of participants turns out to be even 
slightly higher by end of May (about 40,000) than is has been by end of February 2020 
[SECO 2020a].
The full reinstatement of the PES services and of ALMP is, at current state, predicted 
to happen after the summer break in August. However, this is of course dependent on 
the evolution of the infection rates. In any case, it is to be expected that some services 
will resume at lower level and the use of telephone and online channels will remain to be 
more common than before the crisis. The current focus of the PES is on speedy hiring and 
educating additional counselors, in order to handle the rising influx of newly unemployed 
individuals.
Working conditions and work organization
To respond to the increased workload demands due to the pandemic, the Swiss government 
relaxed the working condition rules (according to the labor law) for medical institutions, 
notably with respect to working and resting times. Moreover, specific exceptions to extend 
the weekly maximum working hours beyond the usual legal level have been given to the 
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meat industry and to the banks (to handle the bridging loans applications.) [SECO 2020e] 
These are of course all temporary exceptions. However, particularly employees in the 
medical sector complained that some employers expect too much flexibility with respect 
to work arrangements. Notably employees who were not involved in the treatment of the 
Covid pandemic and were not allowed to work during the infection peak (but weren’t on 
STW either) criticize that some employers require them to compensate now the forgone 
working time by working overtime.
There is no broader evidence yet for Switzerland on the question how working practice 
changed as a consequence of the Covid shock. A smaller survey (n=1500) run by [Deloitte] 
in April documents that 48% of the Swiss employees worked during the Covid period in 
home office arrangements; before the crisis only about 25% of the employees worked at 
least once a week at home. Of course, during the Covid crisis period, the proportion of those 
among the home office workers who worked 100% at home has increased substantively. 
The responses on whether individuals are more or less productive at home and on whether 
they believe to continue to partially work at home after the crisis are highly heterogenous. 
However, about 34% of the respondents indicated that they plan to regularly work from 
home after the crisis. All in all, it seems realistic to predict that the share of employees who 
work (partially) at home will remain on a higher level after the crisis than before. 
The additional workload generated by the combination of home office and home 
childcare was not evenly distributed between the genders. As an analysis of four waves 
of the SRG Corona-Monitor shows (with n=30,000 approx. by wave), women were 
substantially more charged by the additional childcare necessities than men. Depending on 
the education level, 21 to 43% of the female respondents declared in April that they incurred 
reduced capacity for working in paid employment, whereas this was the case for 9 to 27% 
of the male respondents. Similar patterns are visible in the months before and thereafter, 
as documented in Figure 5. Thus, it is clearly shown that highly educated women suffered 
mostly from this double load situation. One driver of this gender difference is the current 
structure of labor force participation in Switzerland: more than 80 percent of women are 
employed – but often in a part-time position. Thus, already in normal times women tend 
to spend more time on household work than men; this pattern has rather been reinforced 
in the crisis times.
Figure 5: Reduced capacity for gainful employment due to child care, by education level
IZA COVID-19 Crisis Response Monitoring: Switzerland 
12/20 
 
The expected higher level of work at home arrangements and, relatedly, more flexible work 
organization in general will boost the political discussion about the appropriate regulation of such 
arrangements, I think. Many related questions are not systematically discussed and regulated so 
far. For instance, who pays for equipment and office space at home? How can appropriate 
supervision be implemented without invading the individual privacy sphere? Should employers 
contribute more to childcare costs if employees work at home more often? How can the employee’s 
private life be protected against the inherent risk of being absorbed by ‘permanent availability for 
work’ at home? Etc. I would expect that some of these questions may become more salient in the 
political debate in the closer future. 
  
Source: sotomo
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The expected higher level of work at home arrangements and, relatedly, more flexible work 
organization in general will boost the political discussion about the appropriate regulation 
of such arrangements, I think. Many related questions are not systematically discussed and 
regulated so far. For instance, who pays for equipment and office space at home? How can 
appropriate supervision be implemented without invading the individual privacy sphere? 
Should employers contribute more to childcare costs if employees work at home more 
often? How can the employee’s private life be protected against the inherent risk of being 
absorbed by ‘permanent availability for work’ at home? Etc. I would expect that some of 
these questions may become more salient in the political debate in the closer future.
New labor market entrants
The challenge to find a job or an apprenticeship after school or university is and will 
clearly be bigger than under normal conditions. The uncertainty among firms has led large 
amounts of hiring processes to be temporarily suspended during the lock-down period, 
with no clear expectation yet when (and if) they will be relaunched. This difficult situation 
particularly affects new labor market entrants who are not yet much experienced in job 
search and who often have a less clearly defined profile than older job seekers. These 
challenges are reflected in the mentioned rising youth unemployment rate (see section 
“Labor market impact of COVID-19”). The issue of less defined profiles among young job 
seekers is aggravated by the fact that some (parts of) final exams are not held. In vocational 
education (apprenticeship plus part-time school), where the majority of new labor market 
entrants is enrolled in Switzerland, only the practical exams are held where possible but 
not the theoretical ones. Whether high school (Gymnasium) final exams are held or not is 
heterogenous, as it is decided regionally (by Canton). In both cases the partially missing 
exam outcomes will potentially weaken the signal and profiling information about new 
labor market (or university) entrants, which may affect the hiring chances and the choice 
options negatively. How severe this issue will be depends crucially on the firms’ reactions 
in adjusting their hiring procedures to the post-lock-down situation.
A positive sign of stability in the apprenticeship market is that traditionally the 
majority of all offered apprenticeship positions are already filled (particularly in the 
German-speaking area of the country). This has been the case as well for the current hiring 
round, 66% (or 58K) of all the available apprenticeship positions have been filled already 
by March/April [Nahtstellenbarometer gfs.bern]. By end of May, about 48K apprenticeship 
contracts have been signed so far, 4% less than last year at the same time. In general, the 
Cantons report “stable conditions” on the apprenticeship market. The lock-down had 
more impact in the Latin areas of the country because there traditionally the recruitment 
of apprentices is done later and has now been substantially delayed due to the situation. 
Luckily, only very few cancellations of new apprenticeship contracts have been reported 
across Switzerland. [SBFI 2020]
The Cantons address the complex situation on the apprenticeship market by 
reinforcing existing sets of support activities: additional marketing for apprenticeships, 
intensified occupational counselling, “bridging” offers (e.g., additional year of school) 
and individual coaching of young labor market entrants. Some Cantons plan “last minute 
apprenticeship markets” in cooperation with the local economy to improve the matching 
on the market, or they allow for an extension of the apprenticeship contract conclusion 
deadline into autumn. Beyond these activities, a new funding mechanism for innovative 
projects to support the apprenticeship market has been introduced by the responsible 
ministry (SBFI) by end of May. First projects have been approved by the SBFI. They focus 
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on measures like coaching and training in occupation and apprenticeship choice as well as 
in application skills, or the launch of virtual apprenticeship market platforms operated by 
local stakeholders.  [SBFI 2020]
It remains to be seen whether these supportive activities by the stakeholders 
are sufficient to achieve a final matching level on the apprenticeship market which is 
comparable to the last years. However, the rising youth unemployment is not only related 
to the finding of apprenticeship positions. Increased difficulties for young labor market 
entrants to find a first job, as discussed above, are salient as well beyond the apprenticeship 
market. So far, I have not seen specific policy innovations to cope with these additional 
challenges in other parts of the labor market for entrants. It is well conceivable that this 
may change if the youth unemployment rate continues to substantially rise in the coming 
months.
Policy innovations and labor market trends
It is too early to identify clear trends of (structural) changes in employment so far. I expect 
that the extensive use of the STW scheme in Switzerland will slow down the speed of 
change caused by this crisis. STW provides the firms more time to assess their situation 
and business perspectives and to wait to decide on potential changes in the composition of 
their workforce.
There are some, currently rather anecdotal, signs indicating possible (accelerated) 
structural changes. The transportation sector as well as tourism operators expect lower 
client flows for several years to come. It is thus probable that these industries will reduce 
hiring and employment for a longer time. In the case of tourism this will affect many short-
term contracts and seasonal positions at a first stage and then possibly more ‘structural’ 
positions in a second stage. Given the rising awareness of the importance and valuation 
of health-related occupations, I would expect that the already ongoing discussion about 
shortages in this area will become more salient. The political intention to promote and 
invest in health-related occupations may increase. A current decision in the parliament 
to invest in education in nursing tends to support this prediction. Next year a more 
pronounced proposal on this issue will come to a vote – this will document to which degree 
the willingness to invest in health-related occupations really increased. 
Furthermore, I would expect that the currently massive increase in use of online 
tools and services will have a sustainable impact on the labor market. Switzerland and 
its workforce are comparably well equipped with internet and computing infrastructure 
and related skills. This supports my expectation that this unintended ‘online experiment’ 
which we are running currently will indeed move the use of online services to a permanently 
higher level. This would have positive impacts on labor demand in jobs related to online 
services, including logistics. It opens the door as well to new innovations through creating 
new online services. I also think it will accelerate the digital transition in how we search 
for and match jobs. Groups of employees and ages who were not yet that familiar with 
operating all the exchanges on the labor market digitally were now suddenly included in 
this transition wave. I think quite many of such immediate transitions of the functioning 
of the labor market towards online operations will remain in use after the crisis. Notably 
because many operators – firms, recruiters, public employment services – are now driven 
into (additionally) investing in new online processes and platform solutions.
First discussions on reshoring some activities back to Switzerland have appeared. 
The current focus is mostly on ensuring the local availability and production of “essential 
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goods” in crisis periods - notably goods related to health and hygiene. For example, a broad 
set of firms have begun producing face masks and developing new technologies to improve 
these masks. Also, the discussion about ensuring local (Swiss or European) production 
of key (components of) pharmaceuticals has been fueled. Switzerland is in principle in 
a good position for the reshoring of such mentioned products, because of the existence 
of a highly competitive pharmaceutical industry and a specialized textile technology 
industry in the country. Clearly, all these plans of reshoring will be grounded in heavily 
automated production strategies. This is the only approach how a high wage country like 
Switzerland can reshore comparably low-priced products. The country has a high potential 
for reshoring production through accelerated automation due to its highly developed tech 
industries and universities. Such structural developments, if they are really boosted by 
the crisis at the end, will mostly generate additional demand for high skilled labor. Thus, 
permanent investment in skill development within the labor force will be essential.
Next steps and fiscal viability
In Switzerland the economy has been reopened essentially in two steps: a first one by May 
11, including the retail shopping sector and most restaurants and cafés, and a second one 
by June 8, where a large part of the touristic infrastructure, cinemas and public transport 
have been reopened. By June 22, the government has broadly abolished and simplified the 
Covid-related restrictions. Also, the recommendation to work in home office has been 
discontinued. A remaining restriction is that large gatherings and events (beyond 1,000 
people) are still banned until end of August. The preventive rules have been generalized 
and simplified: all the public places are required to implement a protection concept, social 
distancing and hand hygiene have to be maintained and registering (or tracking) a/o 
the wearing of face masks should be imposed where sufficient distance is not possible. 
The imposition of these principles currently relies on self-responsibility of citizens and 
businesses, rather than legal enforcement.
As for fiscal viability: Switzerland is in a comparably good position to sustain financial 
support of the participants of the economy for a relatively long time. The state has passed 
a decade of steady debt reduction, and the current debt rate is lower than in most other 
European countries. However, the additional spending of CHF 30.8 billion and loan 
guarantees for CHF 41.4 billion as registered by the [EFV] will essentially undo the whole 
debt reduction achieved over about the last decade. Moreover, projections by KOF-ETH 
[2020a] predict that the state will face a reduction of tax income at all levels (confederation, 
cantons, municipalities) of more than CHF 5.5 billion this year. Next year this reduction 
will expectedly more than double, due to the current measure of deferred invoicing of 
taxes. For the social insurances it is predicted that they will earn about CHF 1 billion less 
in contributions this year. KOF-ETH expects that the rate of registered unemployment 
further increases to 4.7% by the end of 2020 and will remain relatively high with an average 
rate of 4.3% (6.0% by ILO definition) for 2021. In a historic comparison, these are high 
unemployment rates for Switzerland, higher as well than in the financial crisis 2009/10.
To sustain the financial stability notably of the social insurance system, political 
decisions on additional support are required now and next year. Most of the emergency 
ordinances introduced by the Swiss government will run out by end of August latest. 
They require ex-post approval by the parliament, which mostly has been given in June. 
The KOF-ETH projection quantifies the additional financial needs of the unemployment 
insurance including the STW scheme to about CHF 20 billion (75% going into STW). SECO 
[2020c] estimates that the unemployment insurance fund will accumulate debts of about 
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CHF 16 billion by end of 2020, predominantly because of the STW scheme. On May 20, 
the government proposed to spend another CHF 14.2 billion on the UI fund; bringing the 
extraordinary injections into the UI fund to CHF 20.2 billion in total (as mentioned in 
section “Orientation and targeting of adopted measures”). This large support funding has 
been approved by the parliament in June. Through this act it could be avoided that the UI 
contributions which employers and employees pay on the wage bill need to be increased. 
In addition to the financial challenges for UI and STW, the Income Compensation Act 
(EO) scheme will require additional funding as well in the medium run. Which amounts 
of the loan and guarantee schemes will finally be claimed, defaulted or possibly turned 
into cash grants is hard to predict. However, to support the survival and avoid larger debt 
problems for small SMEs and self-employed, it may be necessary as one next step to indeed 
turn loan guarantees into cash grants for such targeted groups of small businesses in need 
(subject to a sustainable business plan).
All these additional funding challenges seem viable, due to the mentioned good 
condition of the public finance in Switzerland. The Swiss confederation has implemented a 
“debt brake” since the nineties. However, the case of exceptional crises has been included 
in the regulation of the debt brake, allowing for exceptions to the usual speed of debt 
repayment. Moreover, the Swiss government bonds and central bank operate with negative 
interest rates – thus, at the current state, increasing debt even pays off. Still, I expect – and 
it is already the case – that the political debates on approving future spending plans will 
become tougher.
Possible next steps to reanimate the economic activity and the labor market would be 
to relaunch and readjust the active labor market policies (ALMPs). ‘Corona-proof’ versions 
of active job seeker support need to be developed and implemented. The ALMP programs 
should be adjusted and more focused to support skill acquisition and job finding in areas 
that are still relatively highly demanded, with good expectations after the crisis. 
In a slightly longer run, as soon as patterns of possible structural changes become 
visible, it may be advisable to set up targeted investment programs in further education 
and start-up subsidies. The goal could be to support occupational switches towards sectors 
that develop favorably after the crisis and to support job creation in such areas. I would 
advise rather against using tax reductions (e.g., VAT) for heavily affected industries like 
gastronomy and tourism. This would in tendency only support structural problems (of 
over-supply) in these industries, and it is moreover an inefficient measure which cannot 
be targeted. If additional support is required in these areas, then specific investments in 
useful touristic infrastructure and in promising start-ups would be more advisable. More 
generally, beyond the short-run survival support, it seems more promising to invest in 
targeted programs that specifically support some risk groups – like young unemployed or 
employers and employees in structurally weak industries – in their skill acquisition and 
transition towards more ‘future-proof’ jobs and business models.
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ABSTRACT
On the 23rd of March, the United Kingdom locked down in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Subsequently, the UK economy suffered the biggest contraction of economic activity in 41 years, 
experiencing a 10% year-on-year drop in GDP. The labour market has seen record rises in unemployment 
claims, big drops in employment and self-employment, a rise in short-time work and a big drop in 
vacancies. These occurred despite the roll out of the government’s job retention scheme for employees 
and income support scheme for the self-employed. How to ensure affected individuals are not on a 
trajectory heading towards long-term unemployment is a top priority for economic recovery.
IZA COVID-19 Crisis Response Monitoring
United Kingdom (June 2020)
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Labor market impact of COVID-19
According to the latest official figures released by the Office for National Statistics (ONS), 
the UK labor market has been hit hard by the COVID-19 crisis. Between March and May 2020, 
there was a 612,000 fall in employee jobs1 (Figure 1), and an unprecedentedly large increase 
in unemployment claims of 1.6 million representing a 125.9% increase since March. (Figure 
2). Vacancies dropped sharply – by 58% relative to March. The largest annual decrease in 
average hours of the past 10 years occurred (6.9 hours fall). For the month of April average 
earnings growth fell dramatically to -1.7% for total pay2 and median pay show an estimated 
fall of 3.5% since March to May3. The most recently available monthly GDP growth statistic 
points to an unprecedented fall of 10.4% in the three months to April 2020 compared 
to the three months prior. This number obviously aggregates over months in and out of 
lockdown, yet this contraction of the economy vastly surpasses that experienced at the 
peak of the 2008 financial crisis (Figure 3).
The most affected sectors are customer-oriented personal and domestic services: 
Non-food, non-pharmaceutical retail; passenger transport; accommodation and food; 
travel; childcare; arts and leisure; personal care; domestic services. The combined 
employment in these sector accounts for roughly 15% of employees in the UK. These 
sectors have experienced the largest contractions in output with gross valued added growth 
for March and April on negative ground of 20%, and as high as 40% accommodation and 
food service activities (Figure 4). According to the latest ONS survey figures4, the sectors 
that reported higher percentages of temporary cease of trading are accommodation and 
food service activities (74%) and arts, entertainment and recreation (75%).5 Vacancy drops 
in these sectors are clearly above 50% (92% and 90% respectively), showing that not all 
sectors have been equally hit (Figure 5).
The composition of workforce in most affected sectors is not homogeneous: being 
disproportionally young (2.5 times more likely to work in sector in lockdown), concentrated 
among low earners (7 times more likely to work in sector in lockdown)6, gender biased 
(women are 33% more likely to work in sector in lockdown) , self-employed intensive (22% 
of self-employed work in affected sectors, disproportional to women – close to a third of 
self-employed women). 
The patterns previously described are corroborated by realized outcomes in a recent 
work by Adams-Prassl et al (2020a) who find that: young workers are 1.4 more likely to 
have experienced working hours reductions and earning losses in the past week than their 
older counterparts, lower income workers are significantly less able to work from home 
and are more likely to have lost their job due to COVID in the past 4 weeks, and workers 
in alternative working arrangements (self-employed, those not paid a salary, working 
with variable hours at employers’ discretion (e.g. zero-hours contracts)) are close to 3 
times more likely to have seen their earnings fall compared to workers in permanent 
contracts. Furthermore, Adams-Prassl et al (2020b) finds that women in the UK are 5% 
more likely to lose their job compared to men. According to the latest Quarterly Labour 
Force Survey the loss in weekly hours worked has been particularly pronounced among 
the self-employed with a drop of 11.4 hours on average comparing the periods pre and 
1 Note that employment numbers as presented are likely to underestimate the actual fall in total work as they do not account for 
self-employment.
2 The wage growth is 0% for regular pay.
3 Earnings and employment from Pay As You Earn Real Time Information, UK: June 2020, ONS
4 Business Impact of COVID-19 Survey, 4-17 May, ONS
5 The May figures show a slight improvement relative to the temporary cease of trading experienced in the April by the same 
sector (80% and 81%)
6 See Joyce and Xu (2020)
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post-lockdown until the end of April. Weekly hours worked prior to lockdown had been on 
average similar between employees and self-employed (32.2 and 31.9) but the lockdown 
has affected the self-employed significantly more with a 36% drop in hours relative to 19% 
felt by employees (Figure #6). Forthcoming study by Blundell and Machin (2020), which 
has conducted a survey of self-employed workers in the UK in May, finds that despite the 
disproportionate number of women working as self-employment in affected sectors, the 
average self-employed female worker has not been more affected, mainly due to the fact 
that self-employed women are more likely to be able to work from home.
Figure 1: UK Employment Count of Paid Employees
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Notes: Number of people receiving paid renumeration included in Pay As You 
Earn (PAYE) Real Time Information (RTI) for work done in the reference 
period. It also includes people receiving renumeration for the reference period 
who have not done work but are an employee 
Source: ONS Earnings and employment from Pay As You Earn Real Time 
Information, UK: June 2020 
 
Notes: Claimant count covers claims for Jobseeker's Allowance and those 
claimants in the Universal Credit "searching for work" 























































































































































Notes: Number of people receiving paid renumeration included in Pay As You Earn (PAYE) Real Time Information (RTI) for work 
done in the reference period. It also includes people receiving renumeration for the reference period who have not done work but 
are an employee
Source: ONS Earnings and employment from Pay As You Earn Real Time Information, UK: June 2020
Figure 2: UK Claimant Count
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Notes: Claimant count covers claims for Jobseeker’s Allowance and those claimants in the Universal Credit “searching for work”
Source: ONS 
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Figure 3: Gross Domestic Product Growth UK, 2007 Jan-2020 April
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Notes: Three Month-on-Three Month growth rates relative to previous year
Source: ONS
Figure 4: Gross Domestic Product Growth UK by Sector, March and April 2020
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March AprilNotes: Three Month-on-Three Month growth rates relative to previous year
Source: ONS
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Figure 5: Vacancies Growth UK by Sector, May 2020
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Notes: Average weekly hours worked calculated as total hours worked in the reference week 
including overtime and 2nd jobs. The dashed vertical line identifies the week prior to lockdown 
on the 23rd of March. 
Source: ONS 
Notes: Growth rates are calculated relative to March 2020 levels
Source: ONS
Figure 6: Average Weekly Hours Worker UK by Employment Type, January to April 2020
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Notes: Average weekly hours worked calculated as total hours worked in the reference week 
including overtime and 2nd jobs. The dashed vertical line identifies the week prior to lockdown 
on the 23rd of March. 
Source: ONS 
Notes: Average weekly hours worked calculated as total hours worked in the reference week including overtime and 2nd jobs. 
The dashed vertical li e identifies the week prior to lockdown on the 23rd of March.
Source: ONS
Orientation and targeting of adopted measures
The last update (8h June) for the UK is appropriate although does not include the recent 
extensions of both Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) and Self-Employed Income 
Support Scheme (SEISS) until October announced by the Chancellor Rishi Sunak on 
the 29th of May. The labor market policies introduced to date have been gradual, with 
measures being announced first to provide the businesses with liquidity and to shield 
workers with permanent contracts and then expanded to other workers. Most of the initial 
measures have targeted the preservation of firm-worker matches through furloughing 
in the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS), reducing and delaying the permanent 
ceasing of trading of firms and consequent destruction of jobs primarily among those 
in permanent contracts. This implied that workers in alternative working arrangements 
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when and if eligible7 for support will receive so at a later point in time (Self-Employed 
Income Support Scheme (SEISS) starts payment only in June). As of June 4, the Office for 
Budget Responsibility estimates that CJRS and SEISS will represent an expenditure of 54 
and 10.5 billion pounds respectively accruing to the equivalent to 3.1% of UK GDP in 2019 
(Table 1).8 The most significant policies with respect to estimated cost are CJRS, SEISS, the 
Small Business Grant Scheme and Business Rates Relief Package as presented in Table 1. 
The policies have not yet been granular enough as to take into account the disparities in 
workforce composition stated previously, although that would require more discretionary 
actions that are not easy to plan and could delay effective implementation. However, one 
can observe that the policies first enacted have been directed at workers with arguably less 
exposure to economic damage due to the current crisis (Adams-Prassl et al, 2020a, b).
7 Not all workers in alternative work arrangements will be eligible for governmental support (for example, self-employed workers 
that have not traded in the tax year 2018 to 2019 are excluded)
8 Coronavirus Policy Monitoring Database – 4 June 2020, Office for Budget Responsibility
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Table 1: Estimated Cost of COVID-19 Support Measures UK
COVID-19 Support Measures
Net Cost 




1 Public services spending -16 OBR
2 Additional funding for charities -0.8 HMT
3 Local authority funding to support vulnerable people -0.5 HMT
Employment support
4 Coronavirus job retention scheme -54 OBR
5 Self-employed income support scheme -15 OBR
Other support for households
6 Statutory sick pay support -1 OBR
7 Welfare package -8 OBR
Universal credit - minimum income floor
Increase weekly universal credit by £20
Increase weekly tax credit by £20
Employment and support allowance: removing 7 day wait
Local Housing Allowance measures
Stopping all health assessments and job centre appointments
 Stopping conditionality reassessments   
8 Welfare - suspending benefit recovery * n/a
9 Tax credits: automatic renewal and relaxation of hours rules * n/a
Business support: tax and spending measures
10 Small business grant schemes -15 OBR
11 Business rates package -13 OBR
12 Off-payroll working: delay extension to private sector by 1 year -1.2 OBR
13 VAT on e-publications - early introduction -0.1 OBR
Business support: loans and guarantees
14 Loan schemes -5 OBR
Coronavirus business interruption loan scheme (CBILs)
Coronavirus large business interruption loan scheme (CLBILS) 
 Bounce Back Loan Scheme (BBLS)   
15 Covid Corporate Financing Facility (CCFF) * n/a
16 Support for start-ups (Future Fund and Innovate UK) * n/a
17 Trade credit insurance * n/a
Tax measures
18 VAT deferral -1.9 OBR
19 Self-assessed income tax deferral -1.2 OBR
20 Time-to-pay arrangements * n/a
21 Import duty exemptions for medical products -0.1 OBR
22 Zero rate of VAT on PPE -0.1 OBR
Other measures
23 Rail franchise suspension * n/a
24 Interest holiday for help-to-buy equity loan holders * n/a
25 Lifetime ISA early access * n/a
26 TFL package - HMT
27 Waiving the immigration health surcharge for NHS workers and other  
care providers
* n/a
Memo: policy assumptions included in the fiscal scenario
28 Major financial asset sales - assumed delays -10.5 OBR
Notes: The estimates cover cash impacts of the policies in 2020-21 based on the illustrative assumption that economic activity 
would be heavily restricted for three months and then gradually return to normal over the subsequent three months. Impacts at 
future periods are not covered. * means no estimate has yet been produced.
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility.
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Immediate liquidity support to businesses
As of June 14, HMRC declared that 1.1 million firms had claimed support of the Coronavirus 
Job Retention Scheme (CJRS), representing 9.1 million jobs furloughed (Figure 7). According 
to the latest release from HMRC9, firms with less than 50 employees represented 92% of 
all firms claiming support and 44% of the jobs covered. Considering the official count of 
the population of firms as of 2019 by employment size, it is estimated that 37% of firms 
with less than 50 employees have asked support of CJRS and the same statistic climbs to 
79% for larger firms. According to ONS latest survey figures (covering 4 to 17th of May) it 
is estimated that 79% of responding businesses had applied for the CJRS with a success rate 
of 90%, this represents a significant improvement in the roll out of the scheme compared 
to April. The differences between smaller and larger firms (250 employees threshold) in 
applications does not look to be statistical large (80% vs 78%) whereas the difference in 
approved status is more pronounced (92% vs 84%)10. The March to April differences in 
vacancies growth for businesses employing less than 50 employees compared to larger 
firms of 69.3% and 47.3% respectively, looks to have been reduced during the month 
of May with small and large firms experiencing a similar reduction of 58% compared to 
March11. Firms with workforce size below 250 are 32%12 more likely to have temporarily 
closed or temporarily ceased trading. Furthermore, inefficiencies and burden disparities 
are present in the schemes as set currently, for example, when applying for the CJRS 
with less than 100 employees, firms are required to enter the individual details (name, NI 
number, claim period, claim amount and payroll number (optional)) for each worker which 
plausibly represents an extra burden for smaller firms.
According to HMRC, the official number of applications received for the Coronavirus 
Self-Employed Income Support Scheme (SEISS) was 2.6 million as of June 14 (Figure 8), 
corresponding to a value claimed of 7.6 billion pounds. According to their analysis, Blundell 
and Machin (2020) estimate the take-up of the scheme to be increasing since the opening 
of applications on 13th of May with 43% of their survey respondents declaring they had 
applied as of 15th of May. However, it is worrying that of those not applying, 41% say they 
are unsure about whether they are eligible for the scheme. Most recent official statistics 
from HMRC estimate the take up of the SEISS to be approximately 70% of the eligible 
population13.
9 Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) statistics: June 2020, HMRC
10 It is not possible to conduct inference to conclude if the differences are statistically significant.
11 The improvement for small businesses (firms employing less than 50 workers) is driven by an increase of vacancies in the 1-9 
employee band from April to May of 65%.
12 25% in April figures
13 Self-Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS) Statistics: June 2020, HMRC
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Figure 7: Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme Take Up
Notes: Number of jobs is calculated as the sum of the maximum number of employees furloughed by each PAYE scheme that has 
made a claim. Number of firms is calculated as the number of distinct PAYE schemes that have made a claim
Figure 8: Coronavirus Self-Employed Income Support Scheme Take Up
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Support of dependent workers
Jobseeker’s Allowance (Unemployment Benefit) has suffered no changes apart from the 
waiving of interviews and appointment attendance. Universal credit suspension of the 
minimum wage floor aims to facilitate eligibility of self-employed. An encouraging update 
relates to the option available to furloughed workers under the CJRS to take up part-time 
work for another employer if their employment contract allows. Additionally, flexibility 
on the phasing of workforce has been provided by allowing employers to be able to roll 
employees on and off furlough within the duration of the scheme. The first version of 
the CJRS did not allow for any of the previously mentioned options hence limiting the 
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allocation of work resources and alternative income sources. It is estimated that between 
28 to 31% of the employees in the UK have now been furloughed14, these figures represent 
a considerable effort in reducing or postponing inflows into unemployment. Measures 
addressing job seekers are plausible to be announced at a later stage of deconfinement, 
so far the policies in place have focused on attenuating and postponing the inflows into 
unemployment.
Working conditions and work organization
“Essential” sectors (health, wholesale retail (groceries), public transport) have adopted 
strict health guidelines with their operation procedures. Opening hours and/or frequency 
of service have been affected and “mirrored” work shifts are in place in order to try to 
minimize exposure and strain of workers. According to ONS survey calculations, 7.7% of 
workers in Great Britain responded that they have been working longer hours with no or 
reduced breaks in the past seven days.15 Furthermore, when asked about if they are worried 
about their health and safety at work 17.2% responded positively. Blundell and Machin 
(2020) find that around a third of self-employed workers still working have felt their health 
safety at risk, when focusing on the subset of self-employed who work with digital platforms 
this steeply rises to 79%. Notice that the average self-employed worker, according to the 
study, experiences an exposure to health risk similar to that of key workers when surveyed 
by ONS in May16. Homeworking has seen a pronounced increase; in the month of April it is 
estimated that 36% of employed workers were always working from home compared to the 
reporting by the same workers in January and February of 6%17. The gender gap in working 
from home relative to the month of April was small but statistically significant, 2% in 
favor of men. Furthermore, education seems to play an important role in being able to 
perform work remotely from home, with 47.7% of graduates reporting being continuously 
working from home in April, whereas only 22.5% of non-graduates were able to do so. 
The gap illustrates a sharp difference even with respect to the same workers’ response 
in January and February, when the graduate to non-graduate differential was only 1.8% 
(7% of graduates and 5.2% of non-graduates reported as homeworking). More educated 
workers’ higher accessibility to remote work represents a significant shielding mechanism 
against the labor shock resulting from the lockdown and mobility restrictions in place. 
Looking at the sectoral difference in remote work arrangements one can see considerable 
variation with sector like Information and Communication, Education and Professional, 
Scientific and Technical Activities reporting a proportion of workforce working remotely 
considerably above 50% (Figure 9). In contrast sectors such as Accommodation and Food, 
Transport and Manufacturing show only approximately 20% of their workforce being 
able to work from their homes. When considering care responsibilities facing workers, it 
is estimated the COVID is directly affecting the degree of caring arrangements for 10% of 
those in working age with sharp gender differential: 7.2% of men compared to 12.6% of 
women. For those whose caring responsibilities were disrupted, 51% state that they are 
now spending more time caring for others.18
14 Business Impact of COVID-19 Survey, 4-17 May, ONS
15 Coronavirus and the social impacts on Great Britain: 12 June 2020, ONS
16 Coronavirus and the social impacts on Great Britain: 7 May 2020, ONS
17 Understanding Society COVID-19, May 2020, Institute for Social and Economic Research
18 Coronavirus and the social impacts on Great Britain: 12 June 2020, ONS
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Figure 9: Proportion of Workforce in Homeworking UK, May 2020
Source:  Business Impact of COVID-19 Survey, 4-17 May, ONS
New labor market entrants
Considering the recent figures on the performance of the UK labor market and the likely 
scenario for coming months, it is expected that school leavers and graduates will be facing 
remarkable difficulties in entering the market and potentially severe scarring effects. In 
general, sectors that usually absorb part of the downturn employment shocks of recent 
crisis are precisely the most affected in the current situation, this worsens considerably 
the outlook for new labor market entrants. A natural response from school and university 
graduates will be to stay on in education longer, such will imply the need for additional 
funding on an emergency basis aimed at both students and educators. For those choosing 
to leave education and try to enter the labor market, targeted job guarantee schemes 
and prioritizing of apprenticeships for younger people will be sensible policies to reduce 
the detrimental impacts of crisis for new labor market entrants.19 Several key higher 
education institutions, including University of Cambridge and University of Manchester, 
have announced that their teaching will resume online for at least the next academic term. 
Other major universities, such as Oxford University and London School of Economics, 
are planning for a “blended” approach mixing online and face-to-face tuition next year. 
Although it is less clear how smaller institutions will adapt to the need for online teaching, 
the trend in the UK seems to be clearly oriented towards it. In a recent survey to the UK 
universities, 97% of the institutions (89 out of 92) answered they will be following a 
“blended” approach to teaching while the other 3% answered they will be exclusively 
online on the start of the new academic year.20
19 For a comprehensive analysis of the economic consequences of the crisis on education leavers and policy recommendations to 
tackle it see Henekan (2020).
20 https://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/news/Pages/Most-universities-will-teach-in-person-this-autumn.aspx
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Policy innovations and labor market trends
It is expected an acceleration of the pre-crisis trend in shifting a share of the usual work 
schedule to working from home. As several current studies point out there was already 
a willingness-to-pay for job security among self-employed workers which were willing 
to sacrifice part of their income in order to access the benefits of the social safety net 
(Blundell and Machin, 2020; Boeri, Giupponi, Krueger and Machin, 2020). This preference 
will likely be intensified now that a significant proportion of workers in alternative work 
arrangements are suffering significant economic hardship. In the terms of structural 
changes in production technology, one expects a hastening in adoption of automation 
processes in production in order to circumvent the reliance on in-workplace presence. A 
degree of reorganization and reallocation of global value chain downstream production 
is likely to take place as consequence of firms experience during this crisis. In the UK for 
example, 20.5% of importing businesses21 declared that they completely stopped importing 
materials, goods or services during the outbreak. Of those businesses continuing to import 
60.4% has reduced their importing (62.5% for manufacturing)22. This shock can push 
firms to decrease dependency on single geographic-centric suppliers, which in turn can 
have the potential to benefit labor market effects for domestic workers and closer trade 
partnering economies. The shifts in global value chains will likely to prioritize resilience 
and responsiveness over low-cost, centralized production. When asked about what type of 
support would help their importing challenges, 15.4% of businesses whose importing has 
suffered from the current crisis state support in finding new alternative supply chains as 
beneficial. It is hard to disentangle if firms’ future decisions regarding their downstream 
production will mainly be driven by Brexit or the COVID crisis, although the changes due to 
Brexit are heavily dependent on the future trade deals. Also, we expect to see further wage 
stagnation particularly with some sectors affected (passenger transport; accommodation 
and food; travel) being considerably restricted even in the medium run.
Next steps and fiscal viability
According to OBR, the latest estimate of the aggregate cost of the COVID response support 
packages is approximately -132.5 billion pounds, 6.3% of GDP. The current policy stance is 
likely to be unsustainable if unchanged until the end of the year (potentially even earlier). 
Future fiscal viability is dependent on the speed of recovery of the UK and World economy 
and the “tolerance” by the international financial markets towards the sovereign debt 
level. If the tolerance shown is the same as the one display in the European crisis of started 
in 2008, then most likely it will not be sustainable and can bring pressure of restrictive 
fiscal policies in the medium-term with severe consequences for inequality in the long-
run. Additionally, the UK is no longer part of the EU making the mutualization of debt via 
mechanisms such as the so-called “coronabonds” is not an option. A mitigating factor is a 
likely sustained reduction in the capital financing costs due to a fall in investment demand.
The next steps to revive economic activity without significant job destruction and high 
long-term unemployment need to be focused on an efficient and well-monitored phasing 
out of the job retention schemes coupled with a sustained policy of investment in human 
capital and reskilling. One in four workers are currently furloughed and their prospects 
of being kept on are critical to the recovery and the phasing down of the Job Retention 
Scheme. As employers start to bear more of the costs there would seem to be two groups to 
21 Importing business is defined as having imported in the last 12 months
22 The effects were felt by exporter firm as well. 20.1% completely stopped their exporting during the outbreak, of those who did 
not 73.5% have reduced their exports.
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carefully consider. The first will return to work, possibly first on a part-time or short time 
work basis. The second will not, either being laid off because there is not demand for their 
job, or because their employer closes down. For this group, policy is vital to ensure they do 
not be placed on a trajectory heading towards long-term unemployment, the economic, 
psychological and social costs of which are substantial as we know from a large body of 
research from earlier downturns that featured high levels of long term unemployment 
(Machin and Manning, 1999). It is important, for individuals, families and society that 
we do not return to the kind of long-term unemployment picture that did such damage 
in the UK in the early 1980s. Job guarantees for those reaching long-term unemployment 
(12 months), and perhaps at an earlier cutoff for younger workers (e.g. 6 months for under 
25’s), are being discussed by some UK labor economists.
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ABSTRACT
Widespread business closures and social distancing practices led to an unprecedented fall in employment 
and rise in unemployment in the United States in March and April, although the labor market has improved 
somewhat since May. Extended and more generous benefits for the unemployed and measures to 
encourage businesses to retain workers have been the focus of the labor policy response. Although new 
policies strongly incentivize work share, program take up has been relatively low thus far. As key labor 
policy measures will expire at the end of July, the US Congress is debating a new relief package.
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Labor market impact of COVID-19
Widespread mandatory business closures and social distancing practices have led to an 
unprecedented fall in employment and rise in unemployment in the United States since 
March.  
Official unemployment statistics for the United States are based on a monthly 
household survey. They are released at the beginning of each month and reflect the 
unemployment situation in the middle of the prior month (specifically, the week including 
the 12th of the month). A separate employer survey tracks changes in payroll employment. 
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)1, the official unemployment rate 
was 14.7 percent in mid-April, the highest since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Owing 
to potential problems in the coding by interviewers of individuals who were not at work 
during the survey week, the BLS reported that the unemployment rate could have been up 
to 5 percentage points higher. The employment-to-population ratio for those age 16 and 
older was at 51.3, the lowest rate recorded in the history of the series, which date back to 
January 1948. 
Reflecting the loosening of restrictions on business openings, the employment 
situation improved somewhat between April and May. The official unemployment rate fell 
by 1.4 percentage points to 13.3 percent, and the employment to population ratio improved 
by 1.5 percentage points to 52.8 percent. The Bureau of Labor Statistics continued to flag as 
a problem the potential understatement of the unemployment rate. 
Administrative data on unemployment insurance2, which are published weekly, 
similarly show a surge in unemployment during the crisis. Figure 1 depicts the number of 
people previously in wage and salary jobs receiving unemployment benefits over the last 
year. That number started rising sharply in mid-March and peaked at 25.9 million in early 
May. For the week ending June 6, the number receiving unemployment insurance benefits 
had declined to 20.5 million. Because this figure does not count those who are unemployed 
but do not normally qualify for unemployment benefits, which includes the self-employed 
and new entrants to the labor force, the concept is different from that measured in the 
household survey. 
Figure 1: Number receiving unemployment insurance (millions) 





Source: Administrative data published by the U.S. Department of Labor. The numbers exclude those on 
work-share programs and the self-employed on Pandemic Unemployment Assistance, who do not 
















Source: Administrative data published by the U.S. Department of Labor. The numbers exclude those on work-share programs and 
the self-employed on Pandemic Unemployment Assistance, who do not normally qualify for unemployment benefits. 
1 https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf
2 https://www.dol.gov/ui/data.pdf
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Analyses3 of unemployment insurance claims from the state of California show that one-
third of wage and salary workers age 16-23 and one fourth of those age 24-39 have filed for 
unemployment benefits.  Especially striking is the fact that in California nearly half of those 
without any college education have applied for unemployment benefits during the crisis.
Mirroring the dramatic rise in unemployment, figures from the BLS employer survey4 
show payroll employment falling by 20.7 million between March and April. Nonfarm 
payroll employment rose by 2.5 million, recovering about 12 percent of the jobs lost in the 
preceding month. Job losses were widespread across sectors but especially steep leisure 
and hospitality, education and health, professional and business services (particularly 
temporary help agencies), and retail trade. Employment in the leisure and hospitality 
industry, which includes restaurants, fell by nearly half or 7.7 million between March and 
April; that sector recovered 1.2 million of those jobs between April and May. 
Reflecting the composition of employment in sectors hardest hit by the crisis, the data 
show that youth, minorities, and the low educated have suffered especially high levels of 
unemployment (See Figure 2). Teenage employment, for example, was nearly 30 percent 
in May compared nearly 14 percent among adult women and between 11.6 percent among 
adult men. Unemployment falls dramatically with educational attainment. As shown 
in Figure 2, the unemployment rate among those age 25 and over with less than a high 
education was nearly 20 percent in May compared to an unemployment rate of 7.4 percent 
among the college educated.
Figure 2:  Unemployment rates by age and gender, race and ethnicity, and educational attainment, 
May 2020













Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey
In addition to job loss, many people have experienced lower earnings because of reduced 




Research Report No. 98  Short-Run Labor Market Impacts of COVID-19, Initial Policy Measures and Beyond
149|153
from U.S. Census Bureau5 show that in the week ending June 9, nearly half of those surveyed 
reported that they or someone in their household had experienced a loss of employment 
income since March 13. That figure was about 60 percent for those age 18-24, for Hispanics, 
and for those with less than a high school education.  
Orientation and targeting of adopted measures
The Corona Virus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act6) enacted at the end 
of March contains several important measures designed to mitigate the impacts of the 
pandemic on workers and businesses. In policies designed to reduce employment costs for 
businesses, the CARES Act gives businesses a payroll tax credit and sets up a program (the 
Paycheck Protection Program) that provides forgivable loans to small and medium sized 
businesses if they do not lay off employees.  
The Act also provides substantial federal support for unemployment insurance 
during the crisis.  In the United States, the unemployment insurance system is a federal-
state partnership. While the federal government provides states with funding for the 
administration of the program, the benefits paid out to the unemployed normally come 
from state trust funds that are financed through experience-rated taxes on employers 
operating in the state. The CARES Act extends by 13 weeks the maximum duration of 
unemployment benefits, and the federal government reimburses the states for these 
extended benefits. Moreover, out of concern that the unemployment benefit is too low in 
many states to sustain the unemployed and their families during a period when new hiring 
is very low, the federal government is providing a supplemental unemployment insurance 
benefit of $600 per week. 
The CARES Act also provides benefits to selected groups who normally are not 
eligible to receive unemployment benefits—primarily the self-employed, which includes 
independent contractors and freelance workers. The federal government reimburses the 
states for all unemployment benefits paid to these groups.  
Additionally, the CARES Act contains several provisions designed to promote the use 
of short-time compensation (STC) or work sharing during the recession. At the start of 
the recession, only 26 states, which accounted for about 70 percent of the U.S. workforce, 
operated work-share programs.  The law provides financial support to states without 
work-sharing to develop one.  Through the end of the year, the federal government will 
reimburse states for all STC benefits paid out. This means that state UI trust funds, which 
are being rapidly drained by the high level of regular unemployment insurance payments, 
will not be affected by STC use and employers will not face higher future unemployment 
taxes if they use work sharing in lieu of layoffs. Importantly given the already high level of 
unemployment, employers are permitted to use work sharing to bring furloughed workers 
back to work and even to hire new employees. Those on work share receive the flat $600 
weekly federal supplement to their unemployment benefit, irrespective of the percentage 
cut in hours. These generous STC benefits should make the work sharing attractive to 
workers. 
Even if an employee is not laid off, the worker may be unable to work for reasons 
related to the Covid-19 crisis. Workers may themselves be sick with the virus or may have 
to care for family members who are sick.  Additionally, most schools and daycares closed, 
leaving many workers without affordable childcare options. In response to these problems, 
5 https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2020/demo/hhp/hhp6.html#tables
6 https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-116hr748enr/pdf/BILLS-116hr748enr.pdf
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the Families First Coronavirus Response Act7, enacted into law in March, requires small 
and medium sized employers to provide paid sick leave (up to two weeks with full pay ) 
and paid family and medical leave (up to 10 weeks at two-thirds workers’ regular pay) to 
employees who must miss work for reasons related to the coronavirus outbreak.  Although 
most large employers offer paid sick leave and family and medical leave, this act does 
not mandate coverage by employers with over 500 workers, and some have argued this 
omission represents a major gap in coverage8. 
Immediate liquidity support to businesses
Under the Paycheck Protection Program, if the business retains all employees, the loan 
is forgiven.  The original law stipulated that at least 75 percent of the loan must be used 
for employee compensation, but that share was subsequently reduced to 60 percent. This 
program has been very popular and ran out of its initial $349 billion allocation in less than 
two weeks. Congress has replenished the fund with an additional $310 billion.  The loans 
under the Paycheck Protection Program are only available for businesses with 500 or fewer 
employees. One concern has been that relatively large organizations have been better 
equipped to apply for loans, which have been administered through private lenders, and 
that smaller businesses have been underrepresented among those receiving funds.
Additionally, the federal government has helped provide liquidity to medium and 
large businesses by purchasing loans on favorable terms. For large businesses, the federal 
government has been buying corporate bonds directly (up to $750 billion), and for medium 
sized businesses it has been purchasing business loans from banks (up to $600 billion).  
As noted, independent contractors, freelancers, and other self-employed individuals 
may receive unemployment benefits through a special federally funded program. This new 
program, Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA), took time to set up in each of the 50 
states, but applications for unemployment benefits through the PUA—many if not most of 
which come from the self-employed—have been large in recent weeks.  In the week ending 
May 30, 9.2 million of the 29.2 million receiving some type of unemployment benefit in the 
United States were funded through the PUA9. 
Support of dependent workers
As outlined above, the primary policy for dependent workers (i.e., employees) losing their 
jobs has been income support through the state-run unemployment insurance system, 
supplemented with a federal benefit. States were overwhelmed with applicants in the early 
weeks of the pandemic and the processing of applications was slow. While the situation 
varies across states, the state unemployment insurance agencies have been hiring and 
training new staff and are now better able to process the applications.  The insured 
unemployment rate for dependent workers, defined as the share of dependent workers 
receiving unemployment benefits, was high—17.2 percent—in the week ending May 9.  
The federal supplement to the state benefit was set at a fixed amount ($600 per 
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however, makes benefits very generous for low and middle-income workers.  Analyses 
of unemployment insurance administrative data10 in the state of California show that the 
wage replacement rate for workers on unemployment insurance is 140 percent—meaning 
that more than half of workers receiving benefits are earning substantially more than they 
did when employed. Consistent with this evidence, a study11 of the entire United States 
estimates that, with the federal benefit supplement, the median unemployment insurance 
benefit replacement rate in the United States is 134 percent and that two-thirds of workers 
eligible for unemployment insurance could earn more than they would earn on their jobs. 
There have been widespread reports from employers that it is difficult to get workers to 
return to work.  Although in principle workers become ineligible for benefits if they turn 
down a job offer or are recalled to their old job, this rule may be hard to enforce during the 
economic crisis. 
Thus far, although use of work-share programs is high by historical standards, less 
than one percent of workers receiving unemployment insurance benefits are on work-
share programs. Active labor market programs have been greatly pared back both because 
there has been relatively little new hiring and because job service centers have been closed 
due to health risks.  In Michigan, some employees who had been working in job service 
centers have been reassigned to assist with the processing of unemployment insurance 
claims and setting up work-share programs. 
Working conditions and work organization
As in other countries, there has been a tremendous increase in remote work wherever 
this is feasible—generally for office workers. Although U.S. statistical agencies have 
not collected data on the prevalence of remote work since the start of the crisis, several 
privately conducted surveys have. The Gallup organization reports that in mid-April, 62 
percent of employed respondents to its panel survey12 reported working from home out 
of concern for the Covid-19 virus, up from 31 percent in mid-March. Consistent with this 
estimate, a Google Consumer Survey13 conducted by researchers at MIT and Upwork in 
early April estimates that among those employed four weeks prior to the survey and still 
employed at the time of the survey, about 55 percent were working remotely and that 38 
percent, or 69 percent of those working remotely at the time of the survey, had shifted to 
remote work during the four weeks. 
In the United States, there has been no national policy regarding which businesses 
should be shut down to prevent the spread of the virus, when those businesses may reopen, 
and what workplace practices must be adopted to help prevent the spread of the disease 
and to protect workers.  Instead, those decisions have been left up to the governors of each 
of the 50 states and, in many cases, individual businesses have adopted more restrictive 
practices to protect workers.  Restrictions, for example, have involved limiting the number 
of people who may enter retail stores, requiring individuals in open spaces to wear face 
masks and stay at least 6 feet from others, and mandating daily checks of employees’ 
health status before they may enter the workplace.  
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May, many companies, including prominent tech companies14, continue to have their 
employees work remotely when feasible. Google, Facebook, and Microsoft, for example, 
have announced that many of their workers can work from home through the end of 2020. 
Some businesses have redesigned their workplaces to make them safer for employees. 
For instance, many stores and factories15 have erected plexiglass barriers to protect 
workers from customers or other employees.  Some businesses, most notably meat 
packing16 facilities where employees work in cramped conditions, have been forced to shut 
owing to Covid-19 outbreaks among workers. 
New labor market entrants
College students usually graduate in May and high school students in June. Although the 
labor market for new graduates is very weak, thus far, labor market policies have focused 
on assisting those who have lost work, not on those entering the labor market.  As shown in 
Figure 2, the unemployment rate for teenagers—which includes high school leavers—was 
nearly 30 percent in mid-May and points to the serious challenges facing new labor market 
entrants. 
Policy innovations and labor market trends
Virtually all state governors implemented mandatory business shutdowns in March and 
April and have since largely lifted restrictions, allowing most if not all businesses to reopen. 
There has been considerable variation across states in approaches to and the timing of 
re-openings, and because there has been no uniform national policy to govern the process, 
this variation is not always related to regional variation in coronavirus trends. 
Provided another major coronavirus outbreak does not materialize, the economy is 
expected to continue to steadily improve.  Nonetheless, many businesses likely will not 
be operating at full capacity until a vaccine or effective treatment is developed, and the 
Congressional Budget Office17 projects unemployment to remain high through 2021. As 
noted earlier, the federal government is permitting employers to use work share to rehire 
furloughed workers18, which has the potential to significantly lower unemployment and 
help reconnect workers to jobs. Furthermore, the CARES Act provides strong incentives 
for states to promote the program and for employers and businesses to use it: The 
federal government will pay for all short-time compensation benefits through 2020, and 
consequently state unemployment insurance trust funds will not be drained and employer 
unemployment insurance tax rates should not increase if employers use STC in lieu of 
layoffs; employees on STC receive a generous federal supplement to the unemployment 
insurance premium, making this option attractive to workers. 
Although there have been reports of strong interest in STC by both private sector and 
government employers, as noted, the weekly unemployment insurance reports suggest 
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unemployment benefits. Low use may reflect lack of familiarity among employers in the 
program. Prior research19 shows that relatively few employers in states with programs know 
about the option, and that this lack of information poses a major impediment to its use.  In 
addition, the process of setting up a work share program is more involved for employers. 
Just as unemployment agencies have been slow to process regular unemployment claims 
from individuals, state agencies have been ill-equipped to handle the surge of interest 
from employers in work sharing. In Michigan, for example, the state agency has increased 
staff to handle this interest and this is likely occurring in other states as well. Given strong 
financial incentives to use work share programs, there may be a significant increase in 
use of the program in the coming months.  It is also possible that states unemployment 
insurance agencies, whose staff have been overwhelmed during the current crisis, lag in 
their reporting on STC program use. 
Next steps and fiscal viability
The United States is at a policy crossroads. Three months into the pandemic recession, 
unemployment remains at historically high levels and Congress is debating the next round 
of legislation to give further relief to the unemployed, to provide additional liquidity to 
businesses, and to boost hiring. Generous federal supplemental benefits to regular weekly 
unemployment insurance benefits have been effective in providing financial assistance to 
the many low-wage workers who have been laid off, but these benefits are set to expire 
at the end of July. The fact that a majority receiving unemployment insurance earn more 
than they did while working has been highly controversial, and it is unclear whether these 
payments—or any federal supplement—will be extended beyond July. 
Another salient issue is budgetary problems20 faced by states. Unlike the federal 
government, which can run budget deficits, states must balance their budgets each year. 
High unemployment and a reduction in business revenues are expected to lead to large 
state budget shortfalls.  States, in turn, will need make deep cuts to services, which will 
have adverse spillover effects on the economy. So far, the federal government has provided 
limited assistance to states, and those funds must be directly tied to expenditures related 
to addressing Covid-19 issues.  This situation has prompted calls for additional, significant 
aid from the federal government to states.
It is likely that a new focus of this round of legislation will be on economic stimulus 
measures that will increase hiring through federal spending on infrastructure projects. 
The policy landscape is fluid, but reports suggest that federal budgetary expenditures in 
legislation that includes infrastructure spending could be large—possibly approaching or 
even exceeding $1 trillion. 
19 https://research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1081&context=externalpapers
20 https://www.upjohn.org/research-highlights/automatic-stabilizers-and-federal-aid-states
